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THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION IN ITS RELATIONS TO THEISM.*

[The following Address had been in preparation, by request, as a reply to one previously delivered by the then President of Sion College, before Mr. Darwin's death. I purposely dwelt chiefly on the *Cosmical* Evolution, as a matter on which scientific men are now generally agreed; and did not attempt to do more, in regard to *Biological* Evolution, than show that the same general doctrine applied also to it.]

THE subject on which I am to address you can only be profitably discussed, when the ground has been previously cleared of all misconception as to the relative claims and limitations of Science and Theology, and the boundaries of the two have been distinctly marked out. Dr. Martineau has told us that the object of Science is to determine the *Order* of Nature, whilst it is the function of Theology to determine its *Cause*; but this definition would not be accepted by those who find in the interaction of the *physical forces* a sufficient account of the phenomena of Nature; and I should rather define the province of *Science* as the interpretation of the phenomena of Nature from the stand-point of Physical causation, whilst Theology interprets them from the stand-point of Moral causation.

* An Address delivered at Sion College, May 15th, 1882.

Now, although the two conceptions we thus frame differ essentially in their aspect and character, yet, as I shall endeavour to show, they are perfectly consistent with each other.

The Scientific conception of Causation has recently undergone a remarkable change, which has scarcely yet received its formal recognition. Most of you, I presume, are familiar with the discussions by which the minds of the logicians of the last century and the first half of the present were exercised, as to its real nature. While Hume and his followers admitted nothing but invariable and unconditional *antecedence*, as the "cause" of a phenomenon, excluding altogether that notion of *force* or *power* which was expressed by the term "efficient cause," there has always been a school of scientific men, who have maintained that this notion is not only accordant with the fundamental instincts of the human mind and the uniform teachings of human experience, but is justified by the highest scientific reasoning. And I hold it to be not the least of the vast services rendered to Science by Sir John Herschel, that by constantly keeping this great principle in clear view, he prepared the way for that general recognition of it, which has latterly come about almost insensibly, as a result of those researches into the mutual relations of the Physical Forces, which have culminated in the general doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. For even John Stuart Mill, who was the most powerful upholder of the Hume doctrine, had come, in his later years, to perceive (what I had frequently urged upon him at an earlier period) that when the assemblage of antecedents is analysed, they are always found resolvable into two categories—the force or power which *produces* the change, and the material collocations which constitute the *conditions* of its exercise. Thus—to use one of Mill's own illustrations—although we speak of a man's fall from a ladder as "caused" by the slipping of his

foot or the breaking of a rung (as the case may be), the efficient cause is the attractive force of the Earth, which the loss of support to the man's foot brings into operation. And now that Heat, Light, Electricity, Magnetism, Chemical Affinity, and Vital Agency, are universally admitted to be only varied expressions of different kinds of movement among the *particles* of matter, sustained by the same agency as that which, when it acts on *masses* of matter, produces or resists mechanical Motion, the "efficient cause" of every phenomenon in Nature is sought in the action of one or other of these Forces, and the determination of the conditions of that action becomes the primal object of scientific inquiry.

The first result of this study is the recognition of *uniformity* in the action of these Forces; like results happening under like conditions; and diversities in the conditions being attended with corresponding differences in the results. And it is from observation and comparison of the conditions of the phenomena of Nature, that the materials are obtained for those general expressions of them which are termed *laws*. Thus, by letting fall weights from different stories of the leaning tower of Pisa, and accurately noting the times of their respective descents, Galileo was able to frame that very simple expression of the uniform relation between the space fallen through, and the square of the time occupied in the fall, which constitutes the Law of Terrestrial Gravitation. This enables us to predict, with what we call scientific certainty, how many feet a heavy body will fall-through in a given period of time; but this certainty has no other basis than our own confident expectation, that what has always (so far as our knowledge extends) proved true in the past, will prove equally true in the future. For the "law" has no power *in itself*; only by a false analogy with the law of a State, can it be said to "govern" or "regulate" the phenomena which it enables us to predict. In short, though

perhaps ninety-nine persons out of a hundred would reply to the question why a stone falls to the ground, "because of the law of gravitation," this answer would be only tantamount to saying, "Because *all other stones*, if unsupported, similarly fall to the ground," which is obviously no explanation at all. But when we express this general fact "in terms of force," taking as a fundamental fact of human experience the downward pull which we feel the Earth to exert upon every body which we raise above it by our own effort, we bring it home to our own consciousness of personal agency, which, as I shall presently show, constitutes the connecting link between the Scientific and the Theological conceptions of Nature.

The attributing to "properties of matter" the phenomena which we witness in the Universe around us, is only another mode of expressing the fact of those uniformities, which Science finds it convenient to employ, and does not give any other "explanation" of any one of them, than that which consists in showing it to be a particular case of a general fact. Thus, when the genius of Newton recognised in the deflection of the Moon's motion from the straight path into an elliptic orbit round the Earth, a phenomenon of the same order as that which brings to the ground in a parabolic curve a cannon-shot fired obliquely into the air, and extended the same conception to the orbital revolution of the Earth and other Planets round the Sun, he perceived that even these were only cases of the still more general fact, that *all* material bodies attract one another with forces proportional to their respective masses, and inversely as the squares of their distances, which expression is known as the Law of Universal Gravitation. Now the attributing this general fact to a universal property of mutual attraction inherent in every particle of matter, is really but another mode of expressing the same thing, a mere figure of speech, which no more *accounts for* the phenomenon,

than does its similarity to any number of other phenomena.

Let me illustrate this by reference to a "property" which is not universal. I might place before you two bars of iron, exactly resembling one another in every particular of which our senses can directly inform us, such as size, weight, external aspect, and internal texture, as shown by fracture; and yet one of them, under certain conditions, exerts powers of which the other shows itself to be altogether destitute. When brought near to a piece of iron, it draws it to itself with a force of which we become conscious in endeavouring to resist it; and even from a considerable distance it deflects a compass-needle from its true position, in a manner altogether dissimilar to that which happens when the other bar is brought near it. From observation of these facts, I can predict that if both these bars be buoyed-up so as to float on water, one of them will soon settle itself in a north and south direction, and will return to that direction whenever deflected from it; while the other will remain in any position in which it may be placed. And I distinguish the former as having "magnetic properties" of which the latter is destitute. Further, my knowledge of the laws of magnetic science enables me to predict that by moving the magnetic bar in a particular manner over the non-magnetic bar, I can render the latter also magnetic, or, as may be said, can impart magnetic properties to it; but as this cannot be done to a bar of gold or silver, copper or lead, we say that iron is distinguished from metals generally by its capacity for being magnetized. Now, this is clearly no *explanation* of the phenomena which we trace to the action of magnetic force; it is simply a general expression of one of the conditions under which that force is exerted; and the embodiment of our knowledge of those conditions into such general expressions, enables me to predict other phenomena at first sight

having no relation to them. Thus we have the scientific certainty that the magnetic bar, when moved within a coil of copper wire, will generate in that wire an electric current, which, when conducted to any distance, and made to pass in a coil of wire around a soft iron bar, shall render it capable of attracting iron, deflecting the compass-needle, and so on. Thus, to say that a piece of iron has magnetic properties, is only another way of saying that it is a magnet; but whilst the ancients only knew of a magnet as having the power of attracting iron, *we* know that it is capable of doing many other things; and of this capacity, the phrase "magnetic properties" is nothing more than a convenient expression, embodying the general fact that the piece of iron which is shown to be possessed of any one of them, possesses all the rest.

I might follow the same train of reasoning into every department of scientific inquiry, and show that what has been called the "promise and potency" of matter is nothing else than a phrase embodying a general conception of the various uniformities observable in its actions, and not helping us in the least degree to an explanation of those uniformities. But as the real significance—or, rather, *unsignificance*—of the term "property" becomes most apparent when it is used to designate the respective potentialities of different species of organic germs, I shall defer until the latter part of my address what I would further say upon this point.

One of the most remarkable among the many doctrines which have been recently propounded to account for particular groups of Physical phenomena, is that known as the Kinetic Theory of Gases; to which the eminent ability of the late Professor Clark Maxwell gave such a remarkable development, that, according to the statement of one of its ablest expositors (Professor Tait), it is "capable of explaining almost everything that we know with reference to the

behaviour of gases, and, perhaps, even of vapours." The application of high mathematical reasoning to the facts of observation seems not only to justify, but to necessitate, the conclusion, that the ultimate particles of all kinds of gaseous matter are constantly darting about in all directions, with enormous rapidity, and impinging not only against each other, but against the walls of any space in which any portion of gas may be enclosed; the rates of movement of the particles of different gases, and the number of their impacts against each other, being very diverse, though constant for the particles of each gas so long as its conditions remain the same. Thus the particles of hydrogen are moving at the rate of something like 70 miles in a minute, and every particle has an average number of 17,700 millions of collisions with other particles, by each of which its course is changed; whilst in atmospheric air (in which the mixture of oxygen and nitrogen has become so complete that it behaves itself in this respect like a single gas), the particles have an average velocity of only one-fourth of that of hydrogen, and the number of collisions for each particle is only half as great. But though the hypothetical assumption of these molecular movements in the gaseous particles, is said to "explain" all their sensible actions—such as their escape from the vessels in which they are imprisoned, and the uniform diffusion of one gas through another—it really does nothing more than carry us a step higher in generalisation. For supposing we accept this hypothesis as a fundamental fact in Physics, the question remains as to the *source* of the movements, and the nature of the *force* by which they are sustained. And it does not help us in the least to attribute them to an inherent activity of matter; seeing that our only conception of that activity is based on observation either of the movements or of the phenomena from which those movements are inferred; just as the old notion that "nature abhors a vacuum," merely expresses the general fact that air or water will rush in to

fill a void space, without giving us any understanding of why it does so.

It is not a little instructive to find that two such masters in the philosophy of science as Clark Maxwell and Sir John Herschel, agreed in the view they took as to the *ultima ratio* of any attempt to explain the constitution of the Universe by the "properties" of its component atoms. For any such attempt—as Sir John Herschel long since pointed out—lands us in the conception of a very limited number of *groups* or classes of atoms, distinguished by their several attributes; each group, however, consisting of an almost infinite number of *individuals* precisely resembling one another in their properties. "Now, when we see a great number of things precisely alike, we do not believe this similarity to have originated except from a common principle independent of them; and this conclusion, which would be strong even were there only two individuals precisely alike in *all* respects and *for ever*, acquires irresistible force when their number is multiplied beyond the power of imagination to conceive. If we mistake not, the discoveries alluded to effectually destroy the idea of an *eternal self-existent matter*, by giving to each of its atoms the essential characters at once of a *manufactured article* and a *subordinate agent*." *

Thus, then, whenever we witness any change in the material world for which we desire to account, we are led by scientific reasoning to seek for the *force* which produced it; and only when we have succeeded in finding this, do we consider that we have rationally explained the phenomenon. But whence the Force? Science now teaches us to look for the source of it in the transformation of some other kind of energy; as when the production of heat by the burning of coal is turned, in the steam engine, to the maintenance of mechanical motion, which, communicated to a dynamo-machine, generates an electric current, which, in its turn,

* "Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy," p. 38.

may be made to produce heat, light, mechanical motion, or chemical action. But, as Sir John Herschel pointed out, "In our own performance of a voluntary movement, we have a consciousness of *immediate and personal causation* which cannot be disputed or ignored; and when we see the same kind of act performed by another, we never hesitate in assuming for him that consciousness which we recognise in ourselves."

The Physiologist, above all others, is forced, as it seems to me, by the experience of every day, of every hour, and even of every minute, to recognise the mutual convertibility of Physical and Moral Agency;—the pricking of our skin with a pin producing a change in our state of feeling; and a mental determination calling a muscle (or set of muscles) into a contraction which generates mechanical power. And thus a bridge of connection is established between Physical and Moral Causation, which enables us to pass without any sense of interruption or inconsistency from the Scientific to the Theological Interpretation of Nature, as here formulated:—

PHENOMENA OF NATURE.

SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION.

Physical Causation.

FORCES OF NATURE.—Designations of varied modes of operation of *one force* acting under diversified physical conditions.

LAWS OF NATURE.—Generalised expressions of past uniformities observed in the action of the Forces of Nature, leading to the expectation of similar uniformities in the future.

THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION.

Moral Causation.

POWERS OF NATURE.—The designations of varied modes of manifestation of one and the same Personal Agency throughout the Material Universe.

ORDER OF NATURE.—The expression of the continuous and uniform action of a Supreme Intelligence, as apprehended by the intelligence of Man.

With these views of the relations between Science and Theology, I have never myself been able to see why anything else than a complete harmony should exist between

them. True it is that there have been, from time to time, Men of Science, who, from what I believe to be an equally limited and illogical conception of the subject, have drawn the conclusion that there is "no room" for a God in Nature; the "properties of matter" being, in their view, all-sufficient to account for the phenomena of the Universe and for the powers and actions of the Human Mind. But this seems to me only a natural reaction against what all history teaches, as to the constancy with which, ever since Science emancipated itself from Theology and set up for itself, it has been hampered and impeded in its search for the truth as it is in Nature, by the restraints which Theologians have attempted to impose upon its inquiries. The Romish Church, adopting the philosophy of Aristotle into its own theological system, opposed as heretical every attempt to call in question the authority of Aristotle, even as to matters of fact; and while it could not repudiate the proof afforded by the experiments of Galileo, that a weight of 10 lb. does *not* (as affirmed by Aristotle) fall ten times faster than a weight of 1 lb., it judicially condemned him as an impious heretic, for daring to teach that the Earth moves round the Sun. And Protestant divines in this country, equally taking their stand upon infallible authority, but shifting its basis from the Church to the Bible, have no less vehemently opposed any scientific inquiry which might throw a doubt upon the literal accuracy of the Book of Genesis. Thus it is within the remembrance of many of us, how the conclusions of Geologists as to the long succession of changes which had taken place in the crust of the Earth, and in the races of plants and animals which had peopled its surface, before the advent of man, were denounced as destructive of all religious faith; how, when obliged by the logic of facts to admit that the beginning of the world must be antedated indefinitely, theologians took a fresh stand upon the modern origin of Man, and did their utmost to discredit the evidence

crowding-in from all quarters as to his remote antiquity and the low condition of our primeval ancestors ; and how, when this evidence could no longer be gainsaid, they tried to uphold the universality of the Noachian Deluge,—with the miserable result of an ignominious surrender.

But I rejoice in the conviction that the true genius of Protestantism is now coming to be generally recognised as consisting, not in its opposition to the claims of the Church of Rome to infallible authority, but in its protest against any infallible authority whatever ; in its readiness to submit the basis of its religious system to the most searching criticism ; in its cordial welcome to every truth of science or criticism which has been accepted by the general voice of those most competent to decide upon its claims ; and in the freedom with which it surrenders such parts of its dogmatic systems, as prove to be inconsistent with those great fundamental verities of moral and physical science, whose domination over the educated thought of Mankind constitutes the basis on which alone the religion of the future can securely rest. It is not, in my view, by their re-assertion, with any amount of positiveness, of doctrines from which the educated thought of the age is drifting away, that the teachers of Religion will best combat what they designate as the “prevalent unbelief ;” but by showing themselves ready to profit by the lessons of the past, in regard to the futility of all attempts either to check the progress of inquiry or to stifle its results, and by placing themselves in hearty sympathy with the spirit of the present. Of that spirit, the noblest manifestation is to be found in the life of that great man whose departure from among us has drawn forth an expression of reverential sorrow, the universality of which speaks more eloquently than any words of the world-wide influence exerted by his thought. For in Darwin—as has been well said by one who knew him best—the *love of Truth* was more than his

animating motive, it was the *passion* of his intellectual nature. And its ultimate prevalence—whether including the acceptance or involving the rejection of his own system—was the firmest and most deeply-rooted of his convictions.

It is in this spirit that I ask you to follow me through the inquiry which constitutes the purpose of our present meeting.

I need scarcely tell those whom I am addressing that the general idea of Evolution is by no means new. A notion that the universe has not endured for ever in the form and aspect it now presents, has been entertained in all ages, and by all peoples of whose thoughts on the subject we have any record. In the Chaos of the old Greeks we have the type of confusion and disorder; in the void and formless waste of the Hebrews, the attempt to represent a primeval condition which could only be characterised by negations,

—a dark

Illimitable ocean, without bound,

Without dimension, where length, breadth, height,

And time and place are lost.

Out of this Chaos, divine power evoked order and harmony; the void and formless waste was made first to take definite shape in the separation of the firmament from the earth; the great lights were set in the one; the other was first clothed with vegetation, and then peopled with animated forms, beasts of the field, fowls of the air, fish of the sea; and last of all Man was called into existence, and dominion given him over all other creatures. And even those who at the present time regard the Mosaic Cosmogony as having an authoritative claim on their acceptance, are bound by it to regard Creation, not as an *immediate* but as a *progressive* act,—a gradual development, not the sudden springing of a complete universe out of nothingness. And this is equally the case whether the

"six days," each with its evening and its morning, are received in their literal sense, or are lengthened into indefinite periods of time.

Lucretius and other "atomic" Philosophers attempted to give a definite shape to this conception; but it first found really scientific expression in the "Nebular Hypothesis" of modern Astronomy, the combined doctrine of Laplace and the elder Herschel. According to this, the original condition of the universe was a diffused "fire-mist" of unequal tenuity; the mutual attractions of whose particles would cause its denser portions to gather round them the rarer matters of the intervening spaces, would draw together the smaller collections thus formed into larger clusters, and would thus "evolve" out of the universally but unequally diffused nebular matter a limited number of separate substantial masses. At the same time, the inequality in the movements of the different parts of the condensing fire-mist would impart rotary motions to the clustering masses, just as whirlpools are formed in water, or whirlwinds in air, by the action of opposing currents; and such rotation would lead to the detachment of the outer parts of the clusters, which would then draw together into planetary masses. These would retain their rotary motion round their original centres, whilst acquiring, in the act of concentration, a rotary motion around centres of their own, and in their turn giving off their outer portions to form satellites.

As regards the Stellar Universe, this hypothesis mainly rests on the observations of the elder Herschel, which led him to the conviction that besides the nebulae which the power of his telescope enabled him to resolve into clusters of stars, there are some which are still in the condition of patches of diffused faintly luminous matter, in which the process of condensation has scarcely begun; others smaller but brighter, whose central parts look as if they would soon form into stars; others, again, in which stars had actually

begun to form ; and finally star-clusters, in which the condensation is complete. Among the nearer stars, again, which he considered to form part of our own particular cluster, he distinguished many which are not clear points of brilliant light, but are surrounded by a more or less extended bright haze, such as would be given out by an atmosphere of nebular matter in a state of progressive condensation. And he pointed to what are known as "variable" stars, as affording evidence that the heavenly bodies are not permanently what they seem to us at any one moment, or within the limited period of our observation of them, but are undergoing progressive changes, the several stages of which are presented to us in the various bodies now visible in the firmament,—just as the several stages of any one human life from infancy to old age are presented by the members of a single community.

Now Laplace did not begin, like Herschel, with the Stellar Universe ; but aimed to give a scientific account of the evolution of the Planetary system from the atmosphere of nebular matter, which he, in accordance with Herschel's ideas, supposed to have originally surrounded the Sun ; and the train of reasoning by which he worked this out on the lines I have already indicated, was one of mechanical deduction from the Newtonian laws of mutual attraction and motion. That these deductions were not only in accordance with the ordinary conditions of the Planetary system, but were also applicable to the exceptional cases of the ring of Saturn, and to the intervention of a multitude of Asteroids, in the place of a single Planet, between Mars and Jupiter, seemed to afford the same kind of confirmation to Laplace's theory, that Herschel's had derived from the different degrees of condensation observable among the Celestial bodies. And the wide basis of observation on which the Nebular Hypothesis of Herschel was erected, commended it to the minds of many who viewed with dis.

trust the reasoning process by which Laplace deduced the Solar System from the supposed nebular atmosphere of the Sun.

I have never been able to understand why this doctrine should have been the subject of so much Theological opposition. It was said to have been framed by Laplace with the express purpose of "doing away with the necessity for a Creator;" but though others may have used it (as many are now using the Darwinian doctrine) as an instrument of attack on Theistic belief, there is no trace, in his own exposition of it, of any but that purely scientific conception of orderly sequence, under the constant and uniform action of Physical Forces, in which there is assuredly nothing Anti-theistic. Let it not be forgotten that Newton, the devoutest Man of Science that ever lived, was reproached by the Theologians of his time for setting up forces of his own invention as a substitute for the Power of God; a charge of which every one now sees the absurdity. And yet Laplace merely extended the Newtonian doctrines of Force and Motion into the past, by showing how, under their continuous operation, a diffused nebulosity would evolve itself into a Solar System. Whence came the mutual attraction of its particles, which aggregated them into masses, and gave these masses their movements of rotation, it was not for him—any more than for Newton—to explain. To Laplace it must have been apparent, as it is to us, that the whole of this process of evolution implies *a commencement*,—that however far back we go in time, we come to a point at which the mutual attractions must have *begun* to exert themselves,—and that as a universal but *perfectly homogeneous* "fire-mist" (the only condition under which it could have existed from eternity) could not *of itself* have broken-up into separate parts, some account has to be given of its *heterogeneousness*, the existence of which has to be assumed as the starting-point

of the process. Hence it is obvious that, however remote that point to which we trace in thought the history of our Universe, we are still confronted with the impossibility of accounting by Physical Causation for its commencement; and further, that if we find our only explanation of this commencement in Moral Causality, we do not exclude the subsequent perpetual agency of Creative Will, because in scientific reasoning we speak of it in the language of Physical force. To the clear-seeing Theologian, the evolution of an orderly Cosmos, not by a fortuitous concourse of atoms, but by the continuous operation of mutual attractions according to a law of sublime simplicity, should furnish (as it seems to me) the sublimest exemplification of an Infinite Intelligence, working out its vast designs "without variableness or the shadow of turning."

But, it may be objected, the Nebular Hypothesis of Herschel and Laplace has been disproved by subsequent research. One after another of the Nebulae, which Herschel regarded as consisting of unconsolidated "fire-mist," has been resolved by the superior power of modern telescopes into clusters of stars; and the mathematical reasoning of Laplace has been found not to stand the test of a rigorous scrutiny. This may be freely granted; and yet the general doctrine that the material universe has come into its present condition by a *process* of immense duration, and not by a single creative *act*, has received such a vast amount of support from new and unexpected sources, that I have no hesitation in affirming it to be accepted by all who are most qualified to judge, as having been now placed beyond the reach of discussion. Instead of starting from a hypothetical postulate, modern science reasons *backwards*,—in Astronomy as in Geology,—from phenomena presenting themselves to our own observation; and I shall briefly notice the *orders of facts* which seem to me of the greatest evidentiary value.

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First in importance among these, is the certain distinction which the Spectroscope now enables the Astronomer to draw, between the nebulae which are clusters of stars, and those which consist of glowing gas. To the latter class belongs that great nebula of Orion, which was long considered a sort of "crucial instance" whereon the fate of the nebular hypothesis was to turn. The prolonged and minute study which the late Lord Rosse had made of this nebula, with the unequalled power (for that particular object) of his six-foot reflector, had previously led him to this conclusion; but Spectrum-analysis has placed it beyond doubt; and the fact acquires a new importance when the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy is brought to bear upon it. For "a nebulous body, in order to shine by its own light, must be hot, and must be losing heat through the very radiation by which we see it. As it cools, it must contract; and this contraction cannot cease, until it becomes either a solid body, or a system of such bodies, revolving round each other." (Newcomb.)

Another fact of supreme importance, resting not only on the indications given by the Spectroscope, but on chemical analysis of the Meteorites, which have now been ascertained to be planetary bodies revolving in regular orbits round the Sun, but to be deflected from these by the Earth's attraction when we cross their path,—is the *identity in elementary composition*, not only among the bodies included in our Solar System, but throughout the innumerable solid and vaporous masses of which the Stellar Universe is composed. And it is not a little curious that a link between these two orders should be supplied by those wandering bodies—the Comets—of which many seem to belong to both; not properly belonging to our System, but presenting themselves within it as occasional visitors from the celestial spaces. Not only does this identity add immensely to the strength of the presumption as to the identity in Physical origin of the

entire Universe, but it also gives an entirely new meaning to the facts previously determined by Astronomy in regard to the relative specific gravities of the Sun and Planets. For whilst the Earth weighs more than five and a half times as much as a globe of water of the same bulk, Mercury rather more in proportion, and Venus and Mars nearly as much, the specific gravity of the Sun is only one-fourth that of the Earth, that of Jupiter a little less, that of Uranus and Neptune only a little above that of water, and that of Saturn so much *below* it, that if his globe were thrown into water it would float like a cork. Now so long as nothing whatever was known about the chemical composition of the heavenly bodies, it might be not unreasonably surmised that the several Planets might be composed of different materials. But now that we have evidence of their identical composition, their differences in density suggest differences in degree of condensation. And this suggestion derives a most remarkable confirmation from the fact, that the *greatest* density shows itself in those *smaller* planetary bodies which would have cooled the most quickly, and which have therefore more or less nearly reached their final stage; whilst the *least* presents itself in the *larger* masses, whose slower loss of heat would retard their condensation. The smallest planetary body of whose constitution we have any knowledge,—the Moon,—is the one whose consolidation is most complete; even the gases and vapours which form atmospheres round the Earth, Mars, and Venus, being fixed in its solid substance. And of the relative rapidity of its cooling, we have further evidence of the most convincing nature, in the intensity of the former volcanic activity, which shows itself in the multitude of gigantic extinct craters by which its surface is now made rugged,—that activity having been due (there can be no reasonable doubt) to the rapid contraction of a solidified crust upon a still molten interior. In the ring of

Saturn, on the other hand, we have a no less striking exemplification, not only of the mode in which the detachment of the peripheral parts of the planetary masses may be presumed to have given origin to their attendant satellites, but of that earlier stage of condensation which consists in the aggregation of nebular matter into such assemblages of small solid separate masses as form the Meteor-streams with which we are now familiar, and also (there is reason to believe) the trains of Comets. For mathematical investigation has demonstrated that the ring of Saturn, or rather the system of concentric rings, cannot possibly be *solid*,—that it is in the highest degree improbable that it can be *fluid*,—whilst all the conditions of its continuous equilibrium are satisfied by the hypothesis of its consisting of streams of separate small solid masses, revolving as satellites round their primary, which may itself be presumed, from the specific lightness of its mass, to be still in a somewhat similar stage of incipient condensation.

Again, an entirely new series of mathematical investigations is now being followed out, as to the effects at present produced by *tidal* action in retarding the Earth's rotation, and the conclusions that may be justifiably drawn from the backward projection (so to speak) of that retardation, so as to apply it to an earlier stage of the history of our globe and its satellite. And one of its results affords so striking a confirmation of the doctrine that the existing state of things is the resultant of a long sequence of previous continuous change, that I shall ask your special attention to it. Assuming that the Moon was once in a fluid state, the Earth's attraction must have exerted a most powerful tidal influence upon it; and the retarding effect of these lunar tides would gradually diminish the rate of that rotation of the Moon upon her own axis, which theory would lead us to suppose that she must have originally performed. At present, as every one knows, she always turns the same face

towards the Earth, in virtue of a rotation on her axis which occupies exactly the same time as her orbital revolution. Now, this phenomenon has been a standing puzzle to Astronomers. Of course, it may be said that the Creator, when he set the Moon in the firmament, ordained that she should for ever turn the same face to the Earth. But no man of scientific habits of thought could rest satisfied with such a notion. The probabilities were many millions to one in favour of some *physical* cause for so singular an effect; and such a cause has recently been discovered by Helmholtz, who has shown that the continuous retardation produced by ancient tides would at last bring the Moon into the only attitude it could permanently retain without being subjected to further incessant disturbance.

One more important evidentiary fact I have still to adduce, which forms the connecting link between Astronomical and Geological Evolution, and brings what may be now designated as the scientific certainties of the past history of our own globe, to bear on the history of every other body in the Universe. I refer to the determination of the *high internal temperature* of the Earth, which now rests upon so wide a basis of concurrent observations, that no one capable of scientifically appreciating their value any longer entertains the smallest doubt as to the fact. And this fact can only be rationally accounted for, as the result of gradual cooling of the entire mass from a temperature higher than that now possessed by its hottest interior, by the radiation of heat from its surface. For, as Sir William Thomson has tersely remarked, "If we were to find a hot stone in a field, we could say with entire certainty that this stone had been in the fire, or some other hot place, within a limited period of time."

Astronomical Evolution, then, lands us in the idea of a globe of molten matter, over whose surface a crust is beginning to form; and it is at this point that Geology takes up

the inquiry, and aims to give a consistent history of the long succession of changes which that crust has since undergone—in other words, to trace the “Evolution” of its existing from its primitive condition. Here, again, two distinct lines of inquiry may be pursued. One of these, leading us onward in Time from the assumed beginning, furnishes us with those great Dynamical conceptions, that help us to account alike for the vast movements whose evidence we trace in the elevation of continents and of mountain-chains, and for the local developments of heat which have shown themselves in volcanic action and in the metamorphism of sedimentary rocks; showing these to be the mechanical results of such inequalities of the rate of cooling of different parts of the surface, as may well be conceived to arise from the conditions of the previous condensation. The other, leading us *backward* from the present to the past, brings the various agencies which we know to be at present modifying the Earth's surface to bear upon its previous history; enabling us “in the fall of rain and the flow of rivers, in the bubble of springs and the silence of frost, in the quiet creep of glaciers and the tumultuous rush of ocean-waves, in the tremor of the earthquake and the outburst of the volcano, to recognise the same play of terrestrial forces by which the framework of our continents has been step by step evolved.” (Geikie.)

I cannot suppose any one I am now addressing, to be ignorant of the doctrine as to which modern Geologists are now, I believe, in universal accord—that of *continuity* of change (not necessarily of uniformity in its rate) throughout the entire period of the Earth's history. The old notion of universal interruptions, has given place to that of local changes analogous to those of which we have present experience; that of vast sudden convulsions, to slow progressive elevations or subsidences. The regular succession of stratified deposits, while interrupted in one portion of the earth's

surface, is found to be completed in another. And the same proves to be the case in regard to the succession of those organic forms, whose remains are preserved to us in those deposits. For Palæontologists have long since been forced, by the "logic of facts," to abandon the idea that in each of the successive "periods" marked out by the earlier stratigraphical Geologists, the Earth was peopled by a set of Plants and Animals peculiar to that period—many of these forms being traceable with certainty, in the same spot, from one "formation" to another; whilst, when they disappear in one locality, they may often be found to have migrated to another. And thus, before the introduction of the Darwinian doctrine, the old notion of a succession of entirely new creations of Plants and Animals, to replace the Floras and Faunas which had, one after another, been swept away from the entire surface of the globe, was giving place to the notion of *continuous succession*—certain species dying out from time to time, as they have done even within our own limited experience, and these being replaced by others, of whose origin, however, Science could give no account.

Now, putting aside for the moment the question of the origin of new forms of Organic life, I would ask you to consider what is the real Theological bearing of this general doctrine of Continuous Evolution, whether Astronomical or Geological. As I have endeavoured to make clear to you, the very fact of its *beginning* implies a Moral cause for that beginning; and the experience we derive from our own sense of effort in producing physical change, justifies us in regarding the action of what we scientifically designate the "Physical Forces," as the expressions of a continuously acting Will. Now, I fearlessly ask, which is the higher Theological conception,—that of the progressive unfolding of a plan conceived in the first instance by the Infinite Wisdom whose counsels have not changed because the end has been seen even from the beginning, and of the continuous exertion,

with persistent uniformity, of an Almighty Power, which "fainteth not neither is weary" during these countless ages through which we are carried back by our cultured Scientific Imagination; or the anthropomorphic figment, conceived in the lowest stage of religious development, of an Artificer beginning the work of Creation (according to Archbishop Usher's Chronology) on the 23rd of October, 4004 B.C., proceeding with its successive stages for six days, and then, fatigued with his labours, taking a Sabbath day's rest, during which the newly-created world had to go on as it best could?

Passing, now, from the Evolution of the Inorganic Universe to that of the Organic forms with which our globe is at present peopled, I must content myself with the general statement, that no one who possesses a competent knowledge of the facts brought to light by the ever-widening extension of Palæontological research, can do otherwise than admit that they tend strongly and unmistakably in the direction of the doctrine of *continuity*—maintained by "descent with modification"—in opposition to the doctrine of successive creations *de novo*. And this doctrine is found to be in such singular accordance with the converging indications furnished by every department of Biological research, that, to almost every unprejudiced mind, its truth seems almost irresistible. Thus the Zoologist and the Botanist, who have been accustomed to classify their multitudinous and diversified types of Vegetable and Animal life according to their "natural affinities," find a real meaning in their classification, a new significance in their terms of relationship, when these are used to represent what may be regarded with probability as actual community of descent. The Morphologist, who has been accustomed to trace a "unity of type" in each great group, and especially to recognise this in the presence of rudimentary parts which

must be entirely useless to the animals that possess them, delights in the new idea that gives a perfect *rationale* of what had previously seemed an inexplicable superfluity. And the Embryologist, who carries back his studies to the earliest phases of Development, and follows out the grand law of Von Baer, "from the general to the special," in the evolution of every separate type, finds the extension of that law from the individual to the whole succession of Organic Life, impart to his soul a feeling of grandeur, like that which the Physical philosopher of two hundred years ago must have experienced when he came to recognise the full significance of Newton's law of Universal Gravitation.

I find myself quite unable to understand why the doctrine of Organic Evolution should have been stigmatised as Atheistic. We have before us the every-day *fact* of the "evolution" of Plants and Animals of every type from germ-particles of a common simplicity; and, scientifically speaking, we must assign to each of these germs a determinate capacity for a particular mode of development, in virtue of which one evolves itself under certain conditions into a Zoophyte, and another (not originally distinguishable from it) into a Man. But if we do not, in so describing the process, set aside the Creator—any more than in scientifically describing the self-formation of a crystal—why should we be charged with doing so, if we attribute to the *primordial* germ that capacity for a particular *course of development*, in virtue of which it has evolved the whole succession of forms that has ultimately proceeded from it,—these forms constantly becoming more complex in organisation and more elevated in the scale of being? Attach what weight we may to the *physical* causes which have brought about this Evolution, I cannot see how it is possible to conceive of any but a Moral Cause for the endowments that made the primordial germ susceptible of their action. And of a *beginning*, we have even clearer evidence in the Organic than in the Inorganic world; since

it may be accounted as certain that there could have been no *Life* upon our globe, until its surface had so far cooled down that water could remain as a liquid in its depressions. And in the so-called *laws* of Organic Evolution, I see nothing but the orderly and continuous working-out of the original Intelligent Design.

There are some, however, who feel no difficulty in accepting the doctrine of Evolution as regards the Animal and Vegetable Creation generally, but nevertheless cannot bring themselves to believe that it is equally applicable to Man; whose place in Nature, it is contended, is *psychically* so far above that of the creatures which most nearly approach him *physically*, as to justify his being placed on a different platform. Now, I recognise to its fullest extent the weight of this objection; for whilst freely admitting (as the result of my own life-long study of Comparative Psychology) the possession, by many among the higher animals, of reasoning powers and moral attributes which are of the same *kind* as those of Man, however much below his in *degree*, I hold firmly to the conviction that Man, in his condition of fullest development, is essentially distinguished from them all, *first*, by his possession of a *self-directing power*, and *second*, by his *capacity for unlimited progress*. "The soul," says Francis Newman, "is that part of our nature which is in relation with the Infinite;" and I do not know what better definition could be given of it. And I should regard the possession of this "soul" as fully justifying the exemption claimed for Man, if it could be shown to be something distinctly added-on, at any given moment of his existence, to his previous capacities. The very contrary, however, is the fact, as I hope now to satisfy you.

Every human infant born into the world, began its existence nine months previously in the condition of a "jelly-speck," not to be distinguished by any recognisable

characters from what we may suppose to have been the primordial germ of the Animal World in general. This first evolves itself into an aggregate of cells, corresponding with that which represents a higher stage of Protozoic life ; and long before it shows any trace of the Vertebrate type of organisation, this aggregate shapes itself into a *gastrula* or primitive stomach—the common possession, at this stage, of all animals that rise above the protozoic condition, which is permanently represented in the Zoophyte. It is in a certain spot of the wall of this *gastrula*, that the foundation is laid, in all Vertebrate embryos, of that which is to become the brain and spinal cord, with its bony investment ; and this “primitive trace” of what is to constitute the essential part of the Human organism, does not differ in any essential particular from that of a Fish, a Frog, a Bird, or any ordinary Mammal. So, the early development of the Circulating and Respiratory apparatuses proceeds upon a plan common to all Vertebrates ; even the early Human embryo possessing the gill-arches which are to sprout into gills in Fishes and Amphibia, though they afterwards disappear in Man (as in Reptiles, Birds, and Mammals) with the development of the lungs and the diversion of the blood-circulation into them. When, in the progress of development, the distinctively Mammalian type comes to present itself, there is still nothing distinctive of Man ; in fact, the general configuration of the body is shaped out, and most of the principal organs have shown their characteristic structure, before the embryo presents any feature by which it could be certainly distinguished as *human*. And I may specially notice the fact that the *cerebrum*, whose great size and complexity of structure constitute Man’s most important differential character, is evolved as a sort of offset from the chain of Sense-ganglia, which is the real basis of the brain in all Vertebrates, and continues to represent it in Insects ; that it at first presents the small relative size

and simple organisation which we find permanently retained in the Kangaroo or Rabbit ; that, as embryonic life advances, it comes more to resemble the brain of a Dog or Cat, and then that of a Monkey,—the distinctly Human type manifesting itself last. This is marked, not only in the backward as well as forward extension of the cerebral hemispheres, but in the number and depth of the convolutions which extend the surface of their outer ganglionic layer, and bring it into closer relation with the capillary blood-vessels, on whose supply of oxygenated blood its whole subsequent activity is dependent.

Now, I cannot suppose any one of you to be ignorant of the fact, that the Human infant at its entrance into the world is *de facto* a mere automaton—its life-movements for some time being of a purely “ reflex ” character, such as may be carried on without even any exercise of consciousness. And for long after the child has begun to receive and register sensory impressions, has learned to understand articulate speech, and is acquiring knowledge of *ideas* as well as of objects of sense, any parent who attentively compares its psychical manifestations with those of an intelligent Dog will recognise the close correspondence between them. The uncontrolled dominance of impulses to action shows itself in both alike ; and in the training of one, as of the other, we have to make our appeal to the strongest motive. But the time comes when we can fix the attention of the Human child on the motive which he knows *ought* to prevail ; and in proportion as he acquires, by habitual effort, the power of regulating the exercise of his intellectual powers, and of controlling the action of his moral and emotional forces, in that proportion does he become responsible for his conduct, and capable of further self-elevation.

Thus, then, it is a *simple matter of fact*, revealed by continuous observation of the history of the Human indi-

vidual, that the very highest grade of humanity is only attained by a process of *continuous evolution* from the very lowest and simplest. For while his *bodily* evolution takes place in accordance with the plan common to the whole Animal Creation, the same is equally true of his *psychical*. The infantile condition is the same in all races of Mankind, and child-nature presents itself everywhere under an aspect essentially the same; but whilst in some races an arrest of development causes that nature to be retained through the whole of life, others present an ascending series of stages, that culminate in what we regard as the highest products of mental and moral culture. But even among the races which as a whole are most advanced, we find not individuals only, but grievously large numbers, in whom a bad heredity and depraved surroundings have tended to foster the lower animal nature at the expense of that which is distinctively human; and thus to rear a set of creatures which are morally far nearer akin to the brute, than they are to more elevated types of humanity. In these degraded outcasts we have the true types of *fallen* man; but it is now coming to be generally recognised by scientific men, that the early history of the Race generally, as now revealed by the study of its primeval conditions, has been one of *upward* progress; and that the time required to bring it up to the capacity for recording its doings, even by picture-writing, must be measured by thousands—not of years—but of centuries.

If, then, we have to trace back *our own* ancestry to a primeval type now represented by races whose limited capacity makes them incapable of receiving any culture much higher than their own (save through an education prolonged through many generations), why should we shrink from attributing to these last the ancestry to which *their* bodily and mental organisation distinctly points? And why should we assume, in the case of Man, a special *creative* exertion

of Divine power, when everything points to a *continuity of the same original plan of action*, that has previously manifested itself in the progressive evolution of the highest Mammal from the primordial jelly-speck?

To myself the conception of a continuity of action which required no departure to meet special contingencies, because the plan was all-perfect in the beginning, is a far higher and nobler one than that of a succession of interruptions, such as would be involved in the creation *de novo* of the vast series of new types which Palæontological study is daily bringing to our knowledge. And in describing the process of evolution in the ordinary language of Science, as due to "secondary causes," we no more dispense with a First Cause, than we do when we speak of those Physical Forces, which, from the Theistic point of view, are so many diverse modes of manifestation of one and the same Power. Nor do we in the least set aside the idea of an original Design, when we regard these adaptations which are commonly attributed to special exertions of contriving power and wisdom, as the outcome of an all-comprehensive Intelligence which foresaw that the product would be "good," before calling into existence the germ from which it would be evolved. We simply, to use the language of Whewell, "transfer the notion of design and end from the region of facts to that of laws," that is, from the particular cases to the general plan: and find ourselves aided in our conception of the Infinity of Creative Wisdom and Power, when we regard it as exerted in a manner which shows that not only the peopling of the globe with the Plants and Animals suited to every phase of its physical conditions, but the final production of Man himself—the heir of all preceding ages, with capacities that enable him to become but "a little lower than the angels"—was comprehended in the original scheme.

And, lastly, I would point out that the doctrine of

Evolution presents its greatest attractiveness, when viewed, not merely in its Scientific aspect, as the highest form of the Intellectual interpretation of Nature, but in its Moral bearings—as one which leads Man ever onwards and upwards, and encourages his brightest anticipations of the ultimate triumph of Truth over Error, of Knowledge over Ignorance, of Right over Wrong, of Good over Evil,—thus claiming the earnest advocacy of every one who accepts it as scientifically true. And it is under this conviction that I have now brought the subject before you; in the hope of, at any rate, weakening what I cannot but regard as the prejudices of some, and strengthening in others that disposition to regard it favourably, which its cordial acceptance by many of the ablest leaders of Religious Thought may have already engendered.

WILLIAM B. CARPENTER.

DR. KUENEN'S HIBBERT LECTURES.*

DR. KUENEN ingeniously discovered an unappropriated, but most important, aspect of the history of religions, from which to regard it in the course of Hibbert Lectures, delivered by him last spring. Dr. Max Müller had gone deeply into the question of the essence of religion, of its origin, original character, and subsequent development, till it reached the stage of nature-myths exhibited in the early Indian Vedas, which were his proper theme. Yet in all those preliminary chapters we look in vain for any allusion to a division of existing religions into those limited to one nation, and those that spread from one nation to be adopted in an unlimited circle beyond. And Mr. Rhys Davids, while treating of Buddhism, one of the universal religions that sprang up on the soil of one of the typical national ones, does not, as far as I can see, emphasize the distinction in question. To have avoided this precise aspect of the religious systems of the world is no reproach to either lecturer. They had abundant and overflowing matter without it; and Dr. Max Müller's object was to classify religions according to their internal character, not according to their history. But the consideration that so many courses had already been delivered on the history of religions without any discrimination of the national and the universal, makes us rejoice that

* *Lectures on National Religions and Universal Religions.* Delivered in Oxford and London. By A. KUENEN, LL.D., D.D., Professor of Theology at Leyden. Hibbert Lectures, 1882. Williams and Norgate.

Dr. Kuenen has seen fit at once to supply the want. It is a distinction on which all speculators on the history of religion will find it profitable to ponder, and which may therefore well be found fruitful by future lecturers on this foundation. It is here introduced, in the most natural combination, in connection with a course dealing with the pre-eminently national religion—Yahwism,* or the religion of the Old Testament, and with the universal religion that sprang from it—Christianity; illustrating the subject by a subsidiary treatment of the two other known universal religions—Buddhism and Islám.

All religions begin by being national, if indeed even this is not too extensive an appellation to bestow on the small tribe held together by the same religious ideas. The tribe speaks the same language, and therefore holds the same ideas, for ideas are conterminous with words. Others, however near geographically, not having the same words, cannot hold the same ideas. The religious ideas and the practices resulting from them must in the primeval age have been extremely few and simple. Every family, indeed, in patriarchal times, when the family-bond—in far later

* This term is perhaps the best that could be adopted for the religion of the Old Testament—the worship of Yahweh. Mosaism means the system of the Pentateuch; Judaism, the post-exilic system of the tribe of Judah, when they became “Jews.” But the spelling, at least, is open to question. It is my strong opinion that changes in orthography should be made systematically (in all words of similar formation or origin) or not at all. Until, therefore, we are prepared to transliterate the Hebrew י and ו in all proper names by y and w (writing Yoseph, Yoel, Yirmeyahu, Yeshayahu for Joseph, Joel, Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Hawwah, Washti, Evil-Merodach, Awwim for Eve, Vaahti, Evil-M., Avim), we ought not to introduce confusion by writing exceptionally *Yahweh* instead of *Jahveh*; if we do so, we obliterate all similarity to other names similarly formed from the imperfect tense (Jeremiah, Joseph, &c.), and act as perversely as one who should coin a new English word, based on a Latin *in atio*, and spell it *ashyun*, or *aishun*. Even as to pronunciation, there is no more reason for pronouncing the j correctly (i.e., as y) in *Jahveh* than in *Joseph*; or if any of us think there is, it should be done through special instruction about the word *Jahveh* being exceptional, just as is done without difficulty in the analogous case of *Hallelu-Jah*.

times regarded as the germ of the state-bond—actually was the state-bond, must have had its distinct religious rites. Of this we have many proofs wherever the separate life of the family has not been eclipsed by the later combination of many families to form a larger state—in the Latin gentes, the German and Norse clans, the Arabic families. When such adjacent clans had in progress of time found their common interest in dropping their separate existence, and gradually losing their dialectic differences of speech, and began to be fused into a larger nation, their language was enriched by the adoption into the common speech of words that had been the exclusive property of one only of the former clan; and, similarly, the ultimate religion was an amalgamation of the religions of all the clans. Thus a more complicated religion is the resultant, in which we shall not be surprised to find several distinct gods to represent each of the powers of nature or of the mind, and many distinct forms of ritual to propitiate the divine powers. In later times the separate origin of these deities, with similar attributes from distinct clans, is likely to be forgotten, and then systematising mythologists will attempt to discriminate them by their attributes—against the true history, if it could only be known; or, again, of two names, one will be accepted as the only true name, and the other explained away as an epithet. With such difficulties is the investigation of religions everywhere beset. As the original ideas, and even the language, of the early clans are generally pre-historic, or at best known only in very general outlines, it must in most cases be extremely difficult now to disentangle the complicated system. Who can say, for instance, what elements of the Roman religion are derived respectively from the Romans, the Latins, and the Sabines? or even what the Greeks owed to the Æolians, the Dorians, and the Ionians? Yet when once we recognise the fact that what we call the Religion of the Romans has been

brought together from these different sources, and is in no sense an organic whole, something can and must be done in this direction. Greater difficulties on the field of ancient history have been surmounted in epigraphy and in the recovery of lost languages.

It seems to result from this explanation of the origin of a national religion, that Dr. Kuenen's conception of it, while practically extremely useful in differentiating it from a universal religion, is not philosophically correct. If a national religion did not exist in the same form and extent from the beginning, but was itself the result of the fusion of many smaller religions—in which fusion, it ought to be observed, many earlier discordant elements perished altogether—then who shall set a limit to its power of absorbing new elements, even from perfectly foreign nations? We know that the Roman religion, especially under the Empire, did admit Syrian, Egyptian, and other foreign deities with their cultus; and it might be difficult to frame a rule by which these would be treated as extraneous accretions, while the earlier receipts from the Etruscans, or even the Sabines, would be admitted as essential factors; yet, if the latter are cast out, what is left to represent the Roman national religion? The solution of the difficulty seems to be found in objecting to the term National Religion as a description of any class of religions, or at least of those of highly civilised nations. It is to be objected to because it ignores the essential principle of Growth. A religion which has ceased to grow, to alter itself, to develop new forms, and to cast away dead and useless ideas and rites, is no longer a religion at all, but a superstition in the strict sense of the term—*superstes* from the time of its true life. The Nation itself does not exist through all centuries with the same dimensions; it grows on one side, falls off on another, according to natural affinities; and its religion is even less capable of being held

permanently within the same bounds. Indeed, the same impropriety attaches to a National Religion as to a National Church. The Church, as the institution embodying the religious ideas, appeals to the support of all souls united by a common faith, and experiences a loss of spiritual power as soon as she is tied down to one nation and made the instrument of one political constitution, no matter how enlightened or how generously disposed towards her.

The history of the formation of national religions, however, does not form the subject of Dr. Kuenen's lectures. He takes the term as *de facto* true of many religions which have never overleapt, or have never been calculated to overleap, the bounds of the nation in which they had their birth. And the only national religion whose history he actually presents to us in its full extent is that which is the most incontestably national of all—the Religion of Israel, from which was born in the fulness of time the most universal of all—Christianity. This is a connected history of the noblest types of religious thought and feeling known to the world, first national and then universal; it occupies the three middle lectures, and is preceded by an account of Islám, and followed by one of Buddhism—the two other religions which most plausibly contest with Christianity the title of Universal. The final summing up reminds us of the estimate previously made of the three great religions, and concludes with the comforting assurance that Christianity is the only one which is truly universal in principle and in spirit, and whose part in the religious influences in the world is not only not played out, but is destined to have a still greater future.

I shall not say much of Dr. Kuenen's treatment of Islám. He shows how much Mohammed owed to Judaism, and how he claimed to be restoring the ancient religion of Abraham. At the same time Mohammed cannot have had

any accurate knowledge of the Jewish Scriptures, for while he uses the names of Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob, he betrays ignorance of their relation to one another, calling Isaac and Jacob sons of Abraham, and classing Ishmael as a prophet with Elisha and Jonah; besides which he speaks of the book-rolls of Abraham and Moses, as if he supposed Abraham to have been a writer and legislator like Moses. The results of recent criticism on the Qorán enable Dr. Kuenen to distinguish between its earlier and its later chapters, and thus to discover changes of view during the lifetime of its author, which are often historically important. The Qorán, Dr. Kuenen asserts, is the work of Mohammed alone, and his alleged teachers have no real existence. Further, Islám itself cannot be regarded "as the result of a national, though not universal, longing for something higher and better in the matter of religion. If such a need was felt at all, it was only in a very small circle, and in a very small degree. In one word, remove Mohammed, and neither Islám nor anything like it comes into existence." Indeed, "Islám is in a high degree, and far more than most other religions, the product not of the time or of the people, but of the personality of its founder." The explanation of the success of Mohammed, though he seems not to have been a specially creative genius, appears in the fact that his nature was truly religious, and that he was fired by the indignation aroused by his countrymen's polytheism, superstition, scepticism and irreverence, to speak with irresistible force like an old Hebrew prophet in the name of Allah, claiming for his Qorán a place among the sacred books. Thus he regarded his mission as directed not to the Arabs alone or pre-eminently, but to all without distinction, and expected the adhesion of the Byzantine emperor and the king of Persia, so that in its conception in the mind of its author Islám is truly universal. But, in fact, it turned out very different. Mohammed was an Arab of the Arabs—

his eye saw nothing beyond his own country and the adjacent states and religions of the Eastern Christians, Jews and Persians; and his utterances are directed solely to the elevation of the ideas of those around him, and the correction of the abuses he knew of; and, worse still, he is tempted to allow, in his would-be universal system, mere ceremonial matters which were firmly established among his own people and could not be easily uprooted, but which give to Islám a narrow and local character which is certain to prevent its ever attaining to universality: so for example he makes the Ka'ba or black stone at Mecca the central sanctuary, to which it is the duty of every Moslem to undertake a pilgrimage. And by attempting to confine his entire system within the bounds of his book, he quite prevented any further development of religious thought. When, therefore, his religion was adopted by or forced upon nations who had already distinct ideas of their own, no real blending or assimilation was possible; and Islám becomes in Java "the official cloak that is stretched over native society," and in Persia co-exists with the ideas of the old Zoroastrian faith. More than this,

Though Allah is called by preference "*ar-rahmánó 'r-rahímó*," the Compassionate and Merciful, yet he is "*a god afar off*." The people knows no other than Him, and, therefore, observes the religious duties imposed by Him, and appears at the stated time in His house of prayer; but this does not satisfy the wants of the heart, and the people therefore makes itself a new religion. At the graves of its saints it seeks compensation for the dryness of the official doctrine and worship.

The same judgment must be pronounced, Dr. Kuenen says, on Sufism, or mysticism, as upon the worship of saints. It was necessary to satisfy the religious aspirations of some souls, but it is rather a divergence from, than a legitimate growth out of, the principles of Islám. Similarly the Free-thinkers called Mo'tazilites, who maintained that the Qorán

was *created*, and who endeavoured to establish Islám as an ethical religion, in opposition to the orthodox view of the uncreated Qorán and the God who was subject to no other rule than his own caprice, failed to move the already stereotyped religion in a direction which might have led to universality. And, lastly, the modern movement called 'Wahhábism is an attempt to weed out all later accretions, and revert with the greatest strictness to the precepts of the Qorán alone ; of which Dr. Kuenen says :—

The Wahhábites have been called the Puritans of Islám. The comparison is not unjust. But whereas no serious historian would ever dream of simply identifying Puritanism and Christianity, Wahhábism really is Islám itself—Islám, the whole of Islám, and nothing but Islám. And this is the very reason why it bears such strong evidence against the universalism of Islám. A religion which can be restored in such a shape, with a well-founded appeal to its genuine sources, may meet the wants of the inhabitants of the desert which witnessed its birth—but there are other and higher demands which it cannot satisfy ; indeed, it wants the power so to transform itself as to meet the requirements of a higher type of life which in its present form it cannot satisfy. At a given period it becomes a hindrance to that development of the spirit which it must actually choke if it [the spiritual development] be not strong enough to cast it [the religion] off.

It may appear, on considering this line of argument, as if Dr. Kuenen bore rather hard on Islám. Why should the worship of saints, Sufic mysticism, and Free-thought be treated here as illegitimate accretions, whereas under Christianity the identically same phenomena, together with monachism, the Papal system of having a permanent head of the Church, and other developments of which the Founder and the New Testament know absolutely nothing, are allowed as modes of expansion natural or necessary to a religion whose aim is to be universal ? If those accretions to Islám are to be pronounced illegitimate because Islám is not universal in spirit, whereas similar additions to early

Christianity are to be received because Christianity is, then *cadit quæstio* about universality. But obviously Dr. Kuenen cannot intend anything so one-sided or so foolish. His contention that Islâm was the product of one mind, and its possibilities were shut up deliberately by the founder himself within the corners of one book, justifies him, he considers, in pronouncing movements whose aim is to satisfy longings which are either not named or condemned in the Qorân, illegitimate, and in declaring a movement which would bring back the simple dry literalism of the sacred text, to be of the very essence of Islâm itself. Undoubtedly Islâm stands in this respect on a very different basis from Christianity. Jesus did not write a book; and his companions, if they wrote the books attributed to them, produced no fixed and complete system of Theology—very little, indeed, which can fairly be used for dogmatic purposes—only very imperfect biographical notes, and a number of letters on certain religious needs of some of the earliest Christian congregations. If therefore it is fair to judge Islâm by the precepts of the Qorân, by which it was to stand or fall, then at least Christianity is not tied in any similar way. And Dr. Kuenen decides that it is fair to judge Islâm thus. He is undoubtedly right from a legal point of view. Mohammed did what he could to restrain the free development of religion by making his religion co-extensive with his book. But is it altogether right to regard the entire subsequent development of Islâm from the standpoint of the wishes of the "pious founder"? Movements, political as well as religious, continually outrun the calculations of those who set them going; but we do not therefore condemn the founder, or say that his principles were wrong because they led to a fuller development than any that he could foresee. So here, though it may be true that the Sufites were mystics rather in spite of, than through, their adhesion to Islâm, and likewise that in

Mohammed himself and his book there was very little of a mystic character, yet I should hesitate to declare Sufism an illegitimate accretion. Mystically disposed souls will find anywhere something that they can read in a mystic sense, and the Sufites did find such even in the Qorán. In the Christian world, if there had not chanced to be among the early converts some one to write the Gospel attributed to St. John, the mystic element, which was to play so important a part in medieval Christianity, would be judged to be without any ancient justification. The capacity of, and the possible development inherent in, a religion which has a long history must be judged *a posteriori* by the facts of that history; the intentions of the founder, even when documentarily reduced to writing, as in the case of Mohammed, cannot have anticipated every possible development, and visited it beforehand with sanction or disapproval. It is indeed quite possible to go further, and to contend that the limitation of view was the necessary fault of the age and the locality, and that the same Mohammed, living in the nineteenth century, would omit many of the sayings which sound to us the most bigoted, cruel, or foolish, and speak in a different—a higher and purer—tone. Though it is impossible to prove the truth of such speculations, yet justice demands that we should not lose them altogether out of sight.

Dr. Kuenen next approaches the more generally interesting, and, intrinsically, also more important, subject—Judaism and Christianity. His contributions to the interpretation of the Old Testament, and especially to the true historical sequence of the forces which combined to form the religion of Israel, are well known in this country, first through the work of Bishop Colenso, who used largely his early work, "*Historisch-kritisch onderzoek naar het opstaan en de verzameling van de boeken des Ouden Verbonds*" (Historical and

critical investigation into the origin and collection of the books of the Old Testament), and still better through his later book (in which his views are modified and matured), translated as "*The Religion of Israel.*" The historical principles which guide him in his investigations are mainly these: When he finds in the historical books apparent inconsistencies, anachronisms, evidence of plurality of authorship, and of partisanship, which seems to throw doubt upon the truthfulness of the historian, he takes refuge in other books—especially in the Prophets, whose authorship is known and whose evidence is above suspicion—in which incidentally a good deal of history is contained, and endeavours to reconstruct the history from them. The result thus obtained is then compared with the picture given in the historical books, in order to discover the relation between the two classes of books, to discover the standpoint of the latter, and the reasons for their divergence from the picture presented by the former. With the historical books may be classed the Pentateuch, which exceeds all in the divergence of teaching of its different parts, and upon which scholars have worked hard in speculation for more than a century to classify its contents and assign them to their several authors. It might be expected that a perfectly independent source, such as the Prophets, would throw much light upon the composition of the Pentateuch; and this is really the case. It has done more important service here in a few years than the speculations of the previous century, which had no such solid historical basis. It has rendered antiquated even the arrangement of the Pentateuch made by Ewald, and essentially adopted by Colenso, and by Dr. Kuenen himself in his "*Onderzoek.*" Dr. Kuenen's principles of historical investigation will be recognised as essentially the same as those of New Testament critics, who study the undoubted Epistles of Paul as the oldest reliable documents of Christian history, and proceed with the facts thence elicited to determine the

age and authority of the more doubtful Gospels and Acts of the Apostles. It is obvious that his method could not have been tried while the authorship of the entire Pentateuch by Moses was an article of the creed of all critics. But it is no less evident that no advance in historical criticism was possible until some such mode of investigation as Dr. Kuenen's could be tried. And it need not surprise those who know anything of the innumerable inconsistencies of fact and of legislation discovered long ago in the Pentateuch, that Dr. Kuenen finds it to be not the product of one man nor of one age, but to be a complex, containing some of the most ancient sayings current in Israel, and constantly added to till the very latest age of the Hebrew history found in the Bible. Hence in these lectures but little use is made of the Pentateuch; more of the books of the Kings (Samuel and Kings), but most of the Prophets, whose age is known.

It has been said that Jahveh was the national god of Israel. No satisfactory theory derives him from any foreign people; and the prophets rely so constantly and confidently on the assertion that Jahveh is Israel's god, and Israel his people, that we feel bound to admit him to be the native conception of the Deity. Of course we deal solely with the historical period, commencing with the settlement of Israel in Canaan. Temples were erected to him in the earliest period at many places—Jerusalem, Beth-el, Dan, Shiloh—and ruder structures called "high places" all over the country; at all these sacrifices were offered, and at first any Israelite might perform the rite, but later there was a recognised order of priests to do it. In the regular domestic life Jahveh was remembered at all seasons: on the Sabbath, at new moon, at the feast for the rejoicing over the harvest, and at that for the shearing. Moreover, they consult Jahveh on every important event of life by means of an oracle, which is given by either a priest or a

prophet. Another sign, indicating how closely the idea of Jahveh as their god and protector was entwined with the whole existence of the Israelites, is the fact that their names were generally compounded with that of their god. This is the case with all the names that end in *jah*, and nearly all those that begin with J; to which class belong the great majority of the names of the Kings of Judah. This picture shows Jahveh to have been the national god, whom every class acknowledged, and to whom every individual in Israel testified in some way or other. Whatever evil might be said of Israel, it could not be affirmed that they failed to honour Jahveh.

But this is not the idea of the history of Israel that passes generally current. The current conception is that which the historian (especially of Judges and Kings) expresses when he moralises on the acts of a reign (as 1 Kings xv. 3-5, 2 Kings xv., &c.), and notably in the summary of the history at its commencement, in Judges ii. 7-23, and at the dissolution of the kingdom of Ephraim, in 2 Kings xvii. This conception is as follows:—A compact or covenant of mutual fidelity was made between Jahveh and Israel. To this the people remained faithful under Joshua; but after his death they went astray and served Baalim, were punished by Jahveh, repented under the force of affliction, and returned again to his service—to repeat the same process again and again. In Ephraim it was still worse; the people persistently worshipped the idols, would not listen to prophets who warned them of their folly, made two metal idols in the form of calves, performed idolatrous worship to Baal and the host of heaven, and sacrificed their children to Molech. And Judah imitated Ephraim in all this. The Chronicler gives essentially the same picture. According to this view the people were constantly idolatrous, and abandoned the service of Jahveh for that of Baal, Molech, Asherah, and other deities of neighbouring

nations, and a majority of their kings are distinctly named as taking the lead in these bad practices. Jahvism, therefore, is here *not* the national religion, but rather an ideal, conceived by prophets and exceptionally good kings, but too exalted for the common people. The national religion is pronounced by these authorities to be some form of Idolatry.

The explanation of the discrepancy is not difficult. The prophets (to whom mainly we owe the former picture) are far from being satisfied with the religious condition of the people, although they do not generally accuse them of abandoning Jahveh. But while the object of their worship was the right one, the mode of worship and the spiritual condition of the worshipper might be all wrong. And this is exactly what the prophets are never tired of saying. Without repudiating sacrifices and other ceremonies in honour of Jahveh, they declare that what he loves is mercy, and not sacrifice; that he even hates their ceremonial feasts in honour of him when the heart is foul and the hands full of blood; and that he threatens to destroy them if they return not from their wicked ways. The authors of the latter picture, on the other hand, which represents the sin of the people to be not an irreligious spirit pervading their worship of Jahveh, but apostasy from Jahveh, take the law of the Pentateuch, and especially Deuteronomy, for their measure of right and wrong in religious matters. Now that law confines offerings and feasts in honour of Jahveh to the Temple of Jerusalem, and imposes many vexatious and troublesome conditions. Those, therefore, that had presented their offerings in an irregular manner had not presented any that the legalists could allow for a moment—they could only be treated as idolatrous, or as going after other gods. Hence these legal historians describe the people as false to Jahveh himself. This is perhaps a sufficient account of the discrepancy; but what *we* want is to

penetrate to the actual truth of the case, not merely to account for the different opinions held by different writers. In this the prophets are our safest guides.

Priests existed as an order from the first, though without the exclusive privileges afterwards accorded to them, since at first any Israelite might offer sacrifices. They were all of one family, and called themselves sons of Levi, the tribe to which Moses and Aaron belonged; and all Levites were priests, not the "sons of Aaron" only. The priests' special duty is to teach the people the ordinances of Jahveh, to determine the cleanness of sacrificial beasts, and to adjudicate in the matter of slaves, lost property, &c. The crime of the priests in Ephraim, according to Hosea, was that, being the instructors or interpreters of the will of Jahveh, they had not given the necessary instruction (*thorah*). But besides priests there were also prophets of Jahveh, who were not necessarily priests, though Samuel and some others were both priests and prophets. The prophets were a recognised, but not an hereditary order; they were distinguished by moral earnestness and courage. They gave the strongest proof that the worship of Jahveh was a real, genuine, and living faith, and prevented its degenerating into a mere official system of an *opus operandum*. Their strong faith in the power and the desire of Jahveh to reward the good and the pious, and to punish the wicked and the idolatrous, led them to utter prophecy, often of the nature of warnings or threats on the one side, and of exhortations and promises of good on the other. Hence it is very natural that in the eighth century the prophets began to write down their words, thereby furnishing us with the most remarkable religious literature that has been preserved from the ancient world. The theme of it all is, that Jahveh is Israel's god, Israel Jahveh's people. Amos anticipates a restoration of the house of David, after which Jahveh will never pluck the people out any more.

Isaiah says, Jahveh will gather together again the scattered remnants of his people. Jeremiah says, Jahveh will make a new covenant with his people, and this time will write his word upon the living tables of their hearts, that it may never be forgotten. But these glorious results are only to be obtained through a radical reformation of character, which they all urge as primarily necessary. The prophets preach strongly against the conduct of the people, and demand repentance from the unjust judges, declaring that only the righteous and truthful shall be safe. In short, they give to Jahveh an abiding ethical *character* in accordance with which he must act. The moral *attributes* assigned to him by the people are much less impressive, and do not so strongly impel him into action. To the prophets therefore righteousness is higher than patriotism, and they can conceive of Jahveh taking part with Israel's foes to administer a much-wanted chastisement; thus the Assyrians are called the rod of his wrath, and Nebuchadnezzar Jahveh's servant. We may also observe a change of view introduced by the prophets. At first Jahveh had been the god of Israel—believed by the Israelites to be the most powerful of the gods, but still only one among many gods of the nations—Moab had Chemosh, and Ammon Molech—the existence of whom it did not concern them to deny. But in the prophets' eyes Jahveh was not so much mighty as *holy*, and this conception, ennobled by the higher ethical meaning given by them to holiness, raised him to a different order of being from the heathen gods, and thus brought about the conception that he was the Only God, while the heathen gods were merely Vanity—*i.e.* Nothingness—or had no existence at all. This monotheism is taught explicitly in Deuteronomy and Jeremiah in the last quarter of the seventh century B.C.

The Assyrians first brought Israel into close contact with the politics and the influences of the great outer world.

The effect was to introduce heathen rites under Ahaz and Manasseh. But the prophets stuck firmly to Jahveh; when it appeared as if his power was gone, they declared that his power was as great as ever, and that he was only chastising the kingdom of Israel for their sins through the Assyrian, and anticipated a day of glory for Jahveh when foreign nations would serve him; and the second Isaiah prophesies that the "servant of Jahveh"—the faithful in Judah—would be a "light to the heathen." The same prophet advances further into details, and describes Cyrus as the "anointed of Jahveh," "Jahveh's friend, who shall accomplish all his good pleasure," and before whom, as Dr Kuenen paraphrases the passage, "Jahveh will clear away all obstacles, and will give him wealth, in order that he may acknowledge that Jahveh, the god of Israel, calls him by his name." And the exaltation of Israel was to be accomplished not only by the humbling of his foes, but also by the general acknowledgment of Jahveh; as the same prophet says, "My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations." Thus had the purely national conception of Jahveh been gradually enlarged in the minds of the greatest of the prophets into Universalism.

But the minds of the people were not ripe for any such conclusion. Hezekiah's measures for purifying the worship vanished at his death without a trace. A more important attempt was made by Josiah, in whose reign a new *Thorah*—law, or divine instruction—the book of Deuteronomy, was suddenly announced to have been just found in the Temple—which modern historians interpret to mean (what is clearly the fact) that it had been recently composed. "Here," Dr. Kuenen says, "the prophetic aspirations of the time had found complete expression." But the writer, while making no change in the character of the sacrifices and feasts in honour of Jahveh, introduces one important novelty; probably through the experience that

the high places had served the purpose of maintaining a mingling of Jahveh-worship with the adoration of other gods, he confines the worship of Jahveh to the temple at Jerusalem. Yet this great attempt at reform, pressed by the king with all his authority, failed. Josiah was killed on the battle-field of Megiddo, and none of his few successors till the fall of the monarchy and the Exile supported it. In the Exile the ideas of the Deuteronomist made no way; and at the Return a very different system of legislation, drawn up not by prophets, but by priests, and conceived throughout in the sacerdotal interest (contained in the books of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers), was read aloud and solemnly accepted. This was the establishment of Judaism. The universalism of the *Israel* of the prophets was extinguished, and the particularism of the *Jewish* creed had triumphed.

Judaism—the religion of the Jewish people from Ezekiel to Ezra—was manipulated by the priests. It does not entirely set aside the works of the prophets, for there are points of contact between them—both insisting on the severe greatness of Jahveh, though the priest thinks less of his goodness, and puts him further off from man. Still, the religion of the priests differed greatly; its highest conception is that of holiness, which is another word for purity; and this includes material chastity or cleanness, and consequently means of expiation for uncleanness, which brings in a whole system of expiatory sacrifices, in which the priests themselves are the necessary agents. In spite of the greatly-increased power thus acquired by the priests, Dr. Kuenen considers, rather oddly, that the prophetic idea has really triumphed:—

The conflict between the two conceptions of Jahvism has disappeared. If in the days of Jeremiah they still stood off one from the other so sharply that they might be called with no great exaggeration two religions, they are now reconciled. And

it is the conception of the small minority that has triumphed. It is true that it has not issued unscathed from the conflict. Something of its idealism is lost, and it has been forced to clothe its spiritual ideas in a material form. The victory has been dearly purchased, but who shall assure us it could have been won on any other terms? We may rest content with the actual result. And yet in one respect we feel that we can hardly do so. Was not the religion of the prophets on the very point of spreading its wings to pass beyond the boundaries of Israelite nationality?

Dr. Kuenen's mind, it is obvious from this extract, is almost evenly balanced. It may well surprise some of us that his conclusion is not the opposite. I, at all events, will not "rest content," and cannot but regard the fact expressed in the last sentence as outweighing all that may be said in favour of purchasing peace by sacrificing the most life-giving principles of the prophets.

The Jews now became truly a peculiar people; they separated themselves from the people of the land, and allowed no intermarriage with these. Their principles became apparently rigidly national; yet not entirely so, since religion and nationality no longer went necessarily together, and the former retained the adherence of many who were indifferent patriots, and preferred to live in foreign countries. But the religion was simply the *Thorah*, now understood as the Mosaic law; and it became more and more legal with time, and demanded learned *Scribes* to interpret every precept. Now that Jews were spread over many foreign countries, the *Synagogue* had its origin, probably in Babylonia, either during the captivity, or after it among the Jews who preferred to remain there. It is to be noted that Judaism now adapted itself much more than previously seemed possible to the conditions of various countries—to the Greek civilisation especially at Alexandria, to Rome, to Babylonia. Notwithstanding its sanctity, the *Thorah* itself was translated into Greek.

Still, while the Jewish religious system was advancing so rapidly in the direction of legalism and exaggerated veneration for the Torah, the ideas of the Prophets also were not forgotten; the Scribes perpetuated their books by copying, and read and preached from them in the synagogue. And we find them to be by no means unknown; on the contrary, Jesus, son of Sirach, glorifies Isaiah, and expressions implying the universalism of the prophets are found in late Psalms. Strangers to the race of Israel are now by the sacerdotal Torah allowed to form part of the political community, though not received into Israel. And probably many did settle there, as they are henceforth known by a special term, *Proselytes*.

The conditions are now approaching which enabled a religion of universalist principles to be developed out of Judaism. Although it may be said that the Judaism of that age grew into Talmudism, yet it is equally true that Christianity was developed out of it. The Judaism of the age of Christ was its indispensable antecedent. It is an important question, which kind of Judaism it was that produced Christianity—Palestinian or Hellenistic? Dr. Kuenen, appreciating highly the philosophical ideas of the Hellenistic Jews, especially Philo, considers, nevertheless, that they have a certain artificiality and affectation which makes them utterly unable to be the source of a religion, although they might, and did, strongly influence the theology of that religion not long after it was once established. The Essenes are next to be considered, and these also Dr. Kuenen rejects still more summarily, mainly on the ground that "the formation of a small and strictly closed society to realise the ideal of ceremonial purity has nothing Christian in it; and conversely the Christian propaganda for the rescuing of sinners is in no way Essenic." The centre of Palestinian Judaism is found in the Pharisees. They were the diligent followers of the teachings of the Scribes, whose

prime endeavour was to observe the law most strictly, and realise righteousness through its precepts. It must not be supposed that the Scribes cared not for general ethical principles, such as those of the prophets: many very fine sayings are quoted from them; but they were not really free to act upon them, as they were pledged to the observance of all the minute precepts of the Law, and the breadth of the one was quite incompatible with the narrowness of the other. The Pharisees and Scribes, however, while so careful about their personal habits, do not seem to have undertaken missionary work to make their poor and ignorant brethren understand their ideas of religious duties; on the contrary, they were only a few thousand people, highly respected for doing what they themselves believed that all ought to do. Still, the more spiritual prophetic religion was not extinct, and was doubtless often preached by the Scribes themselves to the poor ignorant multitude that knew not the Law. The Messianic idea is prominent in these times, being retained especially among the Pharisees and their followers. It has an inspiring effect, and nerves the Jews to great efforts and to great personal sacrifices, even death for the faith, or rather the Law. Proselytism is a new feature of the time; great numbers, especially in heathen countries, joined the Jews. The wall of partition seemed to be broken down; Judaism was ready to undergo a transformation into a world-wide religion. The other essential factor in the production of Christianity is the personal character of Jesus, of whom Dr. Kuenen simply says that, the prophetic ideas having proved themselves, after all the struggles, the permanent ones,

It seems then to lie in the nature of the case, that in the transition from the national to the universal the chief part is reserved for the prophet. What Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah and "the great Unknown" had begun, it was reserved for Him to finish.

I have here summarised Dr. Kuenen's survey of Hebrew history; even in this epitome it will be found very suggestive, since, although it deals with a history which we have all read, it puts so new a face on it that it is difficult to recognise it as the same. But, when recognised and understood, it may be found to show the cause and effect of things which before seemed very arbitrary; and to distinguish as mutually opposed things which we had been taught to consider of similar character and equally good—the precepts of the priests and of the prophets, for instance. The full account, and the justification of the assertions, must be sought in the book itself, which abounds with references to sources, and has several important notes at the end. I must however touch on one or two points which surprise me in Dr. Kuenen's exposition—I cannot say on which I hold a different opinion, for I estimate so highly his learning and his sobriety of judgment, that I fancy even here that he may be right in a way that I understand not.

The explanation of the discrepancy between the prophets' and the priests' conceptions of the history seems to me questionable. Would the author of the Book of Kings have treated sacrifices offered to Jahveh, but in an irregular way, *i.e.* at an improper place, as equivalent to sacrifices offered to idols, and have said with reference to them that the people left the service of Jahveh? I think not; and on the evidence of his own words. He does not confuse together all forms of worship which fail to come up to his highest standard under one general term, such as idolatry; on the contrary, he discriminates very carefully between various grades of impropriety. Thus, of the nineteen Kings of Judah after Solomon, he pronounced eleven to have been bad, and eight good. But of those that he calls good, he allows only two (Hezekiah and Josiah) to have been as good as David, in that they destroyed the high places (which he

does not pretend were used for idolatrous worship, but implies that they were seats of Jahveh-worship, 2 Kings xxiii. 8, 9; the high places in v. 13 he distinguishes from these as idolatrous), and abolished all idolatry and paganism. The six others are allowed to be good, but in a lower degree, because while not addicted to idolatry (and Asa is expressly stated to have removed the idols), they had not interfered with the high places; and two, Amaziah and Jotham, are stated to have been each as good as his father. Among the bad kings a gradation seems also to be observed. The palm of wickedness is borne by Rehoboam, Ahaz, and Manasseh, who were the most actively and conspicuously idolatrous, and this in an accelerating ratio from the first to the last. The others were bad by imitation—Abijam acting like Rehoboam, Jehosam like the Kings of Israel, Ahaziah like the house of Ahab, Amon entirely like Manasseh, Jehoahaz, Jehoakim, and Jehoachin according to all that their fathers did, and Zedekiah like Jehoakim. Among the kings of the northern kingdom also, though they are more uniformly pronounced bad, a discrimination is also observable. The first, Jeroboam, is bad because he led the revolt which divided Israel, but especially because of the two golden calves which he placed as objects of worship at Beth-el and Dan, and because he set up non-Levitical priests. Almost all the others are pronounced bad because they "departed not from the sins of Jeroboam," which are defined in 2 Kings x. 29 to mean the golden calves. These calves in a certain sense correspond to the high places in Judah; they do not seem to imply actual pagan worship, and have been supposed by some with much probability to represent an idolatrous form of Jahveh-worship. Indeed in the case of Jehu, their retention is almost condoned; he is not called bad, and he was zealous in abolishing idolatry, but yet sinned, like Jeroboam, in respect of the calves. Jehoram also, though called bad, is stated not to have been bad like the terrible idolaters

Ahab and Jezebel; and he put away the image of Baal, though not the calves. And the last King, Hoshea, is called bad, though not in the same way as the Kings of Israel before him. From all this we see that the historian, though looking at the history with the eye of a priest of the Levitical order, had not so lost the sense of proportion among offences of a religious nature as to condemn all alike who offended against the Levitical rules of worshipping only in the Temple at Jerusalem. I rather marvel at his taking such pains to decide the exact amount of praise or blame to be attributed to acts which in his view were all criminal. The worship of Molech (making one's son to pass through the fire) he justly, on purely moral grounds, regards with the most horror of all; next to that comes the worship of Baal, then the Asherah, then idolatry in general; while, as we have seen, the high places in Judah and the golden calves in Israel are only very slightly condemned. If the "discrepancy" is not to be explained in Dr. Kuenen's way, I do not know that we are bound to explain it at all. It exists as a fact; the prophets' picture of the religion is the older and more credible, as has been shown by no one better than Dr. Kuenen; while the priestly history is a retrospect in which the priests very naturally read into old times the ceremonial laws under which they themselves lived, as is the case (to take a far more flagrant instance) with the Levitical legislation of the Pentateuch, by them actually ascribed to Moses!

We should observe also the use which Dr. Kuenen makes of the Psalms. The titles prefixed to most of them, naming David and others as authors, form no part of the Psalms themselves, and are of uncertain date and authority; most modern scholars reject their authority for determining date or authorship. Thrown upon the allusions in the text for fixing the date, critics have, as might be expected, diverged into both extremes—some assigning many to the earliest

possible date, that of David, and others believing that a large proportion belong to the age after the Captivity and down to that of the Maccabees. Dr. Kuenen quotes freely from the Psalms, and even from some which are usually set down to an early date, in illustration of the state of things after Ezra; Ps. xxii., xlvii., lxviii., and lxxxvii. are so used. He is, therefore, in favour of a late origin; we should like to know whether he considers the frequent allusion to the "House of Jahveh" always to refer to the second Temple, and if so, why there are no psalmists in the period of the Kings to celebrate the Temple of Solomon? I do not venture here to pronounce an opinion, but wish only to call attention to an interesting historical and literary question that is certainly not settled.

I cannot follow the ingenious argument which Dr. Kuenen uses with respect to Malachi, to prove that in i. 11—

The reference is distinctly to the adoration already offered to Jahveh by the peoples, whenever they serve their own gods with true reverence and honest zeal. Even in Deuteronomy the adoration of those other gods by the nations is represented as a dispensation of Jahveh. Malachi goes a step further, and accepts their worship as a tribute which in reality falls to Jahveh, —to Him, the Only True. Thus the opposition between Jahveh and the other gods, and afterwards between the one true God and the imaginary gods, makes room here for the still higher conception, that the adoration of Jahveh is the essence and the truth of all religion.

In Deuteronomy such universalism might, from the prophetic spirit of the book, not surprise us much, as it might seem to be in accordance with the general mercy and care for the rights of others so conspicuous there; but in truth the three passages quoted thence seem not to bear this interpretation except by a very forced induction. Deut. iv. 19, which warns the Israelites against worshipping the

host of heaven, does not say that Jahveh has given these to *other nations as objects of worship*, but that he has assigned them to *all nations under the whole heaven*, therefore including Israel (but evidently not for worship). And as to Malachi, such universalism seems to be in direct contrast with his teaching. He represents Jahveh, more strongly perhaps than any other writer, as favouring Israel specially, notwithstanding Israel's undeservingness (i.), and as determined to hold a great judgment, and to punish the wicked (iii. 5, &c.), and yet to retain his favour to Israel (iii. 6—12). And while accusing the priests of all possible greed and venality (i. 6—ii. 10), he promises to purify their order, not to destroy them (iii. 3, 4). Verse i. 11 (the verse quoted as showing universalism in this very narrow and priestly writer) certainly seems to stand very oddly in the midst of this argument:—"For from the rising of the sun to its setting, my name is great amongst the heathen, and in all places is incense offered to my name and a pure sacrifice, for my name is great among the heathen." One thing is clear: that it is the name of Jahveh *as opposed to heathen gods*, which is here declared to be venerated in heathen countries. Jahveh says here—"Though ye, whose god I am, condemn me, and do not even bring clean sacrifices, yet I am a great god, and am acknowledged as such in heathen countries." This must refer to the growing respect for the Jewish religion in the time of the second Temple—perhaps to proselytism in foreign countries, and rather to a growing respect for the Jewish god in his own person than to a declaration that he is after all much the same as Ahuramazda or Zeus. The incense and sacrifice offered in foreign countries would of course not be according to the Levitical law; but foreign proselytes would not know that.

Dr. Kuenen's last lecture contains a survey of Buddhism,

that great world-religion which has so far outrun the nation of its origin, and spread itself so wide without finding any impediment from national characteristics, that it seems to contest with Christianity the epithet Universal. I cannot enter into the details, which will scarcely bear epitomising, but will only give his general results and the instructive parallels or contrasts which he draws between Buddhism and Christianity. The legendary life of the Buddha he treats as purely imaginary, or at best only to be partly inferred from the tone of the community that he founded. This community he shows to be a purely monastic institution, the principle of which was seclusion from the world, with its strife and troubles, and the cultivation of a spirit of quietism, which had no longer any desires nor any preference for one thing rather than other, even in the realm of morals, since such preferences are the source of mental excitement and dispute, and therefore inconsistent with true toleration and true quiet of spirit. He sums up—

Buddhism sprang from an Indian monastic order. Asceticism—more specifically the Brahmanic contemplative asceticism—was the connecting link between the national and the universal religion. . . . Buddhism has succeeded in taming barbarians, and still shows itself admirably calculated to assist in maintaining order and discipline; but has it ever supported a people in its endeavours after progress, in its recuperative efforts when smitten by disaster, in its struggle against despotism? No such instances are known. And indeed we had no right to expect them. Buddhism . . . *turns away* from the world on principle. Let us reckon fully with the meaning and the ultimate consequences of this principle. It must and it does result in absolute quietism—nay, even indifferentism. . . . Buddhism raises the rejection of every affirmation to the rank of a principle. . . . We gratefully observe that at first compassion overbore quietism. But that quietism, in its turn, has at last maimed compassion, who shall wonder?

Dr. Kuenen thus expresses the contrast between Buddhism and Christianity—

In Buddhism there is monasticism from the first. In Christianity it appears later on, and only gradually; and, in the face of opposition, wins the place which it occupies in Catholicism. And this is no mere chronological difference. There could be no Buddhism without "bhikshus" [begging friars]—there is a Christianity without monks. . . . But it is not only as regards its *form* that the special characteristic of Christianity is explained by its origin. To its birth from the *Jewish*, in distinction to every other nationality, it owes an essential portion of the *content* to which it has never been untrue amidst all the changes which it has undergone. . . . Buddhism, in the first place, misses the aggressive character which Christianity has always displayed—outwards towards the unbelievers, and inwards towards the heretics. Why so? Whence comes it that Christianity, in contradistinction to Buddhism, has too often been promulgated by force, and has failed to characterise itself, like the other, by unlimited toleration? Because the Christian's God was Israel's Jahveh, "compassionate, gracious, long-suffering, and plenteous in mercy," aye, the Father in heaven, but yet "a jealous God," who will endure "no other gods before his face," is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity," and still from time to time "a consuming fire." . . . We cannot regard the combative character of Christianity as a simple defect and disaster. Let us reflect that Buddhism would never have been, as it was, toleration itself, had it been any less sceptical and quietistic. . . . But whatever difference of feeling may remain as to this point, we shall all be at one with respect to the second inheritance from Israelitism. It is the belief in the triumph of Jahveh over everything that opposes him, the expectation of the kingdom of God, the confident trust in the realisation of the moral ideal. This is what Buddhism does not possess, and therefore cannot give. It is a blank which cannot be filled, and which nothing can compensate! The conception of the kingdom of God, one of the chief factors in the genesis of Christianity, remains through all the ages its best recommendation and its greatest might.

And, in conclusion—

Universalism as a fact and as a quality;—if we bear this distinction in mind, and proceed to review the three religions of the world, noting not their extension and the number of their confessors, but their character, we can have no hesitation in pronouncing Christianity the most universal of religions; and that because it is the best qualified for its moral task—to inspire and consecrate the personal and the national life.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

JUSTIN'S USE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.—II.

III. SIMILARITIES OF LANGUAGE BETWEEN JUSTIN AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL (*continued*).

(c) It is inferred from the following passage (*Dial.* 88) that, since Justin puts into the mouth of John the Baptist the words, "I am not the Christ, I am the voice of one crying," he must have had before him John i. 20, 23: "And he confessed . . . *I am not the Christ*. Then said they unto him, Who art thou? . . . He said, *I am the voice of one crying* in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord."

The context of the passage is of importance, and may be summarised thus: After the baptism of Christ, when he went down into the water, not only was fire kindled on the Jordan, but also, when he rose up from the water, the Apostles of this very Christ of ours wrote that the Holy Spirit, as a dove, hovered over (or, flew to) him (*ἐπιπτήῃαι ἐπ' αὐτόν*). And when men began to suppose that John the Baptist was Christ, he cried to them, "*I am not the Christ, but the voice of one crying* : for there shall come he that is stronger than I, whose sandals I am not fit to bear? Also when Jesus came to the Jordan and was supposed to be the son of Joseph the Carpenter, and appeared devoid of beauty (*ἀειδοὺς*), as the Scriptures predicted, and was thought to be a carpenter—for when he was among men he wrought the following carpentry, viz., ploughs and yokes, thereby teaching symbols of righteousness and an active life—

hereon, I say, the Holy Spirit both lighted on him (*ἐπέπη αὐτῷ*) for the sake of men, as I said above, and at the same time there came a voice from heaven, which had also been uttered by David, Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee, declaring that his generation took place for men" [*i.e.*, possibly, so far as the knowledge of men was concerned] "at that time from which the knowledge of him was destined to begin."

Justin here tells us (besides recording the descent of the dove, for which he expressly appeals to written and apostolic testimony) (1) that a fire appeared on the Jordan; (2) that John described himself as the Voice, and denied that he was the Christ; (3) that Christ was devoid of beauty; (4) that he made yokes and ploughs as a carpenter; (5) that the voice from heaven declared that Christ was that day begotten of God. Of these five traditions the fifth is expressly contrary to the testimony of the Synoptists; the first, third, and fourth are apocryphal;—what conceivable grounds, then, does this passage afford for supposing that one only of these five traditions, the second, was believed by Justin to rest on the authority of a document composed by one of the foremost of the apostles?

One of these traditions (which might naturally have arisen from the connection of the baptism of Jesus with "the Holy Spirit and fire") is found in the seventh Sibylline book, probably composed after the time of Hadrian in the second half of the second century (*i.e.*, about the time of Justin's writing), wherein (vii. 84, and vi. 6) the poet described how the Holy Spirit "hovered over him" (*ἔπτατο πνεῦμα ἐπ' αὐτῷ*), and also connects the baptism of Christ in both cases with "fire" (*σὸν βάπτισμα δι' οὐ πυρὸς ἐξεφαάνθη*), and a similar tradition is said by Epiphanius (*Hæres.* xxx. 13) to have been contained in the Gospel of the Ebionites that "a great fire shone round the place." But will any one consequently maintain that this

passage proves that Justin regarded as Apostolic the sixth or seventh Sibylline book, or the Gospel of the Ebionites? The fifth tradition arose naturally from a desire to suit the voice from heaven to the words of Psalm ii. 7, which are quoted by Justin above, and which were so early interpolated into the text of Luke that they are bracketed by Westcott and Hort in the margin. The third tradition, that Jesus was "without *form*, i.e., beauty" (*ἀειδής*), is easily derivable from the language of prophecy of Isaiah (liii. 2) that the Messiah "had *no form* or comeliness" (*οὐκ εἶχεν εἶδος*). The fourth, that Jesus "made yokes," may be easily explained from its suitability to the Carpenter who said to mankind, "Take my yoke upon you." These four traditions, then, being thus easily explicable, if we can show that the remaining one is also natural and explicable, we ought to be prepared to believe that Justin probably accepted it as a tradition on the same level—possibly, indeed, a tradition already incorporated in the Fourth Gospel, but not on that account recognised by Justin as anything more authoritative than a tradition.

To show this, let us consider a similar quotation, also about John the Baptist. Mark introduces his Gospel by a quotation in his own person—"The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God, as it is written in the prophets, Behold I send my messenger, &c." Matthew and Luke, on the other hand, place this quotation in the mouth of Jesus Himself (Matt. xi. 10; Luke vii. 27). Those who believe that Mark represents the earliest Synoptic tradition will find no difficulty in seeing the naturalness of a change which takes a prophecy thus out of the framework of the picture, as it were, and inserts it in the picture itself; and, indeed, the prophecy is so connected by Matthew with the words of John himself that it might very well seem, at first sight, to have been uttered by the Baptist, speaking of himself in the third person: "John came

preaching . . . and saying, Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand; for this is he that was spoken of by the prophet Esaias, saying, The voice," &c. (Matt. iii. 1—3). How natural for early Christian teachers, feeling the importance of subordinating the teaching of the Baptist to the teaching of Christ, to take these latter words as the Baptist's own confession that he was but a Voice to prepare the way for the Messiah! And as to the negative part of the tradition, in which Justin is supposed to have borrowed from the Gospel, we can see it already in growth in Acts xiii. 25 (W. and H.'s text), where John is made to say, "What do ye suppose (*ὑπονοεῖτε*) me to be? I am not he." How similar is this to the tradition of Justin: "When men began to suppose (*ὑπελάμβανον*) that John the Baptist was Christ, he cried to them, I am not the Christ"! But obviously the tradition could not stop here. It was necessary that the Baptist should not only say what he was not, but also what he was; and thus, the negative and the positive traditions being blended together, we have Justin's version of the tradition: "I am not the Christ, but the voice of one crying," while in the Fourth Gospel the same tradition is differently expressed in two answers to two different questions.

From all this it seems to follow, 1st, that Justin may have been here borrowing, not from the Fourth Gospel, but from some tradition to which he and the Fourth Gospel are both indebted; 2nd, that if Justin is borrowing from the Fourth Gospel he probably regarded that Gospel as unauthoritative, and on a level with tradition rather than with "the Memoirs."

(d) (*Apol.* I. 63) Justin says that Isaiah (i. 3) accused his countrymen of not knowing God; and then, according to his plan of showing everywhere that "what the prophets proclaimed Jesus taught," he wishes to show that Jesus in the same way accused the Jews of not knowing the Father

and the Son. Now the Fourth Gospel contains just such passages as are applicable to Justin's purpose; for in that Gospel Jesus says to the Jews (viii. 19), "Ye neither know me nor my Father;" and of the Jews (xvi. 3), "They have not known the Father nor me." But, instead of quoting either of these passages, Justin quotes a passage from Matthew and Luke where Jesus does not address "the Jews" at all, nor does he speak about the Jews definitely, but is represented as in these general terms apostrophising the Father: "I give thee thanks, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth. . . . No one knoweth the Father but the Son, nor the Son but the Father, and they to whom the Son revealeth Him."

Commenting on this most important passage, Dr. Ezra Abbot says, in effect, that, though Justin quotes Matthew, he appears to have had John in his mind (*Authorship, &c.*, p. 45), "his language seems to be influenced by the passages in John, above cited, in which alone the Jews are directly addressed." This is very likely; but the inference from it is exactly the opposite of that which Dr. Abbot intends. It is by no means improbable that Justin had the Fourth Gospel, or, at all events, some tradition adopted by the Fourth Gospel, in his mind; it is very likely that a tradition had sprung up that Jesus had addressed these accusations directly to "the Jews" themselves, and that Justin knew of such a tradition and was "influenced" by it. But then, if he had this doctrine in his mind, and believed it to be contained in an Apostolic Gospel, why did he not quote that Gospel in support of it? Why should he have the Fourth Gospel, which would have been exactly to the point, "in his mind," but the Synoptists, who are not to the point, on his pen? So far, therefore, from proving that Justin recognised the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic, this passage proves just the reverse—viz., that although he probably had it "in his mind," he did not venture to quote it as authoritative.

(e) (*Dial.* 69) Justin says that Christ healed those who were blind from their birth (τοὺς ἐκ γενετῆς πηρούς). "There seems here," says Dr. Abbot (*ib.* 45), "to be a reference to John ix. 1, where we have the phrase τυφλὸν ἐκ γενετῆς, the phrase ἐκ γενετῆς, 'from birth,' being peculiar to John among the Evangelists, and πηρός being a common synonym of τυφλός;" and Dr. Abbot further shows that ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς πηρός occurs in the Apostolic Constitutions v. 7, 17, and in the Clementine Homilies, xix. 22, where there is a clear reference to John ix. 1.

This undoubtedly proves that some tradition about the healing of "men blind from their birth" was current at the time of Justin; and it is possible, but not probable, that he derived it from the Fourth Gospel. For in the Gospel only *one* such incident is mentioned, and special stress is laid on the *unique* nature of the cure (ix. 32). "From the beginning of the world it was never heard that any one (τις) opened the eyes of one that was born blind." Now, if Justin had been aware of this statement, and had regarded it as Apostolic, he would hardly have detracted from the unique nature of the miracle by here so loosely using the plural. Still more effectively does he elsewhere destroy its unique character. For he introduces it, still using the plural number, among a number of other miracles not unique, as having been *imitated* by the agency of the devil (*I. Apol.* 22): "And whereas we say that he made whole the lame, and paralytic, and blind from birth (*v. r.* πονηρούς), and that he raised the dead, herein we shall seem to be describing *acts similar and identical* (τὰντρά) *with the deeds said to have been wrought by Asklepius.*" If therefore Justin did indeed borrow this tradition from the Fourth Gospel, he would appear to have felt very little respect for it in thus point-blank contradicting the tenor of the Gospel's context.

But it is more probable that Justin borrowed this refer-

ence from some other tradition than the Gospel. The story of the miracles wrought on a blind man and a lame man by Vespasian in Alexandria is recorded by Tacitus; and it must needs have been sometimes brought up against the Christians—when they urged that their Master made the lame to walk and the blind to see—"But the divine Vespasian did the same things." Tacitus, however, distinctly adds (*Hist.* iv. 81) that the two men healed were *not* congenitally diseased. It became, therefore, a matter of importance for the Christians to reply that Jesus had healed those who laboured under some congenital defect (τοὺς ἐκ γενετῆς πηρούς) where πηρός might represent lameness as well as blindness. When the tradition assumed more definite shape, particularising an individual cure, the singular would be substituted for the plural (τὸν ἐκ γενετῆς πηρόν); and when the narrative came to particularise the disease, blindness, it would be natural for the Fourth Gospel to change the more general term πηρός into the more definite τυφλός. But still, even after the Fourth Gospel had discarded the old title τὸν ἐκ γενετῆς πηρόν, it would remain for some time as an oral tradition, and by this title it would occasionally be referred to; and thus may be explained the occurrence of this title in the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, although it is certain that the author of the latter accepted the details of the narrative of the Fourth Gospel.

(f) Justin (*Apol.* i. 52, and *Dial.* 14, 32, 64, 118) agrees with the Fourth Gospel (xix. 37) in citing Zechariah xii. 10 in the form, "They shall look on him whom they pierced," ὄψονται εἰς ὃν ἐξεκέντησαν, instead of the difficult version of the LXX. ἐπιβλέψονται πρὸς με ἄνθ' ὃν κατωρχήσαντο. But this is at once explained; for (1) the Hebrew demands some such word as ἐκκεντεῖν; (2) the form of the quotation in Rev. i. 7, "Every eye shall see him, and they who pierced (ἐξεκέντησαν) him," makes it pro-

bable that this reading existed before the second century; (3) the word ἐκκεντεῖν is actually introduced in the passage of Zechariah by the versions of Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus, of which the first was written in the first half of the second century.

But although this passage is useless as a proof that Justin copied the Fourth Gospel, it is of some use as being one among many proofs that Justin used the same traditions as the Fourth Gospel.

(g) (I. *Apol.* 13) Justin speaks of Christ as "having become our teacher and having been *born for this purpose*." It is alleged that this is influenced by John xviii. 37, "*for this purpose have I been born*, and for this purpose have I come into the world, that I might bear witness to the truth;" and it is quite possible Justin had in his mind this saying of the Fourth Gospel; but of course it cannot hence be inferred that he regarded the tradition as authoritative or as part of the Memoirs.

(h) (*Dial.* 56) "I affirm that he (Jesus) has never done nor discoursed save as the Maker of the world, above whom there is no other God, willed that he should do and discourse (ὁμιλεῖν)." This is thought to resemble certain passages in the Fourth Gospel which state that Jesus always acted and spoke according to the will of the Father.

But Justin's affirmation is perfectly explicable without any reference to other sources. It seems (*Dial.* 128) that some of the Jews held that, as the light of the sun is inseparable from the sun, so the Logos was inseparable from the Father. Arguing against this belief, Justin has been here (*ib.* 56) teaching that the Word is distinct numerically from the Father; but he now adds this necessary caution, "distinct in number, *but not in will*; for I affirm," &c. Such a reservation was necessary as a protest against a polytheistic inference, and there is no reasonable ground for supposing that Justin borrowed it from the Gospel. On

the other side, it is probable that, if Justin had really had the Fourth Gospel as an Apostolic document to refer to, he would not have introduced the word *ὁμιλεῖν* (which is not found in that Gospel), and instead of making the assertion in his own person he would have supported himself by a quotation from the Memoirs. For, be it observed, the affirmation is not of the nature of an argument, but a statement of the Christian belief, "We Christians, though we attribute to the Logos a personality distinct from the Father, nevertheless assert that the Logos was not distinct from the Father in will." And how easy to add, "for Jesus also in his words said, I speak the things that I have seen with my Father" (John viii. 38), or, "I and my Father are one" (*ib.* x. 30), or, "I do the works of my Father" (*ib.* x. 37)! If it be urged that Trypho would not have accepted the statement of Jesus about Himself, surely the reply is obvious, that, for an exposition of Christian doctrine, Trypho would have more readily accepted a quotation from an Apostolic Gospel (which he himself must be supposed to have read) than the casual and personal utterance of a comparatively unknown teacher like Justin.

(i) In *Dial.* 100, quoting Psalm xxii. 3, "But thou, the Praise of Israel, inhabitest the Holy Place," Justin says that these words declared that Christ was to do "something worthy of praise and wonder, being about to rise from the dead on the third day after the crucifixion; which (thing, fact, &c.) he (Jesus) has, having received it from the Father, *ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς λαβὼν ἔχει.*" It is alleged that a reference is here intended to John x. 18, where Jesus says, "I have authority to lay it (my life, *ψυχὴν*) down, and I have authority to take it again; this commandment I received from my Father (*ταύτην τὴν ἐντολὴν ἔλαβον παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου.*)"

But here, as elsewhere, the supposition that Justin had

the Fourth Gospel in his mind is incompatible with the supposition that he regarded that Gospel as Apostolic. For immediately after the statement that Jesus had "received this from the Father," Justin proceeds to give his grounds for the statement, and to quote the words of Christ in support of it. After justifying the application of the title, "Praise of Israel" to Christ, he proceeds to give a quotation from Christ's words, introducing it with the preface, "and furthermore in the Gospel he (Jesus) is recorded to have said——." Now, surely, if Justin really had a certain passage in the Fourth Gospel *in his mind*, nothing would have been easier and more to the point than to quote that passage, thus, for example: "This power of rising from the dead Jesus has, having received it from the Father; for also in the Gospel he is recorded to have said, 'I have authority to lay down my life and to take it again, this have I received from my Father.'" But instead of quoting this passage, which would have been exactly to the point, Justin quotes another passage from the Synoptists: "All things have been delivered to me by the Father; and none knoweth the Father save the Son, nor the Son save the Father and they to whom the Son will reveal Him." Why should Justin thus have substituted a comparatively inappropriate quotation for the passage which he *had in his mind*, and which was perfectly to the point, except because he felt that it did not possess the same authority as the Memoirs which contained the written words of the Lord? No explanation of carelessness or forgetfulness will avail here; for how can a writer have forgotten that which—by our antagonists' assertion and our own admission—he *has in his mind* at the very time of writing?

(j) (*Apol.* I. 66) "We were taught (ἐδιδάχθημεν) that the [bread and wine of the Eucharist] are the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh." It is maintained that this use of the term "flesh"—instead of the Synoptic

expression, "body"—is a reminiscence of John vi. 51—56 (*e.g.*, "My *flesh* is food indeed and my blood is drink").

No doubt, if this passage stood by itself, we might suppose that it meant, "We were taught by the words of Jesus, in the Gospel of His Apostle John, that we are to feed on His flesh and blood, and this feeding we believe to take place in the Eucharist." But here, as so often above, Justin destroys this supposition by giving the words of Jesus, from which this "teaching" is deduced; and once more we find that these words are taken from the Synoptists. Moreover, it is probable that the "teaching" (*ἐδιδάχθημεν*) refers to the instruction received by the catechumens from their teachers, and based on the Synoptic Gospels.

The context will make this clear. After describing the rite of baptism, Justin is proceeding to describe the Eucharist, and he begins by saying that it is only partaken of by those who believe the *teaching of the Church* (lit., *τὰ δεδιδαγμένα ὑφ' ἡμῶν*, "what they have been *taught by us*;" not, "by Christ"), and who, after receiving baptism, are living *as Christ commanded*. The antithesis between the teaching of the Church and the commands of Christ appears to demonstrate that, although the teaching is based upon the commands of Christ, it is not identical with them; otherwise it could have been more simply and shortly put thus: "who believe in the teaching of Christ, and live in accordance with it." Justin proceeds to justify the strictness of the Christians in thus limiting access to the Eucharist, by explaining its mysterious nature: "For not as common bread, nor as common drink, do we receive this; but even as Jesus Christ our Saviour, by the Word of God was made flesh, and had (*ἔσχε*) flesh and blood for our salvation; so also *were we taught* (*ἐδιδάχθημεν*) that the food blessed by the prayerful word that proceeded from him (or, by the prayer of the Word that proceeded from him, *τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφήν*)—from

which our blood and flesh are by transmutation nourished—is the flesh and blood of that same Jesus who was made flesh.” This “teaching” then does not apparently refer to any teaching about the Lord’s Supper as first instituted, nor to any doctrine proceeding from our Lord Himself, but to the Eucharistic commemorations of the Lord’s Supper, and to the manner in which all Christians, before being admitted to it, “were taught” to regard these. Some differences of interpretation there may be as to detail—*e.g.*, whether the “prayerful Word that proceeded from him” means the Lord’s Prayer (as Otto thinks, I. *Apol.* 66, *note*), or to some other prayer of blessing—but the general tenor seems clear: “We do not regard the Eucharistic elements as common food; we were taught, before we were admitted to that sacred rite, that the food blessed by Prayer is the flesh and blood of Jesus.”

Justin proceeds in the next sentence to justify the solemn way in which the catechumens were taught to regard the Eucharist, by quoting the words of Jesus, on which this teaching is based. Now, since mention has been made of the “flesh and blood” of Jesus, which are nowhere mentioned but in the Fourth Gospel, it would be natural that he should quote from that Gospel; again, since the “teaching” which he desires to justify, treats of the Eucharistic commemorations and not of the First Supper, some general statements of our Lord, setting forth the necessity that all who believe in him must feed on His flesh and drink His blood, and that the partaking of His flesh and blood conveyed to the recipient eternal life, would be exactly in point, and more in point than any description of the First Supper itself. Yet, to the Synoptic description of the First Supper Justin confines himself: “For the Apostles, in the Memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, delivered that Jesus had thus commanded

them—viz., that having taken bread, he blessed and said, Do this in remembrance of me. This is my body. And that in the same way, having taken the cup, and blessed it, he said, This is my blood: and that he distributed it to them alone."

Now, to some extent, it is true, Justin adapts his quotation for his purpose by selecting the account of Luke, who, alone of three Synoptists, records the *command* of Jesus, "Do this in remembrance of me;" and by this means he certainly succeeds in giving a commemorative tendency to the words of Jesus, by implying that those elements which were the body and blood of Jesus at the First Supper, would be no less mysteriously sanctified in future commemorations. But at what a sacrifice he obtains this convenience! He says that "the *Apostles* delivered that Jesus had thus *commanded* them," whereas not a single Apostle, in any Gospel, delivered this "command."*

But it may be said that Justin regarded St. Luke's Gospel as virtually written by the Apostle St. Paul. This is very doubtful. At all events on one occasion when Justin refers to an incident recorded by Luke alone (xxii. 44), although he still retains the word "Apostles," he makes an addition evidently intended to specify Luke, "In

* It is, however, probable that these words are an interpolation in the text of St. Luke, as it is regarded by Westcott and Hort, borrowed from St. Paul (1 Cor. xi. 23—25). In that case, it will be found that Justin has borrowed (1), the words of Institution, from Matthew and Mark ("This is my body," "This is my blood"), and (2), the words ordaining a Memorial, from St. Paul ("Do this in remembrance of me"). Further, it will be seen that Justin has borrowed *καὶ διέδωκεν* from the *ἐδίδωκεν καὶ* of St. Paul, "In the same way also" (1 Cor. xi. 25). He has also emphasized the words ordaining the Memorial by placing them first. It is possible that Justin, though beginning with the intention of quoting the Memoirs, so far altered his intention as, at least, to append the apostolic version of St. Paul; and possibly this may be implied in his use of the word "delivered," not "wrote." St. Paul himself (1 Cor. xi. 23) says of his account of the Lord's Supper: "I delivered it to you (*παρέδωκα*)," and Justin, using the expression, "the Apostles delivered (*παρέδωκαν*)," may be referring to the teaching of the Apostle, which had, perhaps, already become associated with the Gospel of St. Luke.

the Memoirs which I assert to have been compiled by his Apostles and by *those who followed them* ;” and, as Justin in the whole of his writings makes no use of St. Paul’s Epistles, we have no means of knowing what authority he would have attached to a Pauline account of the institution of the Lord’s Supper. But even if we admit that St. Luke, representing St. Paul, might be described as “an Apostle,” where are “the Apostles”? They are non-existent. But if Justin had accepted the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic all this inconsistency would have been removed, and the argument would have run thus: “We believe the Eucharistic elements to be the flesh and blood of Jesus; for the Memoirs tell us that the Lord’s Supper was to be repeated as a Memorial for the faithful, and the Apostle whom Jesus loved has recorded that all who have faith in Jesus must eat his flesh and drink his blood.” If Justin did not write thus, the reasonable inference is that he could not do so because he did not regard the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic. He used much of it, and believed it, but he accepted it rather as the teaching of the Church (τὰ δεδιδασκεύμενα ὑφ’ ἡμῶν) than as the precepts of Christ. Inferentially this doctrine was true, but it was but inferential, and required to be based on the “Memoirs,” which alone contained the words of Jesus.

(l) *Dial.* 91 speaks of fleeing to Him “who sent (πέμψαντι) His crucified Son into the world.” Compare *Dial.* 40, “according to the will of the Father who sent him (τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτὸν πατρός),” and *Dial.* 17, “the only blameless and righteous Light sent from God to men, πεμφθέντος.” It is urged that, whereas the Fourth Gospel uses πέμπειν of Jesus 25 (? 27) times, the rest of the New Testament uses it only twice (? once), and it is inferred that Justin is therefore probably borrowing a phrase from that Gospel.

Provided that we substitute for “the Fourth Gospel”

some such words as "the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel," this inference may be admitted to be highly probable; and all the more so, because of the participial form in which Justin uses the phrase (comp. *ὁ πέμψας με πατήρ*; John v. 37, vi. 44, vii. 33, viii. 16, 18, xii. 49, xiv. 24, and in the other twenty cases, where *πατήρ* is not expressed, the participle is used). The reason for the introduction of this phrase is interesting. In the Synoptists Jesus speaks of the Father as *τὸν ἀποστέλλαντά με* (Luke x. 16), and Justin, quoting this passage (*I. Apol.* 62), does not hesitate to add, "He is called Apostle (*ἀπόστολος*), for he is sent (*ἀποστέλλεται*);" by which name "Apostle" Jesus is also called in the Epistle to the Hebrews iii. 1. But in course of time, as the word Apostle became technical, and reserved for the Twelve, it became natural to speak of Jesus, not as *ὁ ἀποσταλεις* nor as *ὁ ἀπόστολος*, but uniquely as *ὁ πεμφθεις*; and by a corresponding change, the Father is described as *ὁ πέμψας*. Yet curiously enough, while in the participial form, *πέμπω* thus supplants the Synoptic *ἀποστέλλειν*, on the other hand in the finite parts of the verb, *ἀποστέλλειν* maintains its ground, so that we have the following remarkable result: the Fourth Gospel uses the participial *πέμψας* 27 times and the participle of *ἀποστέλλω* (as applied to Jesus) never; (2) it uses the finite form of *ἀποστέλλω* 17 times, and the finite form of *πέμπω* (as applied to Jesus) never.

This subtle distinction is a mark of late date; and Justin's agreement with the Fourth Gospel in adopting it is one among many proofs that he was in sympathy with the later traditions embodied in that Gospel, although he did not regard them as apostolical.

(m) (*Dial.* 63) "Since his (Christ's) blood has not been produced (*γεγεννημένον*) from human seed but from the will of God." It is suggested that Justin (like Tertullian, Irenæus, and others) read *ὁς . . . ἐγεννήθη* in John i. 13,

and that he has in mind that passage, "Who (ὅς) was born (ἐγεννήθη) not from blood nor from the will of flesh, nor from the will of man, but from God."

For two reasons this is doubtful. In the first place, the same antithesis between human and divine generation is common in Philo. Not Abraham, according to Philo, but the divine Word (θεῖος λόγος) begot Isaac (I. 130), who is to be considered not the result of generation, but the work of the Unbegotten. Samuel also is spoken of as "perhaps a man" and "born of a human mother," but as "divinely born" (I. 379). Moses, having received Zipporah, finds her "pregnant by no mortal" (I. 147). More generally Philo says (*ib.*), "It is not lawful for virtues . . . to have a mortal husband. Yet they will never become pregnant from themselves alone, if they receive not seed from some Other. Who then is it that sows goodness in others except the Father of all, God Unbegotten and All-begetting? . . . Thus virtue receives the divine seed (τὰ θεία σπέρματα) from the Causer of all."

But it may be still urged that, although Philo originated this thought, the expression of it may have been borrowed by Justin from the Fourth Gospel. A difference between the language of the two passages, apparently slight, but really important, makes this supposition improbable. For why should Justin, if he borrowed the phrase from the Gospel, substitute "from the will of God" for "from God"? The answer is that he did not believe that Jesus was incarnate from the Virgin by God the Father, nor by the Spirit, but by the Word, or Logos; and for this reason Justin prefers to say that Jesus was incarnate either by the Word, or by the Will, or Power of God, but *not by God Himself*. This is seen from more than one passage: (I. *Apol.* 66) "Jesus Christ, made flesh *by the Word of God* (διὰ λόγου θεοῦ);" (*Dial.* 54), "not from

human seed, but from the *Power* of God." Now that by the insertion of "Power" he means expressly to indicate the Logos and not the Father is clear from *I. Apol.* 32: "The above-mentioned blood of the grape is significative that he who was to appear would have blood indeed, yet not from human seed, but from divine *Power*. Now (next to that God who is Father and Master of all) *the first Power and Son is the Logos*." It is a repellent and scarcely orthodox doctrine to teach that Jesus was incarnate by the Logos, which almost amounts to saying that the Logos on earth was begotten by the Logos from heaven; but that this doctrine was Justin's is evident by his comment upon the words in Luke i. 31, 35, and Matt. i. 21: "Thou shalt be with child by the Holy *Spirit*."* He explains it thus (*I. Apol.* 33): "Now the *Spirit* and *Power* that proceeded from God we ought to suppose to be *no other than the Logos*, who also is the First-born of God." If it be asked why Justin did not accept the more orthodox belief which affirms that Jesus Christ was incarnate by the Holy Spirit of the Virgin Mary, the answer is, that Justin does not seem fully to recognise the personality of the Holy Spirit except as inspiring the Prophets, and as being joined with the Father and the Son in accepting the worship of the Church. On the whole, then, bearing in mind, first, that Philo, and not the Gospel, originated the antithesis, here discussed, between human and divine birth; and, secondly, that Justin's theory of the Incarnation and of the operation of the Spirit does not appear to be the same as that of the Gospel, and exhibits a significant difference of statement, we are led to the conclusion that if he knew the exact words of the Fourth Gospel on this point he deliberately diverged from them, and consequently did not regard them as Apostolic.

* Justin adopts the text of Luke, but adds words from the parallel passage in Matthew.

(n) (*Dial.* 88) "The Apostles have written that at the baptism of Jesus, as he came up from the water, the Holy Spirit as a dove lighted upon him." The descent of the Holy Spirit being mentioned by the two Apostles Matthew and John (*Matthew* iii. 16, *John* i. 32, 33), and this being "the only place in which Justin uses the expression 'the Apostles have written,' " it is argued that Justin means by "Apostles" Matthew and John, and, therefore, that he recognised the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic.

But surely there is no perceptible difference between "the Apostles have written," and "the Apostles have delivered in the Memoirs composed by them which are called Gospels." Now we have seen above (p. 727) that Justin (*I. Apol.* 66) uses the latter expression to introduce the Institution of the Lord's Supper, of which the Fourth Gospel makes no mention. As therefore no one can maintain that Justin included John in "the Apostles" there, so there is no ground for maintaining that he refers to John here. Besides, since Justin regards Mark's Gospel as written by Peter (*Dial.* 106), he might naturally describe an incident recorded by the three Synoptists as "written by the Apostles."

(o) *Dial.* 103, mentioning an incident described by Luke alone (xxiii. 7), says that Pilate sent Jesus to Herod *bound*. No "binding" is mentioned by Luke; but John (xviii. 12 and 24) says that the soldiers *bound* Jesus and led him to Annas, and that Annas sent him *bound* to Caiaphas. It is suggested (*Authorship*, p. 49), as "the most natural explanation" of Justin's "mistake," that he here confuses Luke and John together, and consequently had read this part of the Gospel of St. John.

Even if this "confusion" were admitted, it would by no means follow that Justin accepted the Fourth Gospel as Apostolic. But it cannot be admitted. For Matthew (xxvii. 2) concurs with Mark in saying that the chief priests

bound Jesus before leading him to Pilate. Now, if there is "confusion" at all, why should we not suppose that Justin confused Luke and the other two Synoptists? He quotes Matthew more than fifty times, and repeatedly blends quotations from Matthew with quotations from Luke; the Fourth Gospel (according to universal consent) he avowedly quotes once at most, perhaps not at all; what then is there in the above *data* which should induce us to believe that he "confused" Luke with an author whom he never quotes, rather than with an author whom he quotes repeatedly, and that, too, in conjunction with Luke? The probability is that Justin remembering, from Matthew, that Pilate had received Jesus *bound* from the Jews, assumed that Pilate sent Jesus on to Herod in the same condition.

(p) In *Dial.* 69 the Jews are said to have called Jesus a "magician" and "people-deceiver" (μάγον καὶ λαοπλάνον), and it is suggested that this may be a reminiscence of John vii. 12, where it is said by the Jews that he "deceiveth the multitude (πλανᾷ τὸν ὄχλον)."

But Matt. ix. 3 and xii. 24 contain charges of working signs like a magician by Beelzebub, and in Matt. xxvii. 63 Jesus is called by the Jews a "deceiver (πλάνον);" so that it is on the whole more probable that the reference, if any, is to Matthew than to John.

(q) *I. Apol.* 35—after quoting Isaiah lviii. 2, αἰτοῦσί με νῦν κρίσιν, "they now ask of me judgment"—asserts that this prophecy about the Messiah was fulfilled by the Jews, who, "having dragged him along, set him on a judgment-seat, and said, 'Judge for us.'" Nothing, like this, is recorded in our Gospels; but it has been suggested by Professor Drummond* that Justin may have extracted his meaning from John xix. 13 by reading ἐκάθισαν for ἐκάθισεν in that passage, and interpreting it transitively.

* In the *Theological Review*, July, 1871, p. 328.

John xix. 13 is, "Pilate therefore having heard these words led Jesus out, and *sat* (*ἐκάθισεν*) on a judgment-seat." Transferring this act to the mob, Justin is supposed to have understood the tradition thus: "The mob dragged Jesus away, and *set* him on a judgment-seat." Then he would naturally add the request of the people, "Judge for us," out of his own head, as a detail which *must* have been true, because it was prophesied (just as, in *Dial.* 32, he tells us that the ass on which Christ rode into Jerusalem was "bound to a vine," because, in Genesis xlix. 11, the future lawgiver was to "bind his ass's colt to the choice vine").

But immediately after this passage, after adding also the piercing of the hands and the feet and the casting lots for the raiment, Justin refers, not to the Gospel, but to the "Acts of Pilate," "and that these things happened ye may learn from the *Acts of Pontius Pilate*." And although the reason for this may be that he was writing to heathens, for whom the Acts of Pilate would possess more authority than the Gospels, yet the fact leaves us uncertain as to the source of this tradition of "the judgment-seat." It is quite possible, however, that, just as the Synoptists (Mark xiv. 63) have preserved a tradition that the Jews—forced by the irony of Providence—hailed Jesus as a Prophet; and the Fourth Gospel (xix. 14) has a similar tradition that Pilate, under the same constraining influence, publicly entitled Jesus as a King,—so Justin here preserves a third tradition that the Jews hailed Jesus as a Judge. But if this tradition is a misunderstanding or various rendering of the statement quoted above from the Fourth Gospel, it would seem that the traditions embodied in the latter had not yet assumed, in the estimation of Justin, such an authoritative position as to prevent very considerable divergences in quoting from it. In other words, it would seem that the Ephesian oral doctrine, out of which the

written Gospel sprang, still existed side by side with the document, and sometimes preponderated over it.

(r) *Dial.* 123 shows a striking similarity to the First Epistle of St. John: "As from the one man Jacob, sur-named Israel, all your nation had been addressed as Jacob and Israel, so also we, from the Christ who begot us to God . . . are both called and are the true children of God, we who keep the commandments of Christ (*καὶ θεοῦ τέκνα ἀληθινὰ καλούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, οἱ τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ χριστοῦ φυλάσσοντες*)." Now in the First Epistle of St. John (iii. 1) Westcott and Hort read, "Behold what love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God, and we are (so)" (*ἵνα τέκνα θεοῦ κληθῶμεν καὶ ἐσμέν*); and it is urged that this resemblance of language and thought is too striking to be accidental.

It is certainly not accidental. But an inquiry into the origin of the phrase may prove that Justin and the Epistle borrowed from some common source. We find a similar phrase elsewhere applied to God (*Dial.* 56), "He is and is called (*λέγεται*) God;" apparently intended to emphasize the reality of that God who revealed Himself as "I am." But this use of the phrase seems to have come to Justin through Philo (I. 580), who comments on the revelation of "I am," and says that it is as though God said to Moses, "My nature is to *be*, not to be called" (*λέγεσθαι*). And again (I. 221), Moses says that the tabernacle is called (*κεκλησθαι*) the tabernacle of testimony—"a very cautious expression, that (*σφόδρα παρατετηρημένως ἵνα*) the tabernacle of Him who is, may *be* (*ὑπάρχειν*), and not merely be called (*καλῆται*)."¹ As therefore the classical authors use a proverbial antithesis between "being" and "seeming," so Philo, and Justin through Philo, appear to have used a similar antithesis between "being" and "being called, or named."

Now in the Christian Church the regular word for the

Saints being "the called, *κλητοί*," it would become natural—while exhorting them to sincerity or strengthening their hopes—to use a kind of play on the word "called," and to urge them not only to be *called*, but also to *be* God's children, or else to comfort them by reminding them that they were not only *called*, but also *were* God's children. Naturally enough therefore, Justin, contrasting the merely nominal title of Israel after the flesh with the spiritual claims of the Saints, declares that, while the former were "addressed" as Israel, the latter "are both *called* and *are* the true children of God."

A coincidence of thought so natural and so easily traceable to a common original in Philo, cannot be assumed to prove that Justin borrowed his language from the First Epistle, even indirectly, still less that he had *read* that Epistle and accepted it as Apostolic. Nevertheless—when combined with the use of the Joannine *ἀληθινός* ("true") and the phrase "keep the commandments of Christ"—it may be accepted as one among many indications that the author of this Ephesian dialogue was not ignorant of the Ephesian traditions, many of which are now incorporated in our Fourth Gospel, and also in the First Epistle which is a kind of Postscript to the Gospel.

IV. THE UNIQUE QUOTATION.

Hitherto we have been discussing a number of alleged similarities between the Fourth Gospel and Justin, some of which proved absolutely nothing at all, and needed little more than the bare quotation to prove their futility; others only showed that he was probably acquainted with some of the traditions of the Gospel, but did not show that he recognised them as apostolic; others proved almost demonstratively that he indeed knew both the doctrine of the Logos and also many of the words of Christ recorded in

the Fourth Gospel, but that he did not altogether accept the former, and that, instead of quoting the latter—even when he “had them in his mind”—he preferred to quote the “Words of Christ” from the Synoptic Gospels; others showed that the teaching of the Fourth Gospel was apparently associated in his estimation with teaching from apocryphal or traditional sources; but not a single quotation hitherto has been ever alleged to be an avowed quotation, that is to say, introduced with any kind of preface indicating an apostolic or authoritative origin. When Justin quotes Matthew—which he does fifty-five times—he generally introduces the quotation with a mention of the “Memoirs of the Apostles,” or “The Words of Christ,” or some other sign of quotation. But no one even contends that any of the twelve or thirteen passages quoted above are thus introduced. We now come to the passage which is alleged to be Justin’s unique quotation from the Fourth Gospel.

I. *Apology* 61. “For Christ said, ‘Unless ye be born again (*ἀναγεννηθῆτε*) ye shall certainly not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.’ Now that it is impossible for those who have once been born to re-enter the wombs of them that bare them is evident to all. (*ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰς μήτρας τῶν τεκουσῶν τοὺς ἄπαξ γεννωμένους ἐμβῆναι, φανερόν πᾶσιν ἐστί*).” Compare John iii. 5: “Jesus answered and said unto him, ‘Verily, verily, I say unto thee, unless a man be born (*γεννηθῇ*) anew (or ‘from above,’ *ἄνωθεν*)* he cannot see the Kingdom of God.’ Nicodemus saith unto him, ‘How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother’s womb and be born (*μὴ δύναται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ δεύτερον εἰσελθεῖν καὶ γεννηθῆναι*)?’” “Jesus answered and said, ‘Verily, verily, I say unto thee, unless a man be born of

* The usage of Philo. i. 28, *ἄνωθεν ἀρξάμενος*, and i. 263 *οἱ ἄνωθεν φιλοσοφῶντες* is strongly in favour of the interpretation “from heaven.”

water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God.' "

The similarity is obvious, and the hypothesis of accidental coincidence is absurd. But the question for us is, whether this similarity, in a passage introduced with the words, "Christ said," is sufficient to show that Justin borrowed the passage from a document identical with the Fourth Gospel, and recognised by him as being of Apostolic origin, or whether here, as elsewhere, he may have borrowed it from a tradition, embodied differently in the Fourth Gospel.

In order to answer this question we must consider (1st) how Justin elsewhere used this preface, "Christ said," whether to introduce passages from the Memoirs, or from traditional or apocryphal sources; (2nd), whether the differences between Justin's quotation and the Fourth Gospel are best reconcilable with the hypothesis that he borrowed from a document or tradition; (3rd), whether there is any evidence to show that this passage, from the earliest times, was a part of traditional doctrine. *A priori* we approach these questions with a fair and reasonable pre-judgment against the hypothesis of quotation from a document; for since we have found Justin, above, repeatedly connecting the words of the Fourth Gospel with traditional doctrine, and nowhere quoting it as the "Gospel" or as the "Memoirs," although he freely quotes the other Gospels thus, it is a reasonable inference that he is quoting from Tradition here. But this consideration might, of course, be overcome by a great preponderance of evidence on the other side, elicited in the investigation of the three points above mentioned.

First, then, the preface, "Christ said," appears to be rare in Justin. His usual preface to quotations from the Gospel contains some references to the "Memoirs;" or else, after making mention of Christ, he introduces some mention of His words with the preface "he said," or "he taught;"

or sometimes he mentions the "Gospel," or says "it has been written by the Apostles." An analysis of Justin's quotations from the Gospels given by Kirchhofer shows that, if we include the preface "Jesus Christ said," as well as the simple "Christ said," there are only nine passages thus prefaced. Four of these are prefaced by "Jesus Christ," and, of these, one is apocryphal—"Wherefore also our Lord Jesus Christ said, 'In whatsoever (state) I find you, in this I judge you.'"^{*} One is a free quotation from our Gospels (Matt. xxii. 37—9); and two are exact (Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22; Luke xviii. 27). But of the five beginning with the shorter preface "Christ said," two—though resembling sayings in the Gospels or Epistles—differ so widely from the Gospels that we cannot feel sure they are not traditional (they resemble Luke xii. 48, and Luke vi. 36, with Ephesians iv. 32), two are apocryphal—"For Christ said, 'there shall be schisms and sects,'" "Christ saying that He would again come to His disciples in Jerusalem and then eat and drink again with them"—and the fifth is the present passage.[†] So far as this induction goes, therefore, it would appear that we are not justified, from the fact that Justin introduces certain words of Christ with the preface "Christ said," in inferring that Justin is quoting a Gospel. On the contrary, the evidence of the preface—though it does not go very far in either direction, yet, so far as it goes—inclines us to believe that Justin is not quoting from a Gospel, but from a Tradition.

Passing next to the differences between the form of the passage in Justin and the Fourth Gospel, we see that Justin, besides stating in his own person what the Gospel

^{*} It is possible that this is another form of the tradition (John v. 30) "As I hear I judge."

[†] A sixth is introduced by the words *καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἡμέτερος χριστὸς εἶπκε*, "for also our Christ had said," (*Dial.* 49) having been previously referred to, in the same chapter, with the preface *ὁ ἡμέτερος κύριος ἐν τοῖς διδάγμασιν αὐτοῦ* *εἰρηκε*. This extract is almost verbatim from Matt. xvii. 11—13.

assigns to Nicodemus in the form of a question, and besides otherwise varying the language, omits all mention of "water" and the "Spirit." If these words are useless for the special purpose for which Justin is making his quotation, their omission requires no explanation and is perfectly compatible with the hypothesis that Justin is quoting from the Fourth Gospel; but if the words are so useful as to seem almost essential, then their omission will be difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of quotation, and will be a strong argument against it.

Dr. Ezra Abbot (*Authorship*, p. 42, note), maintaining that the omission of "water" is intelligible, says: "Justin is not addressing an argument to the Roman Emperor and Senate for the necessity of baptism by water, but simply giving an account of Christian rites and Christian worship. And it is not the mere rite of baptism by water as such, but the necessity of new birth through repentance, and a voluntary change of life on the part of him who dedicates himself to God by this rite, on which Justin lays the main stress." He adds that the sentence about the impossibility of returning to the womb and being born again, is an "unmeaning platitude" in Justin, if we suppose it to originate from him; "we can only explain its introduction by supposing that the language of Christ, which he quotes, was strongly associated in his memory with the question of Nicodemus as recorded by John."

A very brief summary of the context will enable the reader to determine for himself whether this explanation of the omission of "water" is satisfactory. Justin is showing the reasonableness and originality of the two sacraments instituted by Christ, both of which, he says, have been parodied by demons. It is therefore necessary for him to set forth (1) the Christian practice of the Sacrament, with its meaning and purpose; (2) Christ's precept about the Sacrament, and the correspondence between the Christian

practice and the precept of Christ ; he may then proceed (3) to show that the Sacrament is both reasonable and original.

This method he pursues exactly in dealing both with Baptism and the Eucharist ; let us begin by examining his treatment of the latter. First (*I. Apol.* 65), he describes the introduction of the newly-baptized Christian to the Eucharist, the bringing in of the cup and the bread, the offering up of praise by the president, and the participation in the Eucharist by the people. Then he explains the meaning and purpose of this rite ; they do not receive this, he says, as common bread and drink, but as the flesh and blood of Jesus. He next shows that this view is based on Christ's precept : " For the Apostles, in the memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have delivered unto us that thus Jesus enjoined on them, viz., that having taken bread, He gave thanks and said, ' Do this in remembrance of me, this is my body ; ' and having taken the cup in the same way, and having given thanks, he said, ' This is my blood, ' and that he communicated it to them alone." Lastly, he adds that the demons, parodying this rite, have imitated it in the bread and cup, which are introduced in the mysteries of Mithras.

Here, then, we have a clear indication of Justin's method of justifying the Sacraments ; first, he sets forth the rite and its meaning ; secondly, the correspondence of it with the precept of Christ ; thirdly, the conclusion that the rite is reasonable and original. It remains to be seen how he applies this method to the justification of baptism. He begins (*I. Apol.* 61) by describing the selection of those who are thought worthy of being thus dedicated to God, and the prayers and fastings practised by them and for them ; then, he says, they are brought by us where there is water, and are born again (*ἀναγεννώνται*) in the same way in which we were born again ; for " in the name of God, the Father and Lord of the Universe, and of the Saviour Christ, and of the

Holy Spirit, they go through the purification then in the water (τὸ ἐν τῇ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται). In accordance with his method he ought now to show that Christ, by His express words, enjoined this *purification by water*, or spoke of it as necessary; and the passage in John iii. 5, *if quoted without any omission*, as it now stands in our version, would have been exactly to the point; for Christ said, "Except a man be born of *water* and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Instead of this, however, Justin quotes, "Except ye be born again ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." But this might obviously mean nothing more than, "Except ye become as little children"—a mere inculcation of the innocence and trustfulness of childhood—not in any way implying *purification with water*. How is it possible to suppose that Justin, wishing to justify the Christian rite of purification by water, and to show that Christ expressly commanded it, could have omitted the very words that contain the command? *

* Here it may fairly be asked, Why did not Justin quote Matt. xxviii. 19, "Go ye and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit?" Justin, having just quoted this very baptismal formulary, could have found no more appropriate support than the very words of Jesus in "The Memoirs" inculcating it.

It must be sufficient here to state briefly (1) that the Gospel of St. Mark is recognised by all scholars to contain an interpolated appendix; (2) that the Gospel of St. Luke contains four or five most important insertions in the post-crucifixion narrative; see the text of Westcott and Hort, xxiv. 6, 12, 40, 51; (3) that the Gospel of St. John contains an apparent appendix, probably by the same hand as the Gospel itself, but still of the nature of an appendix; (4) the post-resurrection portions of the Gospels are very rarely quoted by the earliest writers, and indeed a cursory glance at Kirchhofer would lead to the conclusion that they are never quoted by them; (5) the Apocryphal Gospels are quoted with comparative frequency for the post-resurrection narrative; (6) many passages in Matt. xxviii., e.g., the description of the "many bodies of the saints which arose from the dead," and how they "came into the city and appeared to many," and also the mention of the tale "spread among the Jews to this day," appear to be late additions.

The conclusion from all which is that the last chapter is by no means of equal authority with the rest of St. Matthew's Gospel, and that it is probable that Justin did not quote xxviii. 19, because he did not know of it, except, perhaps, as an additional appendix to the first Gospel.

Justin's following remarks confirm the impression that he is here quoting, not our Fourth Gospel, but a tradition which did not contain the words "water and the Spirit." For in the first place, as if conscious that his method has failed because he has brought forward no "words of Jesus" that inculcate purification with water, he supplements the deficiency by a precept from Isaiah, inculcating "washing": "And how those who have sinned and repent shall escape their sins, is declared by Esaias the Prophet. 'Wash you, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings from your souls' (Isaiah i. 16-20). And then, appealing seemingly to oral tradition, he adds: "We received from the apostles this account, viz., that, since our physical generation made us the children of impurity, ignorance, and constraint,* now, in order that we may become the children of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and choice,† and may obtain remission of sins committed before baptism, there is named over him who has chosen to be born again, and has repented of his sins, the name of that Lord who is Father of all, and Master." Next, in accordance with his method, he goes on to show (*ib.* 62) how the demons, having heard of this "washing" predicted by Isaiah, imitated it in their purifications; and (*ib.* 64), referring to the connection between "spirit" and "water" implied in the saying of Moses, "The *Spirit* of God moved on the face of the *waters*"—he says that the heathen have set up an idol of the Korè (Persephone) at the sources of streams, and have declared that she is the daughter of Zeus, *i.e.*, that the goddess who presides over *water* proceeded from Zeus as the *Spirit* proceeds from God.

Now does not all this show that there was evidently in

* This doctrine is of the same tenor as John iii. 6, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh."

† Compare John viii. 32, "The truth shall make you free." Philo (1, 426) says that the title of "sons of God" is reserved for those who have "knowledge" (*ἐπιστήμη*).

Justin's mind, and probably in the traditions of the Church, a close connection between "water" and "the spirit" implied in baptism; and, if so, does it not become still more difficult to understand why—if he had before him the teaching of Christ that men must be born "of water and the spirit"—he should have omitted these very words which form the basis of his charge against the heathen of parodying the rite which was to be instituted by Christ? * And, further, the fact that Justin connects Christ's words with the apparently traditional teaching of "the Apostles" is in conformity with the hypothesis that the words here quoted as Christ's were also traditional; and the introduction of Isaiah's precept "wash ye," combined with the omission of any words about washing in the precept of Christ, tend to prove that the latter precept contained no such words.

We pass now to consider the similarity and dissimilarity in the words imputed by the Fourth Gospel to Nicodemus but by Justin uttered in his own person. (1) Nicodemus asks, "Can a man enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born (*μή δύναται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ δεύτερον εἰσελθεῖν καὶ γεννηθῆναι;*)?" (2) Justin says "Now that it is quite impossible for those once born to enter the wombs of those that bare them, it is clear to all (*ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰς μήτρας τῶν τεκουσῶν τοὺς ἀπαξ γεννωμένους ἐμβῆναι φανερόν πᾶσιν ἐστι.*)" Here Dr. Ezra Abbot asserts that Justin is guilty of an "unmeaning platitude"; the question of Nicodemus—as a

* It is interesting, by way of contrast, to show how Irenæus (*Fragm.* 34) cites this same passage: It was not for nothing, he says, that Naaman, the leper, was purified on his being baptized. For even so we, lepers in sin, are made clean by the sacred waters and the invocation of the Lord, being spiritually born again as new-born babes, even as the Lord has declared: "Except a man be born again *through water and the spirit*, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Omit the italicised words, and every reader must feel that the argument falls to the ground, or, at all events, requires further argument to support it. For it is needful to show (if these words are omitted) that a man cannot be thus born again without "water and the spirit."

question uttered by a learned Rabbi determined to misunderstand the words of Jesus by taking them literally—is, he says, intelligible enough; but the Roman Emperor and senate could not thus misunderstand them; yet (argues Dr. Abbot) so imbued is Justin with the words of the Fourth Gospel that this question of Nicodemus is inseparably associated in his mind with the foregoing utterance of Jesus; and consequently, though Justin has no reason at all for inserting these words, he persists in inserting them. Still more strangely, though he might have, at least, preserved himself from this charge of uttering "platitudes" by quoting the words as a question uttered by a learned Rabbi, or by an objector, he either forgets the fact or declines to avail himself of it, and thus is guilty of a second folly. Combine these two errors, one of insertion and one of omission, with the extraordinary (supposed) blunder of omitting the very words ("water and spirit") which are most necessary to his argument, and we must surely find Justin guilty of a complex absurdity, not easily attained in the process of extracting a single quotation—and, let us add, an absurdity not easily believed, unless there can be alleged some much better testimony for it than is yet forthcoming.

But the fact is, that this "unmeaning platitude," as it seems to us, could be by no means unmeaning for those to whom it was addressed. Constantly do the Christians complain that their rites were misconstrued by being misunderstood in a literal sense. Elsewhere Justin says that the Christian Eucharist was made the basis of a false charge of feasting on the flesh and blood of a slaughtered child; and the Jews themselves are charged by him, in a passage referring particularly to baptism (*Dial.* 14) with "misunderstanding all things in a fleshly manner," and with supposing that they are pious if they purify their bodies while keeping their souls in impiety. How much

more likely was such a "fleshly misunderstanding" on the part of Gentiles, unacquainted with the phraseology of Eastern religions ! Therefore, in the first century, when a Christian teacher brought forward before a Gentile audience the necessity of baptism, and endeavoured to support it by one of Christ's precepts on the necessity of being "born again,"* the very next step must necessarily be to secure himself against misunderstanding and to lead his hearers to what he considered the right inference, by urging that "it is obviously impossible to be born again in the literal sense ;" and this missionary traditional supplement to Christ's precept, might either be expressed, as Justin expresses it, in the writer's or speaker's own person, or, as is the case in the Fourth Gospel, might be placed in the mouth of an objector, in the course of a dialogue between him and Christ. We are, therefore, spared the necessity of convicting Justin of the stupidity and irreverence of mangling an apostolic Gospel, by appropriating to himself an utterance assigned by that Gospel to another speaker, and of doing this with no other result than to cause himself to utter an "unmeaning platitude." The truth is that Justin did not misquote an apostolic gospel, because he did not know of its existence ; he merely appended to Christ's precept the ordinary

* It would be an interesting question to determine what kind of baptism was supposed by the author of the Fourth Gospel to be administered by the disciples of Jesus before the Resurrection (iv. 1) ; (a) whether they baptized in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and this at a time when they had not recognised the Son in His divine nature, and when (vii. 39) "the Holy Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified ;" (b) whether if their baptismal formulary omitted the names of the Son and the Holy Spirit, it was thought necessary, after the descent of the Spirit, to re-baptize those who had received the imperfect baptism ; (c) whether the statement that Jesus "*οὐκ ἐβάπτισεν*" means that He never baptized any one, and, if so, (d) whether the first disciples were merely baptized with John's baptism, or (e), if Jesus baptized His first disciples, what was the formulary He employed ; and lastly, why St. Paul (Acts xix. 3) finding certain disciples that had not been baptized, except with John's baptism, did not quote Matthew xxviii. 19, or, at all events, make some reference to the express precept of Christ therein recorded.

traditional commentary common among teachers of the first century. It is quite possible that he did not even know of the dramatic manner in which that tradition had been utilised by the author of a recent Gospel; but if he did know it, and did not recognise it as apostolic, he would naturally prefer the more ordinary way of expressing the tradition.*

Having now stated the grounds, derivable from Justin's context, for believing that he is quoting this text not from a Gospel, but from a tradition, we have to ask whether the nature and history of the text itself confirm or weaken this conclusion; and the answer is that the various readings of this text found in the MSS. of the Gospel itself, and the remarkable variations with which it is quoted from the earliest times, are in favour of the supposition that, from the very first, this text was merely one of several traditional expressions, by which not only scribes copying the MSS., but also teachers quoting the Gospel, long continued to be influenced. In the text of Westcott and Hort this verse contains no less than three various readings of the class "thought worthy of notice in the Appendix on account of some special interest attaching to them," and Dr. Ezra Abbot testifies to the extraordinary variety with which it is

* There is still some difficulty in explaining why the language of Justin's statement should deviate so strangely from the language of Nicodemus, which seems the more simple and natural of the two and more likely to be in conformity with the common tradition. Granting that Justin altered *κοίλας* into *μήτρας* as being more technically correct, and then—in order to avoid the sound *μήτρας τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ*—altered *μητρὸς* into *τεκνοῦν*, still we cannot easily account for his use of the word *ἐμβῆναι*. So far as can be judged from Liddell and Scott, and the best Indices to Aristotle and Lucian (as well as the Concordance to Homer) the word is used for *mount, embark (on), advance*, but never for *εἰσελθεῖν*. Is it possible that Justin had in his mind the famous saying of Heraclitus, which might be thought in point here, that "no one *embarks (ἐμβαίνει)* twice on the same stream (of existence)?" In any case such remarkable variations are more consonant with the hypothesis that he is freely repeating a traditional saying in his own way, than that he is deviating from the written word of an apostolic Gospel.

quoted by the earliest writers. Both in the Clementine Homilies (xi. 26), and in Clement of Alexandria (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, 9), as well as in this passage of Justin, "ye" is used instead of "a man"; instead of "born anew, or, from above" (*γεννᾶν ἄνωθεν*)," Justin's word *ἀναγεννᾶν* is used by the Clementine Homilies (xi. 26), Irenæus (*Frag.* 35), Clement of Alexandria (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, 9), and many others; instead of "he cannot see," or, "he cannot enter," the form "he will certainly not see, or enter," is so common, that Dr. Abbot has noted sixty-nine examples of it in various authors quoting his text; and instead of "kingdom of God," the phrase "kingdom of heaven" is found in Hippolytus (*Ref. Haer.* viii. 10), the Clementine Homilies (xi. 26), Irenæus (*Frag.* 35), and many others, extending to so late a period, and influencing so many MSS., as to be inserted by Tischendorf in his text.*

Such being a brief sketch of the history of the text of John iii. 5, we conclude by showing how all these variations may naturally be accounted for, and how all of them easily fall in with the theory that the text did not originate a precept of Christ before unknown, but was merely one among many traditional expressions of it. It appears from the Synoptists that in the earliest times there had been known some precept of Christ in which He solemnly insisted on (*ἀμὴν, οὐ μὴ*) the imitation of "little children" as a condition of "entrance into the kingdom of God;" but whereas Matthew (xviii. 3) used "ye," and "kingdom of heaven," Mark (x. 15) and Luke (xviii. 17) concur in using the singular "whoever," and "kingdom of God." Matthew's version is, "Verily I say unto you, unless ye be turned (*στραφῆτε*) and become like the children, ye shall certainly not enter into the kingdom of heaven." The words

* Commenting on this variation, Westcott and Hort (*Notes on Select Readings*, p. 75) point out that it is naturally suggested by the recurrence of the phrase in Matthew, but add that it is "perhaps derived from a traditional form of the words."

of Mark are identical with those of Luke: "Verily I say unto you, whosoever shall not receive the *kingdom of God* like a little child, *he* shall certainly not enter into it." The Synoptic variations—"be turned and become like," and "doth not receive the kingdom of God like"—indicate that there was no agreement as to the precise word in which Jesus expressed the imitation of children. It is possible that both the Synoptic phrases are attempts to render some Aramaic word meaning "to be born again," which appeared in the earliest times too difficult to render literally in Greek. Jesus may have said originally, "If ye be not born again," and the First Gospel may have interpreted this into Greek by saying, "If ye turn not back and become as children;" while the second and third Gospels interpreted it, "Whoever shall not receive the kingdom in the spirit of a little child."

Although part of this supposition is conjectural, thus much is certain, that St. Peter assumes (1 Ep. i. 3) that all Christians are "born again" (*ἀναγεννᾶν*), and, consequently, that in very early times, long before the composition of the Fourth Gospel, the phrase was in use among the faithful to denote the change necessary for entering into the kingdom of God. Whether therefore as a development of the Synoptic words of Jesus, or as a recurrence to the original and exact words of which the Synoptic version was a periphrastic interpretation, a tradition would be naturally current in two shapes, first (following Matthew), "Verily, I say unto you, *unless ye be born again*, ye shall certainly not enter into *the kingdom of heaven*;" and (following Mark and Luke), "Verily, I say unto you, whosoever shall not be born again, *he shall certainly not enter into the kingdom of God*." Omitting "verily I say unto you," we find that Justin's tradition exactly agrees with the former of these: "Unless ye be born again, ye shall certainly not enter into the kingdom of

heaven." Another curious version is given by Clement of Alexandria, who combines the use of the word "born again" with Matthew's "become as little children," and Luke's "receive":—"Unless ye again become as little children and be born again, as the Scripture saith, ye will in no wise receive Him who is truly your father, and will in no wise ever enter the kingdom of God" (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, 9). The Fourth Gospel, instead of "enter into the kingdom," prefers the more Hebraic expression, "see the kingdom of God" (compare "see death," "see corruption," Luke ii. 26, Acts ii. 27—31); and instead of "will certainly not" (*οὐ μὴ*), prefers the stronger phrase implying inherent impossibility, "is [not able." Lastly, instead of the single word "born-again" (*ἀναγεννᾶν*), it prefers two words (*γεννᾶν ἄνωθεν*), which may possibly mean "born over again," but which, more probably, may be interpreted "born from above," *i.e.*, "born with a heavenly birth;" and though it adopts (with Mark and Luke) the singular form instead of Matthew's plural, it substitutes "unless a man" (*ἐὰν μὴ τις*) for "whoever." No comment is required to show how very much further the Fourth Gospel goes than Justin in deviating from the Synoptic Tradition.

So far, our conjectures are based on obvious facts, on the variations in the Synoptists, in the quotations by the Fathers, and in the text of the Fourth Gospel itself; but when we pass to the following verses (John iii. 4, 5) containing the objection of Nicodemus and the reiteration by Jesus of his former statement—with the substitution of the words "of water and the Spirit" for "anew, or from above"—we have fewer facts to guide us, and any suggestion must be regarded as merely a working hypothesis. Nevertheless, when a great number of convergent evidences, external and internal, make it so probable as to be practically certain, that, in Justin's estimation, passages now

found in the Fourth Gospel *were* Traditions, neither apostolic nor authoritative, it is not a superfluous task to show how Tradition *may* have originated the present extract from that Gospel.

As to the reply of Nicodemus, we have shown how natural it was for the earliest teachers of the Christians to supplement the "hard saying" of Christ with some words indicating that it must not be understood literally—a supplement which Justin appends in his own person, while the Gospel dramatically assigns it to Nicodemus. Nor is it much more difficult to explain the origination of the new version of Christ's precept with the words "water and the Spirit." For as soon as the Synoptic "born anew" came to be connected, in the minds of the faithful, with baptism, it was natural that some modifying comment should be added to the mysterious word. From St. Peter's Epistle (iii. 21) we may infer that some were in danger of ignoring the inward birth, while laying stress on the outward purification; from the Acts of the Apostles (xix. 3) we find, on the other hand, that in the very early days of the Ephesian Church there were some Christians who were ignorant of the necessity of Christian baptism, and consequently, it may be presumed, of any precept of Christ on the subject, and it is quite possible that a rejection or depreciation of the rite may still have lingered in that city. For the latter class it was necessary to point out that the purification must be "from water;" for the former, that it must be "from the Spirit." Yet the Fourth Gospel does not substitute this new version for the old so as to exclude the latter, but appends it as an explanation: "Ye must be born anew," says the Saviour; "but," replies Nicodemus, "that is impossible." "Ye must be born *of water and the Spirit*," is the answer and explanation.

Some little illustrative confirmation of this hypothesis may be derived from the fact that, even after the recogni-

tion of the Four Gospels had arrested the development of Christian Traditions, the tendency to despiritualise the original saying of Christ is still found (though ineffectually) at work in the quotations of the text by early authors. For example, the *Clementine Homilies* (xi. 26) omit all mention of "Spirit," but retain "water"—suggesting, however, some spiritual signification perhaps by the epithet "living." "Unless ye be born again by living water into the name of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of heaven." And the *Clementine Recognitions* (vi. 9) omit even this faint hint of the spiritual element: "Unless a man be born again of water, he shall not enter into the Kingdom of heaven;" and, to the same effect, Tertullian: "The Lord saith, Unless a man be born of water, he hath not life." If, even after the stereotyping of Christian doctrine by the recognition of the Four Gospels, these variations of quotation from documents were possible, and if their tendency is evidently to lay less stress on the inward reality and more on the outward sign of regeneration, how much more easy was it that changes should take place in the development of a still undefined and sometimes obscure tradition, and how probable that all the changes should be in one direction—namely, towards the interpretation of Christ's "hard sayings," in such a way as to make them more generally intelligible and applicable, even at the cost of making them less spiritual.

Now, summing up the evidence on this unique quotation, we are led to the conclusion that the writer is not quoting from a document that he believes to be an apostolic Gospel, but from a Tradition, our reasons being these:—(1) There is no mention of its being quoted from a Gospel; (2) it is introduced with the words with which Justin *more often than otherwise* introduces a traditional or apocryphal saying of Christ; (3) it is associated, in the immediate context, with other doctrine apparently traditional; (4) its language

differs so remarkably from that of the Fourth Gospel as to be hardly compatible with the view that Justin knew the Gospel and regarded it as apostolic ; (5) those very words in the Gospel, which would have been most useful for Justin's purpose, are omitted by him ; (6) the quotations of this passage by other early authors, and the condition of the text in the Fourth Gospel itself, confirm the supposition that it was a tradition derived from the Synoptists, and taught in the Early Church with great variations ; (7) it is possible, without any difficulty, to explain how the passage in the Gospel may have been traditionally developed from the Synoptists.

In addition to these arguments there is the indirect evidence from the other similarities between Justin and the Fourth Gospel, previously considered ; which show that (1) he knew of the existence of the Gospel, or parts of the Gospel, in some form ; (2) he never avowedly quotes it as a Gospel, or as authoritative ; (3) although it is one of his main purposes to prove Christ's divinity and pre-existence previous to the Incarnation, he yet never borrows thoughts or arguments from that Gospel which alone enunciates these doctrines ; (4) although he agrees with the Fourth Gospel in identifying the Logos with Christ, he differs from the Gospel, and approximates to the Jewish Philosopher Philo, in his expression of his views of the Logos ; (5) where he treats of topics peculiar to the Fourth Gospel (as distinct from the Synoptists)—viz., the mystery of the brazen serpent, and the appearance of God to Abraham, he differs from the Gospel and agrees with Philo ; (6) in all these points, and especially in the doctrine of the Logos, his doctrine is more Alexandrine and less Christian, or, in other words, less developed, than that of the Gospel ; (7) he repeatedly associates references to the Fourth Gospel with teaching from apocryphal or traditional sources ; (8) even when he is said by modern critics to be

"remembering" or "referring to" passages in St. John's Gospel, it is admitted by those same critics that he never quotes those passages, but quotes the Synoptists by preference; (9) even when he declares that he will show how Jesus "revealed" His pre-existence and divinity, he quotes the words of Jesus, not from the Fourth Gospel, but from those Gospels which, as Canon Westcott truly says, "do not declare Christ's pre-existence."

What must we now say to the argument that the Fourth Gospel was "very abundantly" used by the Valentinian Gnostic heretics against whom Justin wrote? Surely this: that (if the fact can be proved) it is a potent argument to show that Justin did not regard the Gospel as authoritative. For if his heretic antagonists used it, while he abstained from using it, this strongly confirms our supposition that his reason for abstaining from the use of it was not ignorance of it, but a belief that it was not apostolical. The testimony of the Diatessaron of Tatian is to the same effect. This pupil of Justin admitted the Fourth Gospel to an equality with the other three; but this is said to have been after he had become a Gnostic Encratite; and his compilation rejected the genealogies and "such other passages as show the Lord to have been born of the seed of David after the flesh." As we know, on Justin's positive statements, that he would have disapproved his pupil's excision of the Gospels, so we might reasonably infer (even if there were no further evidence) that he might very probably have dissented from his pupil's estimation of the Fourth Gospel; but the overwhelming evidence enumerated above, converts this probability into a certainty. The Gnostic Valentinians and the Gnostic Encratite Tatian took one view of the Fourth Gospel; Justin Martyr (who was not a Gnostic) took another.

How, then, did the Fourth Gospel, patronised by Gnostics and regarded with suspicion by the comparatively orthodox

Justin, win its way so rapidly in the Church that, by the end of the second century, it was not only universally recognised, but even all traces of hesitation have been obliterated, except such as may be detected in the works of this single author? Those who regard this question as unanswerable, except on the hypothesis of apostolic authorship, not only make too little allowance for the non-critical and receptive spirit of the Church in the earliest ages, but also do a great injustice to the intrinsic power of this most spiritual treatise. It succeeded because it deserved to succeed; because it was, spiritually speaking, in accordance with the truth; because it truthfully protested against the thaumaturgic tendencies of the Church by exhibiting Jesus principally as a worker of spiritual and not material marvels; because it truthfully represented Him as a Leader who was not, and who could not be, understood till His physical presence had been succeeded by His spiritual presence; because it finally and definitely rescued Christianity from the danger of becoming a narrow sect of Ebionites; and lastly, because, in answer to the cavils of heathen cynics who scoffed at the notion that the Father of men could have awaked from ages of neglect to send His Son at last as a Saviour into a corner of Syria, it raised and established for Christ's religion the claim that it was not an afterthought or extemporised epilogue, but a pre-ordained and continuous drama, co-extensive with the history of the Universe, wherein the Protagonist was none other than the Eternal Word or Wisdom who from the beginning was with God, and was God.

EDWIN A. ABBOTT.

DR. MARTINEAU'S AND MR. POLLOCK'S
SPINOZA.—I.*

THE present Essay falls into three divisions; the first treating of the relation of Spinoza's philosophy to present thought; the second, of the Life of Spinoza as presented by his recent English biographers; the third, of Spinoza's philosophy, in reference especially to Dr. Martineau's important exposition and examination of it. Of these only the first and second appear in the present number.

I. SPINOZA'S RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT.

There are several good reasons why an adequate account of Spinoza's Life and Philosophy should be made accessible to the English public. Of these we may place first the singular purity, self-forgetfulness and rectitude of the man's personal character, and his passionate devotion to truth; for, as Mr. Froude truly says, "it is not often that any man in this world lives a life so well worth writing as Spinoza lived, not for striking incidents or large events connected with it, but because he was one of the very best men whom these modern times have seen." He has a

* *A Study of Spinoza.* By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D., Principal of Manchester New College, London. With portrait of Spinoza. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy. By FREDERICK POLLOCK, Barrister-at-Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Honorary Doctor of Laws of the University of Edinburgh. With portrait of Spinoza. London: Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

further claim on our attention on account of his great significance in the history of theological and philosophical culture. The most important of the few works of his which were published in his lifetime, the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, not only inaugurated sound Biblical criticism and exegesis, and anticipated some of the results of recent liberal scholarship, but has also the merit of holding a leading place among the few books which, in that age of theological dogmatism, nobly pleaded for liberty of thought and expression as being indispensable to a nation's true well-being. Nor has his influence been less striking in the sphere of philosophy, for from the year 1780, when Lessing made to Jacobi his celebrated confession of sympathy with "Spinozism," the *Ethica* of Spinoza so captivated for half a century some of Germany's foremost thinkers, that in the view of Schleiermacher, Goethe, Schelling and Hegel it is Spinoza, rather than Descartes, who should be regarded as the true father of modern thought.

But the most cogent practical reason why thoughtful persons should now be enabled to attain an accurate knowledge of Spinozism is because this philosophy is still a living power in the world, and may be expected to play for some time to come an increasingly important part in the struggle which has now commenced between scientific theories and religious beliefs. It is an obvious and interesting fact that Spinoza's writings have powerfully attracted two quite distinct types of mind. Fervent intuitionists, such as Novalis and Schleiermacher, and thoroughgoing experientialists, such as the late Professor Clifford and his friend Mr. Pollock, opposite as they appear to be in their intellectual sympathies and tendencies, yet agree in regarding Spinoza's chief work as a masterpiece of philosophical genius. Is it a startling paradox—or is it rather an evidence of the depth and catholicity of Spinoza's philosophy—that on the one hand, his views to a great extent anticipated and

-inspired Schelling and Hegel in the construction of their celebrated *a priori* philosophical systems, and that on the other hand, in some of their features, they bear, as Mr. Pollock justly remarks, a striking likeness to the results arrived at in the present day by such purely experiential psychologists and physicists as Taine and Haeckel? When, in the concluding portion of this essay, we endeavour, with the help of Dr. Martineau's exposition of Spinoza's views, to give our readers some account of their true character and of their logical or illogical nexus, the reason of this curious two-fold attraction which they exert will be evident, and we shall then see more clearly whether or not it affords any ground for believing that on the basis of Spinozism the seemingly opposite tendencies of philosophical thought will gradually be brought into harmony, and that hereafter experientialist and intuitionist, savant and theologian, will cordially shake hands over the pages of the *Ethica*, and admit that Spinoza has shown how the true philosophy includes and reconciles their respective one-sided methods and ideas.

In order, however, to form a correct estimate of Spinoza's relation to present thought we must, to some extent, anticipate the answer to the above question and briefly point out why it is that the mystic and the man of science both find satisfaction in the study of his philosophy. It must be remembered, then, before all else, that it is by *the clear and positive intuition of the reason*, and not by any process of logical generalization and abstraction, that Spinoza professes to arrive at his fundamental position that there is one self-existent Substance, and that this Substance (which is with him synonymous with God) is constituted of an infinity of attributes, each of which is itself infinite. These attributes, of which two only, thought and extension, are accessible to human knowledge, manifest themselves in an infinity of finite modes, and these modes of thought and extension con-

stitute the universe of mind and matter. It might be supposed at first sight that this is only the modern Evolution theory inverted; that the two theories cover, in fact, precisely the same ground, only that the terminus of the evolutionist is the starting point of Spinoza, so that the former, instead of first mounting upwards with Spinoza by the intuition of the reason to the Absolute, and then descending deductively to finite things and finite minds, takes the reverse course, and, beginning with finite forms of matter and sensation, endeavours to ascend inductively to a knowledge of the original substance and cause of physical and mental phenomena. But it will be found on reflection that this comparison between Spinoza's thought and the thought at present dominant in scientific circles is utterly illusory and very deceptive. By this inverse process it is not possible to make the slightest approach towards Spinoza's self-existent or uncaused Substance. The study of the finite may conduct us to the notion of the indefinite, but never to the positive intuition of the infinite; the study of the temporal yields no insight into the nature of the eternal. By this we by no means intend to deny that the apprehension of the infinite and the eternal may or must accompany all knowledge of the finite and the temporal, but simply to assert that such apprehension is ever an intuition of the reason and never to be detected among the data of sensation. It is true that according to Spinoza, bodies and minds are modes of Substance; but at the same time he most emphatically teaches that Substance in itself is indivisible and unchangeable, and that in relation to it the notions of part and whole, as well as of time, duration, and succession, have no intelligible meaning. Finite things appear to us to be capable of division and to pass through successive changes, but this confused and inadequate idea is due to the delusive play of the imagination and must be laid aside when the intellect is contemplating things in their

reality, *i.e.*, in relation to the Substance, which is their ground and cause. It must never be forgotten, then, that in Spinoza's view the eternal and infinite Substance is no generalisation or abstraction which the understanding fashions out of a previous knowledge of the temporal and the finite. It is present, indeed, in all finite objects and in all finite ideas, but it is apprehended, not through sensation, but through rational intuition, and it is known with a clearness and certainty to which our knowledge of finite phenomena can make no pretension.

And now we reach the crucial question, the answer to which determines the essential character of Spinozism, as, indeed, of every philosophical system: What is the relation between the infinite and eternal Substance or God, intuited by the reason, and the universe of finite bodies and minds? A thinker's reply to the question determines his position either as an Atheist, an Agnostic, a Pantheist, or a Theist. If he replies, "I know of and believe in nothing but these finite material and mental modes, and recognise no such faculty as Spinoza's intuition," then he is properly described as an Atheist. If again he replies, "I believe in the existence of Substance, or God, on the testimony of intuitive reason, and I regard it as the infinite and eternal reality of which finite material and mental modes are the necessary phenomenal expression, but I can attach to it no other predicate than this," then he is an Agnostic. If, however, he replies, as Spinoza does, "I can say this, but I can say more. I can assert that I know by intuition that this Substance is a thinking thing, and also an extended thing, though its thought is not as my thought (seeing that it does not involve intellect or will), nor its body as my body (seeing that it is one and indivisible); but I agree with the Agnostic that this Substance *must* express itself as it does in the actual universe of nature and mind," then we have that form of doctrine called Pantheism. If, finally, he

replies, "I believe on the testimony of rational intuition and also of my moral and spiritual consciousness that there is an infinite and eternal Being in whom all the phenomena of nature find their ground and their adequate cause, but I see no reason to believe that He *must*, from inner necessity, call into existence and sustain this particular universe; all I know is that He actually does so. The attributes and modes of finite being in the universe I learn by self-consciousness and observation, and not by way of deduction from some previous knowledge of God's nature. What I further know by intuition is that He is the light of my intelligence, and also the inspirer and the object of my holiest affections, and, therefore, I have ground for presuming that all the phenomena which proceed from His causation will be characterised by wisdom and beneficence. I know also by intuition that though 'in Him I live, and move, and have my being,' nevertheless, I am not merely a passive mode of His eternal substance and causality, but am in some measure a free or original cause to whom the choice is continually offered, whether I will accept God's invitation and become at one with Him, or will turn away from the infinite and the eternal and seek the gratifications of the earthly and the temporal," we should consider this to be a Theistic confession of faith.

It will naturally be objected to this last clause that many Theists and Christians hold the necessarian dogma, and so refer all their mental determinations to God's sole causality; but, so far as we can see, this doctrine, in logical minds, must pass into some form of Pantheism. And further, as to Pantheism itself, it should be noticed that it is not essential to it that God should be regarded as having infinite extension, or even that there should be a belief in extended matter at all.

Professor Flint, in the excellent chapter on Pantheism in his *Anti-Theistic Theories*, says that this theory "is always

in unstable equilibrium between Theism and Atheism, and is logically necessitated to elevate itself to the one or to descend to the other," and Jacobi concludes that the logical outcome of Spinoza's system is Atheism. Had the term "Agnosticism" been in use in Jacobi's day, he would, we think, have preferred to say that a logical Spinozist must become an Agnostic,* and we are certainly somewhat surprised that Professor Flint, who clearly recognises the difference between Atheism and Agnosticism, should not have substituted the latter term for the former in the above description of Pantheism. It seems to us that the inner genius of Spinozism is distinctly and intensely antagonistic to Atheism. Is it in the nature of Atheism, or of any system which logically tends to Atheism, to kindle the warmth and enthusiasm which Spinoza's views have kindled, and still kindle, in many pure and lofty souls? We are very far from accepting Spinoza's theological position as true and satisfying, and we heartily endorse what we believe to be Professor Flint's real meaning, that Spinozism is in unstable equilibrium between Agnosticism and Theism, so that its earnest adherents will not find rest for their minds till they settle down in one or other of these two forms of theological thought; but at the same time we must insist upon it, that between the Atheism of D'Holbach and the Agnosticism of the logical Spinozist there yawns a gulf impassable. The thinker who sets the infinite over against the finite, the eternal over against the temporal,

* It should be noted, however, that Dr. Martineau, in the profound chapter on Spinoza's doctrine concerning Religion (which we shall afterwards have to notice), argues that if we adhere to Kant's interpretation of the word "God," Jacobi was certainly justified in classing Spinoza with Atheists, on the ground that Spinoza's God is without intellect and will, and these attributes are, according to Kant, essential to the idea of a "Living" God (See *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 347). But as in another passage in the same chapter (p. 334), Dr. Martineau says that if the view of Causality which leads Spinoza to deny to God an Intellect and Will like ours, be true, "it ought to reduce us to the silence of Agnosticism," we may, perhaps, fairly infer that Dr. Martineau himself classes Spinoza among Agnostics.

the real over against the phenomenal, and emphatically declares that no logical manipulation of the latter member of these pairs can by any possibility conduct us to the former, and that the former is held on the strongest of all mental tenures, the immediate and unquestionable intuition of the reason, that thinker may be far removed from the possession of adequate religious ideas, but he is assuredly still farther removed from the barren and cheerless negations of Atheism. Spinoza most seriously errs, we think, in regarding all finite minds and bodies as logically involved in the essence of God, and thus subjecting both God and man to what is virtually mechanical necessity; he errs also in not recognising the validity of the testimony of the moral and spiritual consciousness as to man's personal relation to the "Father within him;" but amid all these errors he ever clings with unrelaxing tenacity to the idea that human thought and human conduct cannot lead to truth and peace so long as man gives his mind and heart to the study and love of the finite and does not, in intellect and action, aspire constantly to union with the infinite and the eternal. Although Jacobi classed Spinoza with Atheists, there are passages in the *Ethica* which we cannot read without feeling that Spinoza, in happy inconsistency with the logical exigences of his system, has given expression to a mood of thought and emotion which has some real affinity with the mood which prompted Jacobi's own saying, "we believe in God, not by reason of the nature which conceals him, but by reason of the supernatural in man, which alone reveals and proves him to exist."

What has been said will, perhaps, help to make clear the nature of the attraction which Spinozism has exercised, and is still likely to exercise, over minds of a mystical or theosophic turn, as well as over many devout and imaginative natures, who need a religious faith, and yet are held back by prepossessions engendered by prevalent scientific theories

and speculations from the acceptance of definite Theistic doctrines. Such persons find, or think they find, in the propositions of the *Ethica* a revelation of the true meaning of that mysterious antithesis, yet indissoluble union, of the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, which ever presents itself in their own inner life, as well as in the perception of the universe around. Following Spinoza's guidance, they see, or think they see, that all that is painful, discordant, or destructive in nature, all the error, sin, and sorrow in society, and in their own lives, appears to us in a repulsive guise, simply because we contemplate it from the wrong point of view. Seen *sub specie aternitatis*, i.e., from the Divine point of view (and Spinoza teaches how we may at length succeed in placing ourselves at this true intellectual stand-point), all that before appeared as imperfections are now seen to be harmonious and necessary features in the perfect whole. Man is in one sense but a finite mode of God's infinitude, and as such, is constantly liable to error and to passions that mar his peace; but in another sense, as an intellectual being, he has a vision of, and a part in, this Divine infinitude. The end of his existence is to escape from the attractions of the finite and the temporal, and to be actuated more and more by the Infinite and the Eternal. Freed at length from the dominion of earthly passions by the greater might of that one divine passion, the intellectual love of God, man, though living in time, more and more roots his being in the infinite: he becomes one with God, and shares in God's eternity, so that over the better part of him the disintegrating hand of time and death is powerless.* How far these doctrines are in harmony

* Whether Spinoza's views have real affinity with those of many Christian mystics depends, of course, mainly on the answer to the question, "Does he, in ascribing the attribute of thought to God, regard God as *self-conscious*?" This important question is most thoroughly discussed in the fifth chapter of *A Study of Spinoza*, and Dr. Martineau, after stating and examining the arguments adduced by such competent critics as Trendelenburg and Busolt in favour of an affirmative answer, arrives at the conclusion that "there is

with Spinoza's fundamental definitions and axioms, and are legitimately reached *more geometrico*, we shall be better able to determine when, under Dr. Martineau's guidance, we have explored more in detail Spinoza's philosophy. At present we are merely describing the mode in which Spinozism actually attracts a certain class of minds. There is, assuredly, to many persons, a potent charm in this blended determinism and optimism, but it can hardly be doubted that, in part at least, its action upon the spirit is analogous to that of a pleasant soothing narcotic, which deadens the painful sense of human sin and human responsibility, at the cost of weakening those moral energies and those spiritual affections and emotions which constitute what is noblest and divinest in the nature of man.*

Let us now turn to that opposite aspect of Spinoza's philosophy which is making it now so attractive to living savans and sociologists, that Mr. Pollock thinks "it may be safely affirmed that Spinoza tends more and more to become the philosopher of men of science." It is hardly likely that men of science will be strongly drawn to Spinoza's account of Substance as resting on the immediate intuition of the mind. A few of them, so far as they are theologically inclined, may find his religious philosophy more to their taste than Mr. Spencer's Agnosticism; but it is obvious that what Mr. Pollock refers to as the ground of his prognostication as to the future influence of

nothing in the phrases so ingeniously borrowed from the vocabulary of Theism, to contradict or qualify the much plainer propositions which exclude all Divine self-consciousness and personality, and constitute a system of pure naturalism." Dr. Martineau likewise arrives at a negative conclusion in reference to the kindred question, whether Spinoza, in saying that "the better part of us is eternal," meant to assert the doctrine of personal immortality (v. p. 289). This matter will demand attention when we treat of Spinoza's philosophy.

* As Dr. Martineau remarks in his Address on "The Relation between Ethics and Religion" (p. 13), "Spinoza himself notices (*Ethica* III., pr. 49) that towards a being supposed to be free, affections far more intense will be felt than towards one under necessity."

Spinozism, is the striking similarity of Spinoza's views concerning matter and mind, and their relation to each other, and the views now in favour with some of the more influential savans, psychologists and sociologists. Spinoza professes to arrive at these views by deduction from the idea of Substance, and other intuitive notions; but it can be shown that no such deduction is possible, and that he must have reached them by way of experience and speculation. In fact, he started with the physics, mechanical physiology, and psychology of Descartes, carried these out to their logical consequences, and then thought that the cosmological theory thus reached could be shown to follow of necessity from his fundamental intuition of a self-existent Substance. It becomes evident, however, when the *Ethica* is carefully examined, that the theory of the phenomenal world therein contained rests on quite another foundation than that on which Spinoza rests his belief in infinite Substance or God; as, indeed, must be the case in every philosophical system which professes to give a reason for the existence of phenomena. The actual features of finite and temporal things must be learned from experience, but it is only in the light of man's rational intuition of the Infinite and the Eternal that the mind's quest for the cause and meaning of phenomena can attain any satisfaction. Hence it is essential to the very life of Spinozism that the physics and psychology should be taken in connection with the primary ontological perception of God; and, therefore, those savans whose admiration and acceptance of Spinoza's teaching is confined to the views which are common to him and Haeckel, have not imbibed in the slightest degree the vital essence of his thought, and he cannot with any propriety be called their philosopher.

Still when we consider in how marked a manner the physics, physiology, and psychology of Spinoza accord with the views now current among prominent evolutionists, and

how convenient is his authority for setting aside those deliverances of consciousness which stand in the way of the universal application of evolutionist ideas, we shall be prepared to understand why our men of science and our "scientific" sociologists should do homage to a thinker who more than two hundred years ago anticipated many of their principles and even claimed to have deduced them from the necessary idea of substance. The typical evolutionist in the present day is inspired with the conviction that his principle and his method of explanation will, if persistently applied, gradually solve all that is humanly solvable in the mystery of nature and of man. There are, however, certain common beliefs which, if true, indicate facts which the theory of Evolution is quite helpless to explain. Either these beliefs must be declared errors and illusions, or else the pretensions of the Evolution theory must be seriously curtailed. The former of these alternatives is naturally the one usually adopted, and in every such case the evolutionist can appeal for confirmation to the *Ethica* of Spinoza. The most formidable of these beliefs is that connected with the existence of the human will, the consciousness of personal identity, and especially the conviction that man possesses freedom of choice between the springs of action which he feels to be of different moral rank. If this consciousness be really reliable, and it be regarded as a fact that persons who have yielded to temptation could have chosen to do otherwise, then man is to a certain degree an original or uncaused cause, and there is an element in his nature which lies entirely outside the scope of evolutionist calculations. What says Spinoza on this head? That the soul is merely the aggregate of successive ideas; that will is only desire; and that every finite mode of thinking in man is necessarily determined by its relation to preceding finite modes of the same attribute. Human conduct is therefore, in every case, strictly

necessitated, and the emotion of repentance for our own sins and that of blame for the sins of others, are based upon confused and mistaken ideas. Spinoza, accordingly, can hardly fail to receive recognition and gratitude from the scientific moralist and sociologist. Another prevalent idea is that the adaptations in nature indicate intention and design in the cause of nature. The Darwinian theory is supposed by many to have superseded all such appeals to intelligent causality, and Spinoza in denying to God all purposive activity appears to be in entire harmony with the evolutionist position. Again, some of our leading scientists (such as Prof. Huxley) believe that the doctrine of the conservation of force requires us to deny that thought or will exercises any causal influence over the movements of the body, and others (such as the late Prof. Clifford) with more consistency believe that we must also deny that the external world is the cause of our sensations and perceptions. This latter view is precisely in accordance with Spinoza's doctrine that there is perfect parallelism between modes of extension and modes of thought, but that no causal action is exerted by the one on the other. And if it be said that this exact parallelism of two quite independent series of phenomena is *primâ facie* most improbable and demands some explanation, then the theory of Spinoza that thought and extension are two out of the innumerable attributes of the one self-existent substance, and therefore find the explanation of their unity and harmony in it, presents itself as a plausible way of escape from a serious dilemma. And, lastly, the difficulty of accounting on evolutionist principles for the appearance of consciousness on a stage where previously there seemed to be nothing but unconscious matter, is explained away by the doctrine of Spinoza that modes of extension are always accompanied by modes of thinking, so that even in the inorganic kingdom there are elements of sentiency which pass into distinct consciousness

when the elements of extension form a nervous system and a brain.

We have ventured thus to set forth in some detail the two aspects of Spinoza's philosophy, which attract respectively the mystic and the savant, partly because we think that some idea of his relation to both religious and scientific thought will be a useful introduction to a review of Dr. Martineau's admirable exposition and examination of Spinoza's doctrines, and partly because we wish to make our readers share our own persuasion that a thorough research into the strength and weakness of the imposing structure of thought which Spinoza's genius has reared is about the very best discipline for arriving at a correct understanding of the real foundations of religious belief, and of the true character and worth of those scientific theories and speculations which now threaten the destruction of all theological interest in the higher regions of British culture.

II. THE LIFE OF SPINOZA.

There is every reason to be grateful to Dr. Martineau and Mr. Pollock for their masterly delineations of Spinoza, as a man and as a thinker. These two scholarly and graceful treatises are both needed, for, as Dr. Martineau observes in his Preface, "a sufficient *raison d'être* may be found for both in the different points of view which they carry with them, through criticisms seldom much at variance."

Mr. Pollock's "Life of Spinoza" is good, and at the time of its appearance was decidedly superior to earlier English accounts of this philosopher. Now, however, it is almost superseded by Dr. Martineau's far more elaborate presentation of Spinoza's outer and inner history. This latest of the biographies of Spinoza is as admirable for the vast amount of conscientious research which it evinces, and

for its ingenious and happy suggestions in regard to perplexing features in the earlier narratives, as it is for the neatness and elegance of its literary form. While Mr. Pollock has treated the greater part of Spinoza's correspondence in a separate chapter, Dr. Martineau has interwoven a full account of the whole of it in the biographical narrative. It is evident, too, that the latter writer has made a special and minute study of the letters, and the result is that he has not only been enabled to add something to our too meagre knowledge of Spinoza's relations with contemporary thinkers, but by inserting the descriptions of the correspondence in their proper places in the sequence of events, has made the letters more intelligible, and also much enhanced the interest of the story. When to this is added, as another special feature of this biography, that it dwells in detail on the order of the composition of Spinoza's works, and also throws much light on the successive phases of his intellectual development, enough has been said to show that it is to Dr. Martineau's "*Life of Spinoza*" that future students of this philosopher will naturally have recourse.

So attractive is the true story of the life of this lonely thinker, who cared for truth so much and for wealth and honour so little, that we expect that Dr. Martineau's new volume will be sought for by many readers, not because of their taste for metaphysical inquiries, but because, having been interested by Auerbach's charming fancy-picture, they will be eager to make acquaintance with the less romantic but not less beautiful and honourable life of the actual Spinoza. And probably some of these readers may take such a liking to the man that they will be disposed to try to learn somewhat of those ideas of his which in his lifetime led thoughtful people of all ranks to court correspondence with him, and to visit him in his humble lodging; and now, two hundred

years after his death, have caused a statue to be erected to his honour, by contributions from all parts of the world, on the very spot, close to his grave, where, a hundred and fifty years ago (as we learn from Dr. Van Vloten), a clergyman of the then predominant Reformed Church exclaimed, "Spit on that grave—there lies Spinoza." Even orthodoxy, however, which is so prone to pass unkind and unjust judgments on the personal character of heretics, was often disarmed and charmed into admiration when brought into close acquaintance with the blameless purity and noble disinterestedness of Spinoza's nature. By far the most important of the sources of our knowledge of Spinoza's character and history* is a life of him written by John Coler, the Lutheran minister at the Hague from 1693 to 1707, who lived in the same lodgings which Spinoza had occupied rather more than twenty years before. This honest and kind-hearted man was evidently so fascinated by what he heard concerning the deceased philosopher, that he took great pains to collect all the reliable information that could be had about him, and particularly inquired of the worthy and pious people with whom Spinoza had lived during the last five years of his life. The good pastor is evidently quite in love with the sweet and simple beauty of the character he so faithfully portrays, though, as he takes good care to let us know, he shrinks with the greatest dread from Spinoza's theological and philosophical views. It was a happy thought of Mr. Pollock's to append to his treatise a reprint of the old translation into English of Coler's quaint and very interesting account.

"On the Burgwal at Amsterdam," writes Dr. Martineau, "is still shown the house of Michael d'Espinoza, the tradesman, in which his son Baruch was born on the 24th of November, 1632." Michael d'Espinoza, whose native place

* For a complete account of these sources, see Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza*. Introduction p. xxii.

was in the province of Leon, in Spain, not far from the frontiers of Portugal (probably at one of the five towns in that district which bear the name of Espinoza), was among the emigrants who sailed from Portugal about the beginning of the seventeenth century to escape from the cruel persecutions of the Romish Church, and to seek a peaceful asylum among the people whose indomitable spirit had at length secured for them practical independence of Spanish rule. Dr. Martineau graphically describes the condition of things in the Peninsula, which had led the Jews (who so long as they remained in Spain were obliged to outwardly conform to Catholicism, and accordingly passed under the name of "New Christians,") to seek a fresh home in the Netherlands. He tells us also that "it was no home of religious peace on which the refugees had alighted. They had taken advantage of large professions of toleration which were never meant for them, or indeed for more than a victorious majority of the persons who made them. They found themselves in an uncongenial community, which gave them no rights of worship or citizenship, but which, pre-occupied with its own dissensions, left them in the security of indifference and contempt."* By the time, however, when Baruch was born, the Jews, by their industry and enterprise, and their expressions of cordial sympathy with the Dutch Christians in their hatred of Spain, had become a recognised and respected portion of the community, and there was nothing to prevent the young Jew from receiving a thorough training in the faith and culture of his people. After passing through the elementary classes of the Jewish High School, Spinoza appears to have come under the influence of two eminent teachers, Manasse ben Israel and Saul Levi Morteira, whose mental characteristics are picturesquely sketched for us by Dr. Martineau. The former of these teachers has

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 7.

a place in the history of England, owing to the zealous efforts he made to induce Cromwell to re-admit the Jews into this country; the latter was the senior Rabbi, and a learned Talmudist, and under his instruction the precocious Baruch made such progress in the knowledge of the Talmud that at the age of fifteen "he became the pride of his teacher and the hope of the synagogue." In the advanced classes of the Amsterdam school he had the opportunity, says Mr. Pollock, "of mastering the philosophical writings of the golden age of modern Jewish learning, the commentaries of Maimonides and Ibn Ezra." In these studies he would indirectly become acquainted with Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic modes of thought and expression, and therefore Dr. Land holds "that to understand Spinoza aright we must begin by placing ourselves in the circle of thought from which all his teachers set out, that of Aristotle."*

At this period of Spinoza's life it is by no means improbable that he was, as Auerbach represents, unfavourably impressed towards Judaism and its teachers by the fate of Uriel da Costa.† The speculative restlessness and passionate weakness of this unhappy man allowed him no permanent peace in any religious communion. Born and bred a Roman Catholic, though in blood a Jew, he became converted to Judaism and fled from Oporto, his native place, to Amsterdam; there he abused the Jewish teachers and

* P. 6, of *Spinoza's Essays*, by LAND, VAN VLOTEN, KUNO FISCHER, and ERNEST RENAN, edited by Professor Knight. By the courtesy of the publishers, Messrs. Williams and Norgate, we have been allowed to see the proof-sheets of the greater part of this forthcoming work. The two lectures delivered on occasion of the Bicentenary of Spinoza, by Prof. Land, to the class of Philosophy at Leiden, give a brief but admirable account of the sources and of the essential features of Spinoza's philosophy. The question how far Spinoza was influenced by mediæval Jewish writings, is also ably discussed in an article in *Mind*, July, 1880, by Mr. W. R. Sorley, on "Jewish Mediæval Philosophy and Spinoza."

† V. Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza* (p. 8), from which narrative the above sketch of Da Costa's career is abridged.

rulers for not keeping close to the Scriptures ; and they, in turn, excommunicated him. Then he published a controversial tract to disprove the immortality of the soul, and it is an instructive indication of the spirit of that age that on the motion of the chiefs of the synagogue, the Christian civil authorities publicly burned his book and punished him with fine and imprisonment. This seems strange behaviour on the part of those who (both Jews and Christians) had themselves only recently escaped from ecclesiastical tyranny ; but it illustrates Dr. Martineau's above-quoted remark, and is just of a piece with the previous action of this same Reformed Church of the Netherlands towards the Arminians, and with that of the New England Puritans towards the Quakers. Mr. Pollock's remark upon it is :—" It is a general fact in human history, and one of the saddest, that no sooner has a persecuted community secured its freedom, than it takes to persecuting in its turn."

There is hardly ground, we think, for this sweeping generalisation ; the fact rather is that at the period in question the connection in men's minds between dogma and salvation was so close and essential as to render them quite unable to take a just view of toleration and of the right of honest thought to free expression. Both Jews and Christians needed that enlightenment on this subject which first dawned on modern theological thought with the publication of Spinoza's *Theologico-Political Treatise*. But to return to Da Costa. After enduring this social ostracism for fifteen years, he, in outward form at least, became reconciled to the Jewish Church, but his deistic and anti-Rabbinical utterances at length brought upon him a more stringent excommunication. This second exclusion he bore for more than seven years, and then again submitted, but was readmitted only after undergoing a very humiliating ceremony, so humiliating, indeed, that his wounded pride rendered life unendurable. After the ceremony he hastened home, wrote

an autobiography, in which he bitterly denounced his persecutors, and then shot himself.

Whether this event caused Spinoza to consider if he himself was altogether sound in the Jewish faith we do not know, but certainly not very long after this he lost his interest in Rabbinical instruction, and no longer aspired to become a shining light of the Jewish synagogue. We are left to conjecture as to the mental process which brought about this change. It was probably hastened by the mode of instruction of his teacher, Morteira, whose mental habits were not likely to win the confidence of an enterprising thinker and close reasoner such as Spinoza was. "Fond of the forms (to quote Dr. Martineau's words), but incapable of the spirit of philosophical thought, Morteira could not fail to start more problems than he could solve; while his dogmatic temper would but fix the difficulties which he attempted to beat down. It is no wonder that, under such a master, the clear-witted boy of fifteen found matter for many puzzling questions in his Hebrew Bible and his Talmud; and met with answers more disturbing still. He had caught from his straightforward father an abhorrence of pious pretences, and could not be imposed upon by critical excuses and evasions; and when he got nothing better to help his perplexities, what could a modest and retiring youth do, but keep his difficulties to himself, in reserve for future and private scrutiny?"*

Probably soon after this he served his apprenticeship to the art by which he was to earn his living—that of making and polishing optical glasses. At the same time he acquired a knowledge of Italian, French, and German, and, at a rather later period, began the study of Latin. This last-mentioned study indicates a growing thirst for Gentile culture, for the learning of this language (which was at that time the ordinary medium of learned intercourse throughout

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 11.

Europe), was discouraged by the Jews as not tending to religious edification. Greek, it appears, he never thoroughly mastered. Amid his other studies for several years "he repeatedly read the Hebrew Scriptures and their most approved interpreters."

As to what events occurred in the life of Spinoza from the age of fifteen up to the age of twenty-three (when the open rapture with his people happened), we have but little information. There is no doubt, however, that "working silently and living blamelessly, he was passing through the most momentous crisis of his inner history."* During the first half of this period he probably lived at home with his parents and two sisters, quietly studying when not engaged in the manual labour of his trade. During the latter half of the time we know that he formed two connections of a very dissimilar nature, the one appealing to what was religious and mystical in his mind, the other to his mathematical and scientific tastes and aspirations. The first of these was the friendship he formed with several devout and liberal-minded Christians, some of whom, as we learn from Coler, were Mennonites. For an account of this sect we must refer the reader to Dr. Martineau's interesting narrative. "From their disapproval of infant baptism (he tells us), they are often confounded with the later Anabaptists; but their characteristics are quite different, bringing them rather into resemblance, partly with the *Hernhüter* and partly with the Society of Friends."† Closely akin in spirit to the Mennonites were the Collegiants with whom also Spinoza formed friendships, and when, about the time of his excommunication, it was deemed prudent that he should leave the city, he removed some two or three miles out of Amsterdam, on the Ouderkerk road, to the house of one of the members of this fraternity. Mr. Pollock speaks of these Collegiants simply as Remonstrants, but as Dr. Martineau points out,

* p. 13.

† p. 15.

they were a peculiar offshoot of the Remonstrants founded by three brothers, Kobbe by name—all of them farmers—"to whom it occurred that if pastors and churches were not to be allowed, they could do without them. They might be driven away from this 'mountain,' and shut out of 'Jerusalem,' but God was a Spirit, as near as before. The preachers might be silenced and banished, but the truth which they preached could not go into exile with them; belonging to the nature of things, it might still be found by those who stay among the dykes as by those who take ship upon the sea."*

At this date, too, the Remonstrants had a regular ministry in Amsterdam, while the Collegiant communities formed not churches, but collegia, and met together "for mutual help in the Christian life with nothing to disturb the equality of all except the diversity of gifts."

What was it that attracted Spinoza to these simple-minded Christians at this crisis of his mental history? It might be supposed that, as both the Mennonites and the Collegiants appear to have had some mystical tendencies, or, at least, to have held views somewhat akin to the Quaker doctrine of the Spirit, it was a kindred mystical element in Spinoza's mind which drew him and them together. Nor do we think this at all improbable; for, notwithstanding his partiality later on for the *mos geometricus*, we cannot help thinking that Spinoza was all along much of a mystic at heart. It is true that at a later period of his life, after he had thoroughly mastered Descartes' writings, fascinated by the certainty and clearness with which the results of mathematics and of mathematical physics flow from the definitions and axioms, he became altogether possessed with the idea that all phenomena, mental as well as physical, are related to the clearly intuited Substance, as the properties of the triangle are

* p. 16.

related to the essential definition of the triangle. Hence the later mathematical form of his philosophy which masks and fetters the ontological and theosophic passion of the man (*amor Dei intellectualis*). And, if we mistake not (though here we speak with much diffidence, for we are not sure that Dr. Martineau's profound study of Spinoza sanctions our impression),* there are passages both in the *Ethica* and in his other writings, which, in spite of the mechanical rigidity of the form, seem at times to glow with intense heat, as if, indeed, the iron framework of the system were about to melt and allow the mighty spirit within to burst forth into some grand Platonic strain. The blood of the prophets and of the son of Mary still flowed in Spinoza's veins; and it is this strange synthesis in his mind of the mystic intuitionism of the fourth Gospel with the mechanical physiology and psychology begotten of the study of Descartes, which explains at once the secret of his power and charm, and of his glaring inconsistencies. In reading some parts of the *Ethica*, one would almost think that Spinoza believed that it is only such men as La Place and Herbert Spencer who (through getting to see the universe *sub specie æternitatis*) are able to enter into the kingdom of heaven. But it clearly crops up in Coler's *Life of Spinoza*, and still more in the Theologico-Political Treatise, that Spinoza was quite aware that there is another path to heaven, which, though apparently very different from the former one, is just as certain to lead

* V. p. 289 on "The Mind's 'Eternal Part,'" and Chapter V. on "Religion" *passim*. It affords very strong presumption, we must admit, against the correctness of our view that Dr. Martineau and Mr. Pollock, different as are their theological position and sympathies, appear to agree in the main in their interpretation of this important part of Spinoza's writings (V. Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza*, chapters IX. and XI.). Mr. Pollock allows, however, that "there is unquestionably something of an exalted and mystical temper in Spinoza's expressions; and it seems possible enough that but for his scientific training in the school of Descartes, he might have been a mystic indeed." We shall recur to this question in the concluding division of this essay.

those who tread it faithfully to their home in God—the path of simple obedience to conscience, of love to God and man. Spinoza knew somewhat of the deep meaning of the words, “Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes;” and it was, we think, because he knew and felt this truth (however inconsistent it might have been with his intellectual philosophy of God, man, and nature*), that he loved the society of these simple-minded and devout Mennonites and Collegiants. As Dr. Martineau truly says, the attraction which Spinoza felt towards them was not that of conversion to their theological creed, but it was “the inwardness of their religion which set it free from the letter of history and law, and made it a simple relation between the finite and the infinite mind.”†

Our excuse for this rather lengthy digression is that it is not possible to understand either Spinoza's life or his philosophy, unless we see clearly how it came to pass that he continually stood in friendly relations with two very different sorts of people. We have had a sample of one sort in his friends, the Collegiants, and we now come to a sample of the other sort, with whom he made acquaintance about the same time—namely, Francis Van den Ende, who afterwards was put to death in Paris for taking part in a conspiracy against the French Government. He was at this time half doctor and half schoolmaster in Amsterdam, and he undertook to help Spinoza in his study of Latin, Spinoza, in return, becoming a resident usher in Van den Ende's school. Van den Ende was a vigorous but restless thinker, “a scientific materialist without theology,” and so bitterly averse to the theological opinions he had formerly held that prudence did not always restrain his tongue, and so, getting a reputation for Atheism, he finally lost his

* *V. A Study of Spinoza*, p. 369, for a clear statement of the nature and cause of this inconsistency.

† p. 18.

pupils, and had to leave the city. A full account of Van den Ende, and of his probable influence on Spinoza's culture, is given by Dr. Martineau.* Mr. Pollock thinks that he not only encouraged and helped Spinoza in his study of Descartes' writings, but also introduced him to the writings of Giordano Bruno.† That Spinoza had learned something of Bruno's speculations seems very probable, especially from two dialogues apparently written by Spinoza about this time, and now incorporated in the recently discovered small treatise on "God and Man";‡ and as both Jews and Protestants abhorred Bruno, it is difficult to see how else, than through Van den Ende, Bruno's ideas can at this time have found their way into Spinoza's mind.

During his stay in the house of this vigorous free-thinker, we are told he gave his heart to Van den Ende's daughter—"the Olympia of Auerbach's tale, the Clara Maria of fact." This young lady (as we read in the English translation of Coler's "Life") "was none of the most Beautiful, but she had a great deal of Wit, a great Capacity and a jovial Humour, which wrought upon the Heart of Spinoza, as well as upon another scholar of Van den Ende,

* p. 19.

† p. 12.

‡ *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 13. Dr. Martineau says that, if we agree with Avenarius that these dialogues were written about this date (1651-52), they do not throw much light on the state of mind to which Spinoza was brought by the first collapse of his early theology:—"Nothing can be inferred from their crude and confused sentences, except that his philosophy was yet unformed. The incompleteness, however, was all on the affirmative side of his convictions; the rapid gathering of rabbinical clouds and bursting of thunders on his head clearly show the range and decisiveness of his negative conclusions. Naturalism had taken the place with him of the Supernatural; Reason, of Revelation; prediction by determinate causes, of imaginative visions by Prophets; Necessity, of Design; and the reckoning of human consequences, of threats from Divine anger. The Israelites, though having their function in the world, ceased to be a 'covenanted people': their annals were no more sacred than other history; their 'Scriptures' fell back into the mass of ancient literature. He knew he must be treated as an apostate. But having in him a good deal of the esoteric temper, and believing that for the mass of men the religious 'imagination' did something of the work of truth, he was not eager to precipitate his exile, and still held his peace so long as he ingenuously could."

whose name was Kerckkrinck, a native of Hamburg." Kerckkrinck was the successful wooer; as Dr. Martineau neatly puts it, "he made up for want of genius by abundant wealth, and being a handsome fellow into the bargain, easily cut out the olive-faced philosopher by the bribe of a pearl necklace and a good address." Such was the tradition; but Dr. Van Vloten, by hunting up the register of her marriage, found by a comparison of dates that Clara, who was twenty-seven years of age when she married, could not have been more than eleven or twelve years old when Spinoza was studying and teaching in Van den Ende's house, and so it seemed that this, the only bit of romance in Spinoza's life, would have to be mercilessly eliminated. Happily, however, his recent biographers have hit upon a suggestion which enables us to retain it in substance, though slightly modified in form. It is very probable that Spinoza, after he removed to the house on the Ouderkerk Road, where he lived for five or six years, still kept up his intimacy with Van den Ende's family, and nothing could be more natural, says Dr. Martineau, "than that the friendship begun in a common love of Virgil and Cicero should turn, at the ages of seventeen and twenty-nine, into love of each other. But the lens-grinder was penniless, and sure to remain so: he soon removed to a distance, and became absorbed in a more ideal love-suit—to immortal truth; and if the mortal maiden left him to the pursuit, and, after ten patient years, gave her hand to one who was both able to offer her a home and did not forget that matrimony is the crown of love, we can hardly accuse her of worldly fickleness."* Kuno Fischer remarks on this episode in Spinoza's life: "With the pangs of love such a head could not have much to do. It was too clear to be darkened by passion." We fail to see the conclusiveness of this inference. Was Dante's mind darkened by his passion? But it is true, the

* p. 25.

"witty" and "jovial" Clara Maria was probably not exactly a Beatrice. Mr. Pollock, after observing that it is just possible that some such half-ideal, half-childish affection may have sprung up between Spinoza and Van den Ende's daughter, adds: "Spinoza was not a poet, some one will say. No, but he was a mystic at the time in question, which for this purpose will do at least as well."*

Whether or not Spinoza during his residence in Van den Ende's house was captivated by the personal and mental charms of the clever and sprightly Clara, there is no doubt that he was much interested in studies, such as the writings of Descartes, and perhaps of Giordano Bruno, which, in conjunction with the personal influence of Van den Ende, completed his estrangement from Jewish orthodoxy, and from the ceremonial usages connected with it. It appears, also, that at the same time a little circle of inquirers belonging to various religious bodies began to gather round him, and though the Cartesian system seems to have been the chief subject of their discussions, "he must now and then in the course of them have given utterance to heterodox opinions. The heads of the synagogue took offence at the doctrine and the practice of the young member of their body, from whom they had formerly expected so much, and tried every means in order to retain him in their fold."† So anxious were the Jewish leaders to keep the gifted Baruch in peaceful connection with their body, that they offered him, we are told, an annual pension of one thousand florins, if he would attend the synagogue occasionally, and abstain from ventilating his troublesome doubts. Spinoza could not, of course, entertain such a proposal for a moment, because, as Coler says, "he was not a hypocrite, and minded nothing but truth." In a not very reliable biography of Spinoza, written early in the eighteenth century, by one Lucas, a physician of the

* p. 14.

† *Spinoza Essays*. Dr. Land's Lecture, p. 7.

Hague, we read that two fellow-students questioned him closely on theology, and extracted from him certain heretical opinions, such as that, according to the Scriptures, God has a body, angels are only phantoms, and the soul means only the principle of life, and is therefore mortal. This inquisitiveness of theirs was probably, as Dr. Martineau suggests, prompted by the chiefs of the synagogue; at all events, Spinoza's admissions were reported to them, and soon after this in the early part of 1656, Morteira and his colleagues felt it necessary to take decided action. Spinoza was summoned before the Court and, after many unavailing attempts to induce him to recant, they inflicted on him the first degree of ecclesiastical censure, the lower excommunication, which excluded him for thirty days from Jewish society, and was intended to give him time to reflect and repent. The proceedings against him inflamed the zeal of some fanatic, who set upon Spinoza with a dagger one evening as he was leaving some public building, either a theatre or the synagogue.* He evaded the blow, however, and it only pierced his coat, which he afterwards kept in that condition as a memorial. At this time it was that he left Amsterdam and took up his abode with his Collegiant friend on the Ouderkerk road. "It was here," says Mr. Pollock, "under the roof of heretics, anathematised by the Synod of Dort, that he learned the final decision of the Jewish congregation on the charge of heresy against himself." The sentence was pronounced on July 27, 1656, in the Portuguese language. It is given in full in English in Mr. G. H. Lewes' *History of Philosophy*, vol. ii., p. 167. The curse "invokes on him God's unrelenting and pursuing wrath, forbids any one to hold commerce with him by speech or pen, to enter the same house with him or come within six feet of him, to do him any kindness, or read anything of his."†

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 23.

† *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 28.

The blow must have been a severe one to any Jew, for the ties of kindred among Israelites are unusually warm and strong, but it is probable that it fell more lightly on Spinoza than it would have done on most men. The modes of thought and extension which constituted our philosopher must have been singularly unlike those which, in the case of poor Uriel da Costa, issued in self-destruction. Spinoza wrote a reply in Spanish to the "amiable document," as Dr. Martineau calls it, and then most likely quietly resumed the study of Descartes; for we are told that on receiving the news of his excommunication he remarked, "This compels me to nothing which I should not otherwise have done." The state of mind of the pupil of Descartes was probably closely akin to that of the pupil of Kant, described in the following passage from Heinrich Heine's racy treatise on *Religion and Philosophy in Germany* :—

Dear reader, if ever thou shouldst visit Amsterdam, bid some cicerone show thee the Spanish synagogue. It is a beautiful building, having its roof resting on four colossal pillars. In the midst stands the pulpit, from which was pronounced the curse on the despiser of the Mosaic law, the Hidalgo don Benedict de Spinoza. On such an occasion a buck's horn, called a *Shofar*, was blown. There must be something quite terrible about this horn; for as I once read in the life of Solomon Maimon, as the Rabbi of Altona was endeavouring to lead him, the pupil of Kant, back to the old faith, and as he stubbornly persisted in his philosophical heresies, the Rabbi resorted to threats and, holding up the *Shofar*, inquired in tones of awe, "Knowest thou what this is?" But when the pupil of Kant replied with calm indifference, "It is the horn of a buck," the horror-stricken Rabbi fell backwards on the ground.

For the next five years Spinoza (who now dropped the Hebrew name "Baruch," and assumed instead its Latin equivalent "Benedict") lived at his friend's house, earning an adequate livelihood by his handicraft. His lenses were excellent, and we hear that those found in his room at his death fetched a very good price. He also gained some repu-

tation as an optician, and it was in this character that he first made the acquaintance of Huyghens and Leibnitz. He seems now to have broken off all communication with his family, and only once more in his lifetime do we hear anything of them—namely, on the death of his father, when his sisters disputed his claim to a share in the inheritance. On conscientious grounds he legally asserted and established his right; but having done so, gave everything to his sisters except one bed. He was during these years the leading spirit of the little band of Cartesians before alluded to, which consisted chiefly (says Dr. Martineau) “of medical students or practitioners, including his subsequent correspondents, Simon de Vries, Dr. John Bresser, and Lodewijk Meyer, known as the editor of his posthumous works.” It is probable, too, that he began now to give lessons to private pupils in the new scientific method, “and so would become conscious, in expounding it, of whatever difficulty it left unsolved.”

In 1661 he removed from the neighbourhood of Amsterdam with his host and friend, and lived for two years at Rhijnsburg, which town was the head-quarters of the Collegiant sect. Before, however, leaving Amsterdam he wrote a “Short Treatise on God and Man and his well-being,”* probably as a parting legacy to his group of friends. “In order,” says Dr. Martineau, “to give this recovered Treatise its true significance, we should regard it, not as the first draft of a projected work, but as the first landing place of his mind in its independent advance. To a large extent it is a reproduction of Descartes, in its ontology, its conception of method, and its psychology and classification of the passions. But there are marked deviations which, though few, are of supreme importance. He adopts the Determinist theory. He makes the actual and the possible co-extensive,

* For the story of the discovery of this treatise, which had only existed in manuscript, v. *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 33.

and so identifies Nature and God. And the human phenomena he interprets on the principle of automatic naturalism. All these are in fact but different aspects of one thorough-going change ; and are separately mentioned only because they alter the soil and the fruits of different fields. The wonder is that so vital a modification should make so little show and leave the Treatise with still so Cartesian a look." *

The two years at Rhijnsburg, "though wholly uneventful, were probably among the most fruitful in his mental history." † It was during this time that he made a careful study of Method, and had also already placed on the stocks the great work on which his philosophical fame chiefly rests, for as early as 1661, at the commencement of his stay at Rhijnsburg, he sent to his friend in London, Heinrich Oldenburg, a fragment of the *Ethics*, and two years later we find Simon Vries, one of his younger friends in Amsterdam, reading the *Ethics* in manuscript. This Henry Oldenburg, who plays a prominent part in Spinoza's correspondence, was a native of Bremen, and came over to England as Consul for that city in the time of the Protectorate. He formed many intimacies with eminent literary and scientific Englishmen, and was appointed one of the secretaries of the Royal Society. A very full and interesting account of him and of the letters that passed between him and Spinoza is given in Dr. Martineau's biography. He visited Leiden in 1661, and took a trip to Rhijnsburg on purpose to see Spinoza. The relation between him and Spinoza is a very curious one. Spinoza seems to have opened his mind to Oldenburg with unusual freedom, but it is clear that the latter never thoroughly understood Spinoza's philosophy. He constantly urges Spinoza to publish, but his zeal for publication grew much colder after he saw the effect of the publication of the Theologico-Political Treatise ; and though he offered to take

* p. 35.

† p. 39.

some copies of the *Ethica*, if it should be published, he was evidently half-afraid of having anything to do with it, and expressed no great sorrow when Spinoza gave up his intention of publishing it.

During his stay at Rhijnsburg, Spinoza published with his name, in 1663, abstracts of Descartes' *Principia Philosophiæ*, with an appendix on "Metaphysical Thoughts." "This appendix," says Dr. Martineau, "perplexes us by presenting still an elaborate defence of Freewill, which he is said to have long renounced. His editor, Meyer, excuses him by saying that in teaching the pupil, for whom these abstracts were prepared, he felt bound to sink his personality, and remain the mere representative of Descartes. But if so, it is strange that these 'Thoughts' should stand as the recognised indication of philosophical advance from Descartes to Spinoza."*

During these two years at Rhijnsburg he had been studying Descartes' *Discours de la Methode* on the one hand, and Bacon's *Novum Organum* on the other, and, not being satisfied with either, he had commenced and brought nearly into its present form his fragmentary treatise on the "Amendment of the Understanding." As mentioned above, he also sent to his young friend Simon de Vries, for the consideration of his confidants at Amsterdam, the first seventeen Propositions of the Ethics. The affection and respect of this Simon de Vries for his beloved teacher is very beautiful and touching. "I have long desired," he writes to Spinoza, "an occasion to be with you, but weather and the hard winter have not allowed me. Sometimes I complain of

* P. 41. Note. Here Dr. Martineau indicates what appears to have been the one slight weakness in Spinoza's high character. In these "Thoughts," Spinoza not only repeats Descartes' arguments for Freewill, but constructs others of his own, and yet Meyer tells us he did not believe the doctrine. Dr. Martineau holds, and we think justly, that his concealment goes beyond the limits of mere reserve, and that it abates the interest of his character to come across the frequent sentiment, "*Hoc hominum commune vitium est, consilia sua, etsi tacito opus est, aliis credere.*"

my fate in being removed from you by a distance that keeps us so much apart. Happy, most happy, is that companion who dwells with you under the same roof, and who can at all times, dining, supping, or walking, hold discourse with you of the most excellent matters. But though we are separated in the body, yet you have constantly been present to my mind, especially when I apply myself to your writings."* This Simon Vries once offered Spinoza a present of 2,000 florins, that he might be able to live more at ease, but Spinoza refused it, because he had no use for it, and the possession would, he said, be burdensome to him. And when Vries was dying, he wished, as he had no wife or children, to make Spinoza his sole heir; but Spinoza declined the offer, and begged Vries to bequeath it to his own brother; and even out of the annuity of 500 florins which the brother wished him to have, Spinoza would only accept 300. This unselfishness was a striking characteristic of Spinoza's character. We have seen another instance of it in his behaviour to his sisters in regard to the paternal inheritance, and it presents itself again conspicuously later on, when, after the brutal murder of John de Witt, his heirs disputed Spinoza's right to the small pension which the Grand Pensionary had conferred on him for life, and which, at that time, was his chief support. "This wrong," writes Dr. Martineau, "his indignant friends would have resented on his behalf; but rather than retain a benefaction by a quarrel, he surrendered his just claim. So struck were the intending litigants with his forbearance that what they had denied to equity they yielded to admiration, and regularly paid him the allowance."†

In 1663 Spinoza removed to the village of Voorburg, about two miles from the Hague. His chief motive for the change of residence appears to have been "to place himself within reach of powerful protectors who would secure him from harm in the contemplated publication of his philo-

* Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza*, p. 23.

† p. 92.

sophy; and such protectors he would have in the brothers De Witt at the Hague. This is what he means when he tells Oldenburg that he has friends influential in the State, who may guard him against danger; and that if they cannot he will hold his peace."* There, as elsewhere, Dr. Martineau's narrative acquires additional interest and worth from the vivid picture it gives of the contemporary history and politics, and of the influence which the political ideas of Spinoza and his friends exerted upon the higher thought of the country. The seven years which he spent at Voorburg were devoted to the composition of two principal works, the first half of the period being given to the *Ethics*, the latter to the *Theologico-Political Treatise*; and in the former half he also gave some attention to the unfinished essay on *Method*. As an explanation of the non-completion of this last-mentioned work, Dr. Martineau approves of the acute remark of Avenarius "that Spinoza had to break off the 'Emendation' treatise because, when he came to define the intellect, he could not do it without resort to his metaphysical system for which he was only preparing the way, and this difficulty forced him to see that a doctrine of the intellect could not be a prelude to his metaphysics, inasmuch as it can arise only as their result."† The *Ethics* he continued to compose in Dutch, and, as the portions were completed, sent them to Amsterdam for his disciples there to study and translate into Latin. Dr. Martineau shows from Spinoza's correspondence that it is most probable that his great work which was begun in 1661 was already complete before the autumn of 1665, and "this well accords with the fact that in September of this year Oldenburg twits him with having turned from philosophy to theology, to treat of 'angels and miracles and prophecy,' in evident allusion to his having taken in hand his *Theologico-Political Treatise*. For the next four years his industry was concentrated upon this work—a disproportioned time if measured by the

* *Ib.* p. 51.

† p. 49.

product of the previous equal term, but not if we allow for the difference between an achievement of genius and a result of study. His *Ethics* depended only on his powers of thought, spontaneously moving on the lines or off the lines traced already by Descartes. His *Treatise* deals with a vast ancient literature and history, and involves a continued criticism of the opinions of others on a cyclopædia of unsettled questions." *

As an explanation of the circumstance that Spinoza allowed the manuscript of the *Ethica* to lie by while he was composing the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Dr. Martineau suggests that he found at Amsterdam that the papers containing the *Ethics* had passed too freely from hand to hand for the authorship to remain a secret. "This awakened his fears, and sent him back with a resolve to open his assault upon public errors from another side, and by a work which, never leaving his own desk during its progress, should be brought home to him by neither indiscretion nor treachery." † The *Tractatus* appeared, accordingly, in 1670, anonymously. It made a great sensation, exciting both vehement admiration and vehement condemnation. The doctrine of the subjection of the Church to the State, which it advocated, brought upon it the bitter condemnation of the clerical party, "for if there is anything that ecclesiastical dogmatists of all parties are united in hating with a perfect hatred, it is the Erastian view of the relation of the State to religious differences." ‡ It was accordingly proscribed along with the *Leviathan*, of Hobbes, and other works, as a Socinian production—a fate which Spinoza had dreaded, and to avoid which, if possible, he had discounted the translation of the book from Latin into Dutch. While engaged on these two great literary labours he had also, during his residence at Voorburg, carried on an extensive scientific correspondence, particularly with Oldenburg, and, through Oldenburg, with Boyle, and other

* p. 55.

† p. 59.

‡ Mr. Pollock's *Spinoza*, p. 33.

English savans. Dr. Martineau has carefully examined these letters, and gives good reasons for his conclusion—a conclusion which appears somewhat at variance with Mr. Pollock's impression *—"that, in truth, Spinoza's physical knowledge does not seem to have been so accurate or so large as his opportunities would lead us to expect. The reflective tendency of his genius did not permit him to pause with long patience upon the analysis of concrete facts, but hurried him away into the region of large conceptions (generals that had never been generalised), whence, as he believed, he could see them brought to the birth." †

Soon after the publication of the *Tractatus*, Spinoza removed from the neighbourhood of the Hague to the city itself. One of his motives for settling at Voorburg had been the facility it gave for intercourse with cultured friends living at the Hague, and, now that he had finished his two great works, he could afford time to receive the accession of visitors which his residence at the Hague itself would involve. Even at Voorburg several distinguished foreigners sought him out, and after the publication of the Theologico-Political Treatise, the number of persons anxious to converse with him was much increased. At first he lodged and boarded with the widow Van de Velde, who had already had some acquaintance with the ways of studious men, for fifty years before she had been in service at the house of the celebrated Grotius. We cannot resist the temptation of quoting Dr. Martineau's vivid picture of Spinoza's habits during this last period of his life :—

After the lapse of a generation, the widow's house was occupied by Coler, the worthy Lutheran minister who became Spinoza's biographer. He used as his study the single back-room which held the philosopher's bed, and books, and tools of work. No house, once made memorable, passes down without its traditions; and to these we owe the scanty notices remaining of the widow's lodger. Though it was the pleading of friends

* *Ib.*, p. 11.

† p. 64.

that had brought him into town, the chief thing that struck observers seems to have been his loneliness of habit. Even for his meals he would often not quit his room, and for two or three days together would see no one. In part this may have been due to a discouraging experience of the cost of living at the Hague; for the necessity of retrenchment drove him next year to remove into a house on the Pavilio-en-gragt, at the back of the widow's, occupied by a painter, Van der Spijck, whose wife would allow him to provide his own meals, and save something by their frugality. Here he spent the last five and a-half years of his life, endeared to his host and hostess by his sweet temper and quiet friendly ways, but declining all social visits beyond the house, though graciously receiving the calls of visitors entitled to seek him."*

Though at the Hague Spinoza devoted so much time to study as sometimes not to leave the house for months, yet the literary results do not seem proportionate to the labour, for we know only of the unfinished *Tractatus Politicus* and of notes for a new edition of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Dr. Martineau suggests that "his feeble health was now beginning to tell upon his power of intellectual achievement—upon its quantity, though not upon its quality; and that the languid moods which insisted upon relief from strain became more frequent."†

The relations between Spinoza and Leibnitz, which occurred during these last years of Spinoza's life, are fully described by Dr. Martineau, who arrives at the conclusion that "the charge against Leibnitz, of insincere and time-serving depreciation of Spinoza, has no real foundation."‡ These relations with Leibnitz are connected with the far more interesting and intimate connection between Spinoza and Freiherr von Tschirnhaus, a Bohemian nobleman of a noble and generous temper. He was about twenty years younger than Spinoza, and after Spinoza's death earned considerable renown by his achievements in science. He was not only a savant, however, but an acute student of the mental processes involved in scientific discovery.

* p. 73.

† p. 74.

‡ p. 79.

Hence his lively interest in the writings of both Spinoza and Leibnitz, and it was his report to Leibnitz of Spinoza's doctrines which induced the former to visit the philosopher of the Hague. Dr. Martineau regards Tschirnhaus as the keenest of Spinoza's contemporary critics, and the sketch which he gives of this nobleman's character and career, and of his relations with Spinoza, is most attractive.

About this time an incident occurred which showed that Spinoza's name and reputation had already reached the great centres of learning in Europe—an offer, namely, to him from the Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig, of the Chair of Philosophy in the University of Heidelberg, with no other restriction on his action than the understanding that he would not misuse his liberty to disturb the established religion. Spinoza replies in an admirable letter, politely declining the offer, partly because he feared teaching would interfere with philosophical research, and partly because he is not sure what is involved in this understanding that he should not disturb the public religion.

In the year preceding this invitation the tragic fate of the De Witts occurred. The historical incidents associated with that brutal murder are depicted with Dr. Martineau's rare descriptive power, and on this occasion we see Spinoza's soul, usually so placid, vehemently stirred by strong emotions of grief and indignation:—"For once his equanimity gave way, and on hearing the news he burst into a passion of tears. Nay, he resolved to denounce the crime on the spot where it was committed; and prepared a handbill which he was about to post up by night in the low precincts of the prison; but was saved from the rash act by Van der Spijck's precaution in locking the house door and refusing exit."*

Not long after this Spinoza again incurred public odium by an act of which his biographers, previous to Dr. Martineau, have failed to discover any satisfactory explana-

* *A Study of Spinoza*, p. 88.

tion. In the winter of 1672-73, when the head-quarters of the French army of invasion were at Utrecht, a certain Colonel there named Stoupe, at once a soldier and a theologian, who had printed a somewhat unfavourable criticism of Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise, invited Spinoza in his own name, and also in that of the Prince of Condé, to visit Utrecht, saying that Condé would recommend him for a pension if he would dedicate some book to the French King. Such an invitation does not seem at all likely to have been congenial to Spinoza's mind, and yet he accepted it, and went to Utrecht. It so happened that Condé had been suddenly called away, and the visit led to no known result, except that Spinoza said he had no wish for the proposed pension. As might be expected this visit caused him to be regarded with angry suspicion as one carrying on treasonable negotiations with the French, and on his return the populace were so excited that Van der Spijk feared that rioters would attack his house; but Spinoza reassured him by bravely declaring that if any mob came to the door he would at once go out to them and let them treat him, if they chose, as they had treated the De Witts. This shows that Spinoza, with all his timid shrinking from collision, could be courageous enough when duty demanded it. But why did he accept this invitation, and thus voluntarily take a course that threatened not only his peaceful relations with his neighbours, but even his life? Dr. Martineau suggests an explanation which may clear up the mystery. He shows that the contending parties were at that time so circumstanced that both had good reason to wish to learn whether they could prudently open negotiations for peace. "If," says Dr. Martineau, "on each side there was a secret wish to measure the temper of the other, no intermediary could look more innocent and be more informing than a philosophical recluse of republican sympathies whose private life was in contact with the most pacific party in the State. That some such public object should

lie hid behind the personal motive assigned for the visit would be perfectly consistent with the truest patriotism." *

In 1675 Spinoza went to Amsterdam to see about the printing of the *Ethica*; but he found that a rumour had been set afloat, and was believed, that he was about to print a book to disprove the existence of God. He found also that owing to this rumour, not only the clergy, but also some Cartesians, were up in arms against him; and so, with his characteristic caution and love of quietude and peace, he dropped the intention of immediate publication. He appears now to have addressed himself to the preparation of the notes for a new edition of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, and at the same time to have carried on some correspondence which had grown out of the doctrines of that work. The rapid advance of consumption was, however, undermining his strength. For some time his letters had spoken of failing health, and he had begged the indulgence of his correspondents. On Saturday, the 20th of February, 1677, he felt somewhat worse than usual, and sent for his friend Dr. Meyer, of Amsterdam, who arrived on Sunday morning. No one seems to have supposed that his end was so near, for both the Van der Spijcks went to church in the afternoon, and learned, to their great surprise, on their return, that he had died at three o'clock. No one was present at his death save Dr. Meyer, the friend who afterwards superintended the publication of the manuscript works.

In concluding this meagre outline of the story of Spinoza and his writings (which can give, of course, but a very imperfect idea of the complete and artistic picture presented in Dr. Martineau's admirable biography), we would wish to call attention to one great distinctive trait of Spinoza's philosophizing, namely, its practical character.

"Spinoza himself tells us," says Dr. Land,† "by what road he came to philosophical enquiry. He had found that all those things which men generally seek after, riches, honour, pleasure,

* p. 91.

† *Spinoza Essays*, p. 17.

do not permanently satisfy. He asked if it were possible to discover and acquire that by means of which he would partake of perfect and enduring happiness. Nothing he saw but love to the eternal and infinite could bestow on him that joy. The highest good consisted for him in this, that he himself, and as many others as possible by his means, should come to the knowledge of 'that unity which connects the mind of man with the whole of nature.'"

His life and letters convince us that he had found the tranquil happiness he sought for; but the interesting question still remains whether that peace of soul had been mainly won, as he himself seems to have thought it had, by persistent intellectual striving to attain to the true knowledge of himself and nature in their relation to the eternal Substance, or whether it had really been gained by the simpler process (which, in the case of unintellectual people, he admits to be legitimate and effectual) of obeying those monitions of the heart and conscience which are felt to carry with them a divine authority. We are inclined to think the latter is the true hypothesis, and the more we study his life and writings in the light of Dr. Martineau's exposition, the greater grows our reverence and love for the man, but at the same time the clearer grows our perception that his system, so far from being a coherent and consistent chain of reasoning, resting on self-evident primary truths, is, as we think will be clearly seen when we treat of Dr. Martineau's presentation of his philosophy, neither satisfactory in its first principles nor faultless in its logic. We cannot agree with Jacobi when he says, after refuting Spinozism, that it is, after all, the only self-consistent solution of the problem of the universe that philosophy can give; but we heartily echo his genial exclamation:—"Take my blessing after all, great, aye, holy Benedict. Philosophize as thou mayst, and go astray in word respecting the nature of the Supreme. His truth was in thy soul and His love was thy life."

CHARLES B. UPTON.

MUSICA ECCLESIASTICA. •

"**I**N omnibus requiem quaesivi, et nusquam inveni, nisi in hoexkens ende boexkens." This famous saying exhibits the history of Thomas Kempensis in an expressive miniature. We should miss the whole force of the self-delineation, were we to treat it (with a modern writer) as in any respect an echo of the magnificent despair of Ecclesiastes. The "omnia," which constituted the limited experiences of the quiet Frater of St. Agnes' Mount, were insignificant indeed, if we measure them by the eager excursions into all fields of human interest and expectancy, made by the insatiable spirit of him who cloaks his mysterious personality under the ambiguous phrase, "a son of David, a king of Jerusalem." "Requies," which was the first quest and the assured gain of Thomas, never fell upon the cankered soul of that great writer who dared

* 1. *Prolegomena zu einer neuen Ausgabe der Imitatio Christi nach dem Autograph des Thomas von Kempen.* Von KARL HIRSCHKE. Band I. (Berlin: Carl Habel.) 1873.

2. *The Authorship of the De Imitatione Christi.* By SAMUEL KETTLEWELL, M.A. (Rivingtons.) 1877.

3. *Quæritur e quibus Nederlandicis fontibus hausert scriptor libri cui titulus est De Imitatione Christi.* Auctore G. BONET-MAURY. (Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher.) 1878.

4. *Gérard de Groote, un précurseur de la Réforme, au quatorzième siècle, d'après des documents inédits.* Par G. BONET-MAURY. (Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher.) 1878.

5. *Giovanni Gersen, sein Leben und sein Werk De Imitatione Christi.* Von Dr. COLESTIN WOLFGRUBER; Benedictiner zu den Schotten in Wein. (Augsburg: Max Huttler.) 1880.

6. *Thomas à Kempis and the Brothers of Common Life.* By the Rev. S. KETTLEWELL. (Kegan Paul, Trench and Co.) 1882.

to inscribe "Vanitas" as the epitaph alike of piety, of folly, and of toil. And when Thomas, in the course of those fifteen years which he spent with laborious care in making his fair copy of the Vulgate for the Brethren of his House, came to the scornful sentence which said, "Faciendi plures libros nullus est finis: frequensque meditatio, carnis afflictio est," he must have joyed to think how sweet was the peace which his gentler soul had found, in the "nooklets" where he delighted to meditate, and among the "booklets" which he transcribed with unwearied pen.

Characteristic both of his feeling and of his style is that sudden dropping into his native Lowland speech, which gives quaint piquancy to the saying we have quoted. He might have phrased it in continuous Latin, with no loss of the antithetic rhyme which he loved (in angellis atque libellis). But the kindly flavour of the Teuton terms enriches the whole meaning of the home-keeping utterance. Like the Shunammite of old, Thomas could say, "I dwell among mine own people." Not only was the horizon of his natural world bounded by the low-lying flats of Gelderland and Overijssel; but beyond this landscape his imagination took no soaring flights. He felt no desire to penetrate into any greater field of human existence than that which, for him, was amply filled by the diligent Brothers of his Order, the simple and pious women of his own neighbourhood, the poor who resorted to the monastery gates, the children who thronged the little schoolhouse where the Brothers taught. In the souls that peopled this quiet scene, his heart, it is plain, was deeply interested. Yet even these he was prepared inwardly to renounce, "with companions of every kind, yea, also all cities, towers, manor-houses, hills and valleys, streams and fountains, plains, meadows, and groves" (*Orationes Piae*). The catalogue of his renunciations, minute and extended as it is, leaves still untouched the shelter and the occupation wherein he felt most at home.

Safe in the corner of his cell, with ink-horn by his side, and the open page before him at which he worked, there was nothing to interrupt the inward enjoyment of that "rest in the Lord," which was the aim and the ideal of his long life.

Thomas was the younger son of John and Gertrude Hemerken; the name has been Germanised into Haemerlein, and Latinised into Malleolus. He was born in 1380 at Kempen, near Crefeld, in the diocese of Cologne. From the place of his birth he called himself Kempensis, and sometimes Kempis (if, indeed, this be not a mere contraction for Kempensis), and has been called by others de Kempis and à Kempis. It is not improbable that those who brought into use these latter forms mistook the place of the birth of Thomas. The Latin equivalent for Kempen is Kempena, and in 1389 we have an Alexander de Kempena. But there is another town, Kampen, not far from the scenes of Thomas's later life; here some have erroneously imagined him to have been born; one of his biographers accordingly proposes, as the true spelling of his name, de Campis, or Campensis. The connection of Thomas with Kempen ceased in his three-and-twentieth year, when he and his elder brother, John Hemerken, sold the family house adjoining the churchyard.

Of the two brothers, John Hemerken was in some important respects the more distinguished man. He was the senior by full fourteen years, and kept the lead in personal force and ecclesiastical standing, as well as in age. His powers early attracted the notice of Gerrit de Groote, and when the Brotherhood of the Common Life developed into an institution of Canons Regular of St. Augustine at Windesheim, John Hemerken was one of the first six Canons selected as the basis of the scheme. A genius for organisation declared itself in him, and pointed to the special line of service in which he was to achieve distinction. Of six new religious houses in succession, he was the organ-

ising head and the virtual founder. Thus for nine years he presided at Mount St. Agnes as its first Prior, his brother being one of the fraternity. Here, besides spiritual labours connected with the internal welfare of the community he built, levelled, planted fruit-trees, wheat-fields, garden plots, moulded pottery, planed timber, himself labouring with hand as well as brain in all these useful works. Yet could he also excel in arts more delicate; the miniatures in his illuminated service-books vied with the best of his time. We have no reason to suppose that he left behind him any original writing; nevertheless to him has been ascribed (partly, as it would seem, through an inadvertence) the authorship of a work more commonly assigned to Thomas. One of the MSS. of this famous work, at the Bodleian, carries the name "Joannes de Kempis;" and a very early printed edition (Strasburg, 1481) bears the title, *Johannis Malleoli de Imitatione Christi*.

If thus John Hemerken was, on the firm lines of practical work and personal direction, a powerful coadjutor in the movement for the revival of spiritual religion which the preaching of Gerrit de Groote had initiated, Thomas Hemerken for his part proved himself an apt scholar under Gerrit's chosen successor, the rich-souled Florent Radewyns. It may well be doubted whether, without the efforts of religious organisation which were due to the timely suggestions of the good Florent, the fervid oratory and the noble example of Gerrit would have produced permanent effects. To Florent was due the idea of a common Brotherhood, and it came about in a very simple way.

One of Gerrit's most useful plans of practical reform consisted in the multiplication of good books. Copies of the Scriptures, of the Church offices, of the spiritual writings of the Fathers, were scarce and often imperfect. Gerrit offered clerky occupation to many poor students, setting them to work at the transcription of the volumes

which he thought most useful, and these were sold at a small cost. The scheme succeeded, even beyond the expectations of its originator; and there came a time when Gerrit was perplexed as to the way of dealing with the body of copyists who had come at his call, and for whose employment and even maintenance he found himself responsible. Then Florent struck out his bold suggestion. Why not gather these poor scholars into a community, make a common purse with the gains of their vocation, and frame rules for their living together? Gerrit thought the jealousy of the existing Orders would prove fatal to the success of any such new movement. "At least we can try," urged Florent. "In God's name, then," exclaimed Gerrit at length, "let us begin." So started into life the Brotherhood of the Common Life, with Florent as the head of their first society. They were not an Order, and were known sometimes as "*Scriptores bonae voluntatis*," or "*Clerici extra religionem viventes*." It was the home of the Brotherhood at Deventer, presided over by Florent himself, that Thomas Hemerken entered in 1393, when but thirteen years of age. He became an excellent copyist, one of the most skilful of his day. Nor was he merely a servile transcriber; with regard to the Holy Scriptures in particular, we read with no little admiration the account of the sedulous care with which he sought out the best manuscripts that were to be borrowed in his neighbourhood, with a view to securing a text as free as possible from errors. To discover a good book, and to make it generally accessible by painstaking and legible transcription, was one of the main delights of his existence. In this useful labour he persevered, with quiet, conscientious devotion to his favourite pursuit, throughout the prolonged term of a life which extended to ninety-two years.

Of John Hemerken's genius for administration we do not find a trace in Thomas. He left Deventer to join the

Canons Regular at Mount St. Agnes, near Zwolle, in 1406; was ordained priest in 1414; became sub-Prior in 1425; was chosen Procurator of the monastery about 1443, an office which made him purse-keeper to the community, and was considered fitting to his disposition on account of his tenderness to those in need of alms; but its other duties proved uncongenial to him, and he was relieved of it. With advancing years he resigned also the post of sub-Prior, about 1455, and henceforth devoted himself chiefly to his booklets and his cell. He was the chronicler of the monastery, and one of its preachers. His sermons are pervaded by a touching strain of emotional piety, an almost infantile simplicity of devotion to the sublime objects of the Catholic faith. A clear vein of purity of spirit and of self-consecration to the duties of religion, runs like a silver thread through his discourses. Otherwise they have little power of exposition or force of thought; nor do they seem to have procured for Thomas anything of a preacher's popularity. His humble and useful career came to a close on 26th July, 1471. In his later years he had been troubled with dropsy in the lower limbs, and this was probably the cause of death. Many a less excellent and lovely soul has been duly canonised; but the verdict of sainthood has never been formally passed upon Thomas Hemerken by the watchful authorities of his Church; it has been reserved for a recent National Conference of Unitarians to be the first to invest him, in their Report, with the spiritual dignity of "S. Thomas à Kempis."

In his recent account of the Brothers of the Common Life, Mr. Kettlewell is too much inclined to regard them as Reformers, in the modern sense. He attempts to prove that the work done by the members of this community, and the religious awakening which they produced, had a direct influence in causing the Reformation under Luther. But Mr. Kettlewell's method of proof consists too often in the

reiteration of his own impressions at tedious length. We do not see that he has added anything of real force to the argument of Prof. Bonet-Maury, from whose admirable brochure he has borrowed (we might almost say plagiarised) with very insufficient acknowledgment.* Bonet-Maury concedes that Gerrit de Groote remained throughout "a submissive son of Holy Mother Church, and that he meditated no change either in the dogmata or in the ritual of Catholicism. His was a more modest aim, but one not less important for his epoch. His paramount object was to recall the clergy to an apostolic purity of morals and poverty of living, and to stir the faithful from their lethargy by the stimulus of study, and by the promotion of the interior life" (p. 49).

The case in favour of Gerrit's unquestioning acceptance of Catholic usages is indeed stronger than Bonet-Maury puts it, for he cites Gerrit as recalling "with a certain regret, that in the Primitive Church all the faithful communicated of the body and the blood of Christ, while at this day the participation in the cup has been replaced by the *Pax vobiscum*" (p. 27). Gerrit, however, in the passage referred to, is not expressing any desire for the revival of communion in both kinds, or even giving any hint that he was aware of this ancient practice. What he actually says is that "in the primitive Church all the faithful used to communicate, instead of which the *pax* is now given, as a sort of communication of the body of Christ." The change, he thinks, is due to the decaying fervour of the Church, as compared with ancient times. (*Vit. Ger. Mag.*, xviii. 15.)

By two channels, however, of indirect influence, it may be fairly claimed for the Brotherhood that they set men's minds moving, and assisted in preparing them for the Reformation.

The education which they afforded in their excellent

* Compare, e.g., Kettlewell I., 150, 167, 168, with B.-Maury 39, 60, 61.

schools, by recalling the instinct of a more genuine culture, paved the way for the rise of the Humanists. It was at a school of the Brotherhood in Deventer that Erasmus himself laid the foundations of his faithful love of generous letters. The spirit of Humanism was not the spirit of the Reformation, and was in some respects its antithesis and its enemy. But Humanism created or fostered a widespread indifference to the scholastic theology, and thus rendered the open attack, subsequently made upon the old positions in the name of the new dogma, more easy; while it deprived the defence of much of its heartiness.

Again, the appeal which the Brotherhood made for the revival of an efficient, if an austere *morale*, and of a deeply personal piety, led men to question the immaculateness of a Church which responded, as a whole, but faintly and unwillingly, to the voices in her midst, which cried earnestly for a practical and spiritual regeneration. An intellectual dissatisfaction with the prevalent ecclesiastical theories of man's justification before God followed in the train of the moral disappointment. It was from the perusal of the wonderful book which, whoever may have been its author, represents the type of self-consecration cherished in the Brotherhood, that John Wessel, as he owed to his biographer, "first gained a taste of true theology"; and the influence of Wessel upon Luther is well known.

It is interesting to note that the Brotherhood, which had fostered a spirit of so much importance to the Christianity of Europe, was not extinguished at so early a date as Mr. Kettlewell would lead us to believe, but lingered on even to our own day. Bonet-Maury records that the last member of the community, Gerard Mulder, died at Zevenaar on the 15th March, 1854.

We have now to deal with the *vezata quaestio* of the authorship of the golden book above referred to. Let us call it by what seems to be (we agree here with Mr. Kettlewell)

its distinctively English name, *Musica Ecclesiastica*. Its ordinary title, *De Imitatione Christi*, is a part of the heading of the first chapter only of its first book. The term which had suggested this heading has been naturalised in the Revised Version of the New Testament, where we have the phrases "imitators of God" (Eph. v. 7), "imitators of me, even as I also am of Christ" (1 Cor. xi. 1), and similar phrases. But the expression is still somewhat foreign to English usage; the *μίμησις Χριστοῦ*, which is suggested by the language of St. Paul, scarcely bears direct transference into our matter-of-fact speech; and certainly the object of the chapter "*De imitatione Christi et contemptu omnium vanitatum mundi*" is not exactly reproduced by a term which, to our ears, falls in better with the prescription of a mechanical obedience to the external form of the Lord's holiness, than with the loving reception and absorption of the spirit of his divine character. Hence the older English translations have glossed or avoided the seeming rigidity of the Latin phrase. "Of following Christ" is the usual rendering in old versions. Dean Stanhope evades the difficulty by prefixing "The Christian's Pattern" as a new title for the book; Robert Nelson gives us "The Christian's Exercise"; Hain Friswell's "Like unto Christ" is perhaps a more successful substitute than either.

The title *Musica Ecclesiastica* has this to recommend it, in addition to its presence in the majority of the English manuscripts of the work, that it brings into prominence a peculiar characteristic of the style, which had been almost forgotten by the critics, till the enthusiastic diligence of Hirsche invested it with quite new interest and importance. And the pervading style bears a close relation to the sustained spirit of the book. The rhythmical arrangement is no mere trick of art. In its interior substance this wonderful manual of the life religious is a song of the soul, plaintive and musical; its chapters are canticles of the spirit hid with

Christ in God. As we linger on its pages, we feel that we have no treatise before us; these are not passages of an argument, but lyrics of the Holy Ghost. Each book is complete in itself, and contains its own explanation within it; yet there is a certain order in their designed arrangement, which it is well to notice, the rather as this order is disturbed in nearly every printed edition. The book which stands fourth in the ordinary collocation, the *Devota Exhortatio ad Sacram Communionem*, though the last to be comprised in the collection, was placed by Thomas Hemerken, when he added it to the rest, not at the close of the work, but as a new third book. And this is significant. As, when the work consisted of but three divisions, so when it was augmented to four, the climax was reached, not in devotion to an external rite, but in that *Interna Consolatio*, which is communicated by the "interna Christi locutio ad animam fidelem." The dialogue of the soul with the Lord, which constitutes the matter of this largest section of the work, forms its true ending, to which all else leads up. Whether Thomas was the original author, or only the collector and editor of the finished work, he has some right to say how he meant the sequence of its parts to be viewed. To change the order, is to make that appear the end which Thomas introduced as a means, and to obscure the clear view of the true end, "*Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus.*"

Was Thomas the author? Mr. Kettlewell is quite sure that he was; but Mr. Kettlewell's notions of evidence are somewhat elementary. As a specimen of his general style of reasoning, or rather rambling, we give his proofs of the authenticity of an engraving of Thomas, which forms the frontispiece of one of his volumes:—

It is deemed to be a genuine likeness from these two considerations: first, because it bears a resemblance to the best authenticated portrait of Thomas à Kempis; at least, it seems

to be the face of the same man when younger, though even then beyond the prime of life; secondly, from the words *ad vivum* attached to the inscription on the picture, which must mean a lively or life-like portraiture, or "after the living man" or "after the life." What authority there is for this is not known, but when placed on the print it was evidently designed to lead those who looked upon it to regard it as a true likeness of a Kempis; and that there was some ground for this assertion, though we are ignorant of it, we may reasonably presume. The name of the artist is in the corner of the picture, though hardly discernible; and he would scarcely like to risk his credit by such an assumption unless it had been true, when at the time it was done the veracity of the statement might have been otherwise questioned.

The painter's name is "Abrahamus Bloemaert;" and inasmuch as he was not born till 1567, nearly three generations after the death of Thomas, and fully four generations since Thomas attained the age represented in the picture, the probability of his having taken a portrait from the life must be admitted to be extremely slight; but it is quite as great as the probability of any purchaser of the print having been in a position to question the life-likeness of the portraiture from personal knowledge.

The external evidence for Hemerken's authorship is remarkably deficient in point. In his own autograph copy no claim of authorship is made; the evidence of other manuscripts, and of printed copies, is not strong; and it is confronted with similar evidence for a Gerson authorship, which is impossible, and of a Gersen authorship, which is improbable. Of contemporary attestation the best is the statement of Johann von Busch, in the *Windesheim Chronicle*, completed in 1464. In the printed copies we read: "unus frater Thomas de Kempis, uir probatae uitae, qui plures deuotos libellos composuit [uidelicet Qui sequitur me de imitatione Christi cum aliis] nocte insecuta somnium uidit praesagium futurorum." But, in what appears to be the earliest MS. of the *Chronicle*, the passage we have

bracketed is wanting, and it is doubtful whether it comes to us on the authority of Busch himself.

The internal evidence may be read in two different ways. Great similarity of style is observable between the undoubted writings of Thomas and the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. Did he form his style on the model of the book he loved; or is this book the quintessence of his own writing? All must admit that in substance the *devotos libellos* of Thomas fall short of the peculiar beauty and dignity of the *Qui sequitur me*. Mr. Kettlewell's long-winded extracts from the *Soliloquium Animæ*, and other acknowledged works of Hemerken, will hardly contribute to convince the sceptic. On the whole, the interval is vast, in spite of occasional glimpses of the same poetic charm and spiritual grace. Nor is it only that we miss in the undoubted Thomas the master-touches which fascinate us in the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. We are struck with the absence from the *Musica Ecclesiastica* of characteristics which we look for, as a matter of course, in any devotional work of Thomas. Where is that eager and passionate devotion to the Blessed Virgin which was so marked a feature of his writing and his life? Could he have been content entirely to pass this by throughout four books of his own composing? Further, we discover in the *Musica Ecclesiastica* traces of an older ritual than that which existed in Hemerken's day. Wolfsgrubner has drawn special attention to the expression: "Apponam tamen os meum ad foramen caelestis fistulae" (iv. 4), as unintelligible, except as an allusion to the golden tube, "fistula, cujus opera sanguis domini a communicantibus fidelibus hauriebatur" (Du Cange), an allusion which carries us back, at least, to the thirteenth century.

Bonet-Maury's able *Quaeritur* directs us to sources anterior to Thomas, and going back to the year 1384, from which the author of the work may have drawn. Among these sources, all of which belong to the Netherlands, he

enumerates, besides the writings of Gerrit and Florent, a spiritual treatise by the Carthusian Henricus Kalkariensis (1328-1408), and an *Epistola de vita et passione Jesu Christi* by Johann Voss de Huesden (1342-1424). The strain is the same, but the verbal coincidences are not striking, except in the case of the extracts from Florent. And here again the question of priority arises. Did Florent borrow from the *Musica Ecclesiastica*? Or was it the other way?

The argument from style appears to us to possess a very important value, but it is a value chiefly negative in regard to the question of authorship. It definitely and unmistakably excludes, for example, the English claimant, Gualterus Reclusus, or Walter de Hilton, as well as the Paris University Chancellor, Jean Charlier de Gerson. Each of these writers has a characteristic style, and in neither case does the manner of writing, the construction of sentences, the flow of periods, the rhythm and movement and spirit of the diction, bear any affinity to the literary genius of the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. Hilton's *Scala Perfectionis* and Gerson's *De Meditatione Cordis* are very accessible books. Let their solemn prose be read along with the captivating melody of the *Qui sequitur me*. No more will be needed to convince the intelligent ear that the writer of this incomparable piece was filled to overflowing with a natural sense of harmonious cadence, in which the wise Chancellor and the pious recluse were entirely deficient; their writings exhibit literally nothing akin to it. A practical demonstration of this sort is irresistible in its impression. It carries a conviction which is not to be upset by the allegation of any amount of external evidence derived from the headings of manuscripts, or the colophons of printed books, or the emphatic testimony of warm friends.

Nor, let us add, is it difficult to see how such testimony as exists in favour of Hilton or of Gerson may have arisen. In the case of an anonymous work, which obtains vogue

and excites curiosity, the temptation is strong to assign it to the most admired author in the department to which it belongs. He will naturally be supposed more competent than others to have composed it. This tendency to ascribe it to him gains force, when, as will almost inevitably be the case, the anonymous writing attaches itself to some work of the known author on a similar topic. Treasured by the same readers, bound up together, transcribed together, printed together, this fellowship of juxtaposition, added to the fellowship of purpose, breeds or enhances the notion of a closer relationship. Hilton was the typical English spiritual writer; the *Musica Ecclesiastica* naturally got mixed in with his works. Gerson was, in like manner, the typical spiritual writer of France; and when the printers brought out, in one joint volume, his *De Meditatione Cordis* and the *De Imitatione Christi*, they obeyed a sort of blind instinct of probability in that they assigned both to the same pen, as indeed sundry scribes had done before them.

Out of the presence of Gerson's name in the attributions of transcribers of manuscripts, arose, perhaps, as a mere scribal blunder, the form Gersen. But though there is some evidence of this (*e.g.*, the Harl. MS. 3,223, dated in the year 1478, where "cōpositus a D. Johāne gersem. Cācellario parisiēsi" occurs *a prima manu*, corrected in a later hand to "gerson"), yet, on the whole, the proof is insufficient, and it may be that in some cases Gersen is the name really intended, Gerson the blunder by way of emendation.

Assuming the existence of a Giovanni Gersen, Abbot of St. Stephen's, at Vercelli, in the thirteenth century, it is, perhaps, fortunate for him, and certainly it is unfortunate for the critic, that we have not so much as a single alleged scrap of a Gersen writing which we can lay side by side with the *Musica Ecclesiastica* for the purposes of a comparison of style, treatment, sentiment, or spiritual power. The mind of

Gersen is a wholly unknown quantity to us, except in so far as we may be inclined to attribute to him the work whose authorship is in dispute. In the absence of any opportunity of such comparison, it has been sought to invalidate *a priori* the claim of an Italian ecclesiastic, by pointing to a distinctively Teutonic colouring in the Latinity of the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. But here the choice which has been made of a Lombard prelate, to fight the battle against Thomas, interposes a barrier to the success of an argument which is triumphantly urged against the Frenchman, Gerson. The Lombards are of Teutonic stock, and retain many Teuton names and terms of speech. One of the proofs (indeed, so far as we can see, the sole proof) of the historical existence, in the thirteenth century, of the surname Gersen, is drawn from the circumstance that at Cavaglia, in the diocese of Vercelli, an ancient family, having a name which is variously spelled as Gersen, Ghersen, and Garson, holds its seat. This name, according to Weigl, has a Teutonic etymology. The very "shibboleth of the Thomists," as it is called by Wolfsgruber, the use, namely, of *scire exterius* in the sense of "know by heart," has its strict analogy in Lombardic speech. Camillo Mella tells us that to this day the school-boys of Verona use the expression *saper da fuora*, instead of *saper a mente*. The Lombardic *da fuora* comes quite as close to *exterius* as the Dutch *van buiten* can pretend to do,* and Wolfsgruber pursues the parallel, with undaunted skill,

* The German *auswendig* is still closer in form. But, at the risk of being considered impervious to sound doctrine, we must be allowed to express a doubt whether "known by heart" is the writer's meaning in the couplet which is in question—

Si scires totam Bibliam exterius et omnium philosophorum dicta,
Quid totum prodesset sine caritate Die et gratia ?

The meaning of this we take to be, 'If thou knewest *from the outside*, the entire Bible and all the maxims of philosophy, what would it profit thee *without the inner substance*?' Compare what had just been said respecting disputes about the Trinity, as contrasted with humbling oneself before the Trinity. But all the critics are against us. Even the old English version has "yf thou coudest all the bible *without the boke*."

through the whole list of Teutonisms which critical scrutiny has discovered in his author. Nay more, he carries the raid into the enemy's ground, by accumulating an opposition list of pure Italianisms, as he alleges, which are to be met with in the *Musica Ecclesiastica*. We must confess that Wolfsgruber's positions are firmly taken, and sustained with spirit and thoroughness. We are not unwilling to concede to him that he has removed internal objections to a Gersen authorship, and has established some grounds for looking beyond Hemerken's century for the original author.

But if we admit that Gersen *may* have written the book, this is only on condition that Gersen's actual existence is fully proved. We do not see that Wolfsgruber makes good this essential point. He finds a Gersen family now, and for perhaps a couple of centuries, at Cavaglia. He gives fairly good reason for believing that Cavaglia, the ancient Caballicum, was also known in old times as Canabacum. He brings forward a Joannes de Canabaco, of unknown date; and a Joannes of pious fame, at Vercell, in the thirteenth century. He assumes that these two were the same individual. He further assumes that this individual bore the surname Gersen. He yet further assumes that the resulting John Gersen, of Cavaglia, was the Abbot of St. Stephen, at Vercelli, during a period (1220-1245) which the earlier chroniclers have left blank. We commend him for the skill with which these assumptions are fitted to the few grains of material fact in his possession. As an exercise of historical conjecture, *Giovanni Gersen, sein Leben*, is a most interesting study, but as a piece of serious history it is valueless.

What conclusion do we draw from the difficulties which at present beset the question of the authorship of *Musica Ecclesiastica*? Wolfsgruber will assuredly rank us among the "pessimists" who refuse, in the existing state of the evidence, to make up their minds upon the point. Well, if

we are "pessimists," we are "pessimists" in good company; for in the list of these offenders Wolfsgruber reckons Ellies Du Pin, Corneille, Silvester Sacy, and other honourable names. At present we are afraid that we must humbly take our place behind them.

It vitiates the argumentation for and against this or the other of the alleged authors of the book, that the dispute is taken up as a party question. National pride and ecclesiastical associations have had a good deal to say in the discussion. Frenchmen are violent for Gerson;* Germans are positive about Thomas; Benedictines of all nations will go through fire and water for Gersen. All this lends excitement to the disputation, and accounts for the fierceness with which sides are taken, as well as for the absolute certainty which the disputants parade; it accounts, at the same time, for the unsifted condition in which a large part of the materials for judgment still remains.

We apprehend that the conditions of a satisfactory settlement of the question have not yet been reached; but we do not despair of the problem. What is needed, first of all and most of all, is that the large body of manuscripts should be carefully collated, with a view to determine accurately their age, the authenticity of their inscriptions, and the variations of their texts. It is surprising how little has really been done, in this wide field, with scientific precision. The whole strength of the Gersenists' case rests on the presumed antiquity of certain MSS. If, for example, the Benedictine Cod. San. Paulanus (which professes to have been transcribed in 1414 from a dated copy of the years 1384-5) be authentic, the case for Thomas is at once destroyed. If Cod. Aronensis really belongs to the fourteenth century, the case for Gersen is brought within historical grasp.

Wolfsgruber has done more than his predecessors to

* Bonet-Maury, whose education has given him cosmopolitan sympathies, is a Thomist.

exhibit a conspectus of the MS. materials existing in continental libraries, but he has not exercised any strong critical faculty in the direction of estimating their value. The English manuscripts he has not dealt with : some of these Mr. Kettlewell has described, in an Appendix abounding with errors. The theory of recensions, of which Wolfgruber gives some hints, requires a further investigation of the actual contents of the several codices. Which are the oldest readings? And do the varieties of reading so arrange themselves as to point to a Dutch, an English, an Italian recension of a common original? This, we believe, is the view of a Roman Catholic ecclesiastic who is now engaged in working at the problem. He admits, we understand, a recension by Hemerken, but goes no further with the Thomists.

On any view of Hemerken's relation to the authorship of the book, the world must gladly own an ineffaceable debt to him in respect of its promulgation throughout Europe. He it was who sent it forth on its career of spiritual helpfulness, a helpfulness which has been acknowledged in every land, almost in every religion. From Thomas Hemerken's quiet nook came forth, without a name, on its errand of blessing, this holy book, winning its way by its own merits, and loved everywhere for its own sake.

It may add somewhat to the interest of this paper if we call our readers' attention to the existence of an early English version of the first three books of the *Musica Ecclesiastica*, hitherto almost unknown, and never, we believe, printed. Two copies of it exist in manuscript, of which one is in the Cambridge University Library, the other in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. The Dublin copy formerly belonged to Henry Dodwell, the Nonjuror, a fellow of T.C.D., from 1662 to 1666. It has been described by Dr. Ingram, the Librarian of Trinity College, in a communication read to the Royal Irish Academy on 22nd May of this year.

Previously to this, we had an opportunity of examining the MS. with some care.

We hope that Dr. Ingram may be induced to edit and publish the whole text of the version, collated with the Cambridge copy. Considerable philological interest attaches to it as an early English document. As a translation it is marked by great simplicity and strength. Merely as a specimen of some of its merits and peculiarities, we give the brief fifth chapter of Book I., not keeping to the old spelling (with its *thorn* for *th* and its many contractions), nor to the original punctuation, but following, as far as practicable, the metrical arrangement as exhibited in Hirsche's edition of the original. It will be observed that the translation of the opening sentence is unusual. There is a curious variation further on, where "to the love of God" represents "ad legendum," the uniform reading of the manuscripts, so far as we have been able to ascertain. Our conjecture is that the manuscript from which the translation was made had the contraction "ad legēdū," which was erroneously read, "ad legem dei," and that then, from "the lawe of God" the transition was easy to "the loue of God." The "without exception of persons" is also noteworthy. The clause "And not curiously inquired" is an addition to the text. And there are some other signs of independent readings.

OF READING OF SCRIPTURES.

CHAP. V.

Truth is to be sought in holy writings :

And not in eloquence.

Every holy writing oweth to be read with the same spirit
wherewith it was made.

We owe in scriptures rather to seek profitableness :
Than highness of language.

We owe as gladly to read simple and devout books :
As high books and profound sentences.

Let not the authority of him that writeth,

Whether he be of great letter or little,
Change thy conceit.
But let the love of pure truth draw thee to the love of God.

Ask not who said thus :
But take heed what is said.
Man passeth :
But the truth of our Lord abideth everlastingly.
God speaketh to us in divers wises,
Without exception of persons.

Our curiosity oft times in reading of scriptures de-
ceiveth us :
In that we search curious sentence where it is to be
passed over simply,
And not curiously inquired.
If thou wilt draw profit in reading ;
Read meekly,
Simply and truly :
Not desiring to have a name of cunning.
Ask gladly ;
And hear holding thy peace :
And let not the parables of elder men displease thee,
For they are not brought forth withouten cause.

ALX. GORDON.

HAMLET AND THE TEMPEST: A SHAKSPERIAN CONTRAST.*

HAMLET, perhaps more than any other work of the poet, reveals the very heart of Shakspeare. Of all the creations of his genius we should point to the Danish Prince as most resembling Shakspeare himself. It is wonderful how the Warwickshire peasant, the London playwright, saw into the mystery of the world, and apprehended the tragedy of this strange, perplexing life of ours. Perhaps more than to any other play the soul responds to this dark, terrible, fateful story of Hamlet. We read the Comedies: we listen, laugh, feel instructed and amused, and lay them down again. In the Histories we admire the wonderful procession of events, in which heroes live again for us, battles are renewed, and great empires of the past seem to be revived. In other Tragedies our souls are harrowed by bloody deeds of jealousy, ambition, and revenge. But, after all, we turn again and again to the pages of our familiar *Hamlet*, and learn every time new lessons of the mysterious soul, the world of circumstance, the conflict of life, and the terrors of fate.

How did the problem of life present itself to the mind of Shakspeare? Here in this play we have the answer to that inquiry. We all know that the most popular plays and romances are those which are steeped in tragedy. Most eagerly do we read the story of the human soul struggling with opposing forces, triumphing in moral greatness

* A Lecture.

over its foes, or showing its majesty even when overwhelmed in the terrible conflict with the powers of the world. Thus the deepest heart of man testifies that life is a conflict, that existence is a tragedy, that we do not come into a play-ground or pleasure-garden, but into a battlefield, and that those who would fulfil their vocation must gird on armour, and do their appointed work in the never-ceasing strife. Even in the smallest life the tragic element may be found. The powers of the soul, and the circumstances amidst which it is born, and which cramp it in; the sense of inward freedom meeting ever with the iron barriers of outward necessity; the greatness of thought and the material limitations of activity; the obligation of duty and the feebleness of the will; the constant changes of the world bewildering the mind, dashing our love by death, spoiling our plans by unexpected events, overwhelming the structures we have been so long in raising by some terrible catastrophe;—with more or less intensity these tragic elements enter even into the smallest life, while from a world-historical view the whole course of mankind appears as a constant struggle with natural forces and opposing wills—the martyrdom of man. Now let us come to this play, read its living words, take in these sentences which throb with life, and here there shall be for us no strange story, no unfamiliar picture; but here we shall find our own deepest life-experience *writ large*; here we shall find the soul interpreted to itself; each one of us shall find that Hamlet is no other than himself; over and over again shall we repeat his passions, his meditations and terrors, as the very best expressions of all that we have felt and thought and feared. Before we begin to read, we look down the list of *dramatis personæ*: the King, the Queen, Ophelia, the fawning courtiers, the merry gravediggers, who so strangely mingle the tragedy of death with jests and laughter—yes! and we include that mysterious Ghost who keeps alive the dreadful Past and

compels the sinful deed to bring forth its dire harvest of woe and death. The Ghost is the dramatic representation of the present consequences of the undying Past; the Past lives with us, is in us, is part of us.

But besides all these, there is another Presence not included in the list—a Presence more awful than even the returning Ghost,—a Presence whose influence is felt in every line of every scene, whose power is resistless, who, though unseen, is omnipotent—who, from the very first, makes prophecy of doom, and drives the torrent of events to one direful end.

That Presence is the power whom men call Fate, who to the rebellious soul appears a cruel tyrant, to the wicked a relentless judge, but who to the faithful and obedient becomes transfigured into the Beneficent Necessity, the Eternal Righteousness, the Everlasting God.

This wondrous story is saturated with Divinity. You say Hamlet did this and thought that; the King committed such a crime, and devised such tricks and schemes. But who appointed this fearful issue? Who directed the torrent of events to this awful end? Who ordained that the seeds of crime and weakness should bring forth such a harvest of calamity? Not even Shakspeare, who wrote the story, *consciously* designed its close. Do you think his gentle mind took pleasure in distracting our souls with horror and filling our vision with scenes of blood? No! the course of this tragic history is as necessary, as fateful, as the course of Nature's order. Given the circumstances of the time, given the characters hemmed in by those circumstances, and no other issue was possible.

Here, then, presiding over the whole, shaping every event, controlling every movement of the troublous tide of change, is the power which men call Fate, which philosophy calls Necessity, which conscience regards as relentless Justice, which faith rejoices to worship as eternal God and

ever-blessed Father. Overshadowing all the actors in the play is the presence of this tremendous Fate. Hamlet shrinks from its behests; the King thinks to cheat and bribe its eternal laws; Polonius knows nothing of it in his worldly wisdom and political blindness; Ophelia is carried on its tide like a frail lily cast upon some impetuous cataract; the foolish gravediggers make merry with its ordination of mortality. But there it abides, over-ruling the whole, omnipotent in its force, triumphant in its vindication. This is the tragedy of Fate.

Now the saddest tragedy which Fate can ordain is that of a man who finds himself unequal to his duty, hemmed in by conditions and events with which he is too weak to deal. And that is the tragedy of Hamlet, the tragedy of a man who confesses *I ought*, and then cries *I cannot*.

Consider, for a moment, where this young prince finds himself at his first entrance into the active world of duty. His education is complete; he has come home from college a finished gentleman—a prince indeed, worthy in some future year, when his noble father waxes old and dies, to take the crown and rule the kingdom. A fond mother, a most dear father, a loyal country, the hope of kingship—what earthly lot could be happier?

In the meantime he devotes himself to the studies he so much loves, and in quiet meditation and earnest thought he finds his most congenial occupation. All at once he is rudely wakened from this dream of security. Suddenly the scene is changed. The gracious world in which he has been living vanishes—his love blasted, his hopes destroyed, his deepest sensibilities grossly offended.

His father dies—stung by an adder, it is said, while sleeping in his arbour. His ambitious uncle, taking advantage of Hamlet's inactivity and excess of grief, draws round him the creatures of the Court, and seizes upon the crown. This is terrible; but worse is yet to come! Surely he can

find consolation in the love of his widowed mother ; they can mingle their tears, share their grief, and renew their memories of the dead ! But even this natural comfort is denied him. Within a month of his father's funeral his mother becomes the wife of his ambitious uncle !

Can there be worse than this ? Yes ! Fate seems resolved to pile the agony upon this delicate soul, least capable of so great a load. There comes to him a whispered rumour that his father's spirit haunts the city. The guards have seen the Ghost pacing the platform of the castle at the midnight hour. Then descends upon the delicately-cultured youth the avalanche of woe, and he hears the summons to a duty too terrible for him to obey. The visitant from the other world explains, in tones of anguish, the unnatural murder which has been committed. The man who now wears the crown is the murderer of Hamlet's father, and (horrible to tell !) the husband of Hamlet's mother. Revenge !—that is the one command the angry Ghost lays upon the terror-stricken son ; and Hamlet records a solemn vow to neglect all other things, and devote himself to the work of vengeance. And, surely, every noble impulse of his soul must prompt him to avenge the deed. A terrible crime has been committed against the majesty of the State, and against the sanctity of the family. The highest sanctions of morality demand the exposure and punishment of the hideous deed. Hamlet is a *Prince*, and he is bound to defend the State against treachery ; he is a *Son*, and he must vindicate the sacredness of the family against unnatural crime. And yet, strange to say, he fails in this most solemn duty. Had he met his uncle as he parted from the Ghost he could have killed him in his passion ; but his inner world of thought has time to assert its sway over the storm of emotion ; ideal meditation, mental analysis, speculative thought, begin to overpower him ; his will becomes paralysed, his

executive power sinks into feebleness. A delicate, sensitive, cultured youth is called to deal with horrible events which require unflinching purpose and swift activity. A poet is called no longer to meditation, but to deeds of terror. A soaring Genius is placed in the midst of circumstances which make it shrink from the world of hideous realities into its own native region of pure ideas.

Instead of gratitude that the crime is revealed, and that he is elected the minister of justice, he mourns his fate, cries—

The time is out of joint : O cursed spite
That ever I was born to set it right !

Instead of leaping to vindicate justice, he laments the spiteful Fate which has given him too hard a task. At one time he thinks to free himself from his difficulties by suicide ; but even the thought of self-destruction has only the effect of starting his mind on speculations about the mysteries of death and immortality ; and in wandering meditation he loses sight of the world of facts.

Every time he begins to plan some scheme of action, the chariot of thought with its horses of fire snatches him away into the clouds, where the real world for the time is lost.

It is instructive to notice the difference between the tragedies of *Macbeth* and *Othello* and this deeper tragedy of *Hamlet*. In *Macbeth* and *Othello*, the action hurries on with terrible speed to the close ; but here the plot is retarded, and slowly works its way until, all of a sudden, comes the final crash. To murder Duncan is most horrible to the mind of Macbeth. But the witches' prophecy (stirring up his fierce ambition) drives him, against all nobler thoughts, to the deed of blood. The incantations of a witch are enough to make Macbeth rush into treason and murder. The appearance of his injured father, the call of every duty as a Man and as a Prince, are not enough to rouse the will of Hamlet to avenge treason and murder.

One deep suspicion of Desdemona's unfaithfulness, and the fierce Othello slays the woman he has vowed to love. Hamlet has certain proof of his uncle's guilt, and yet he cannot brace up his resolution to hurl the criminal from the throne he has defiled. Macbeth and Othello, blinded by passion, precipitate the will into a torrent of activity. Hamlet requires to see every circumstance, weigh every condition, and anticipate every issue before he can decide on action.

Or take the contrasts which Shakspeare has provided in this play itself. Young Fortinbras (who has been too much neglected in criticism and on the stage), the Prince of Norway, to snatch from Poland a worthless strip of land, raises an army and marches forth to sacrifice blood and treasure to vindicate his foolish claim. Young Laertes hears of the murder of his tedious old father, Polonius; and, in an ecstasy of rage and grief, gathers a crowd of rebellious Danes, and rushes, sword in hand, into the King's presence to avenge his death.

While the great tide of action goes surging on around him, Hamlet still lingers, hesitates, shrinks, and bemoans his grievous lot. Though he stands still, the world is moving on, and Fate is rushing forward to a catastrophe, all the more sad and horrible because of that fatal weakness of Hamlet's will.

Only one man in all Denmark has opportunity to direct affairs aright. Only one man is able to bring back justice, truth, and loyalty to the distracted realm. Let Hamlet act with firm purpose and steadfast will, and good shall rise out of evil, crime shall be blasted with shame and ruin, and the State shall be delivered from the curse under which it groans. That awful Fate; let Hamlet bring into its service a strong will and steadfast resolution, and it shall appear as a blessed redeemer. But let Hamlet stand aloof in ignoble lethargy and miserable weakness, and it

shall appear as a dreadful judge, only to reach its purpose by a wide-spreading catastrophe of wrath.

There are many particulars in the play on which we must not venture to enter. The nature of Hamlet's mental derangement, his treatment of Ophelia, his relation to Horatio, the terrible fate by which he murders Polonius, at the very moment when he has summoned resolution to slay the King; thus instead of avenging his father's murder, becoming himself the murderer of the father of his lover and his friend. All these matters deserve most careful study; but we must pass them by while we try to gain some glimpse of the great *motive* of the play.

Before the final catastrophe, Hamlet has a presentiment that Fate has proved too strong for him. He says to Horatio—"Thou wouldst not think how ill all's here about my heart." But though the clouds of the fateful storm are gathering fierce and dark, he proclaims his faith in Providence, and his readiness to abide the end. If his will is weak, his mind is true, and his conscience faithful; if his arm is too feeble to wield the sword of justice, yet he has never once bowed to falsehood or curried favour with successful wrong. Horatio would not have him fence with Laertes, if his mind misgives him:

If your mind dislike anything, obey it. I will forstal their repair hither, and say you are not fit.

And the answer proves how pure, noble, and brave is this soul, which, alas, is united to such a feeble will:

We defy augury: there is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come: *the readiness is all!*

At last Fate forces the hapless Prince to do the deed which he has meditated so long. In the path through which Fate has carried him we can trace the victims of his

weakness. Old Polonius rashly murdered; the fair Ophelia, once to have been Hamlet's bride, driven to madness and the grave; Hamlet, the son of a murdered father, standing himself charged with the murder of the father of his dead lover and now alienated friend. After these auguries of deeper gloom, we have the frightful close—the Queen poisoned, Laertes slain, Hamlet with the poison of the venomous sword working in his blood. Then at last, with all this train of grief behind, surrounded by a scene of death, just before the poison takes his strength, like a flaming candle before it sinks in darkness, his will rises into one supreme action, and he slays the wretched King from whose most hateful crime this crop of sin and suffering has grown.

The end was *necessary*. Shakspeare did not choose it. No other end was possible. A manufactured story would have made it like the conclusion of many a three-volume novel; the sheep would have been divided from the goats; the bad punished, the good rewarded; the King slain, but Hamlet saved alive; the Queen condemned to shame, but Ophelia spared to take her place with her husband Hamlet upon the throne of Denmark.

But Shakspeare never manufactured; he created. A play of Shakspeare is not wilful and accidental, but natural and inevitable as solar system and tidal wave. The Fate which rules the lives of men was the inspiration of his genius, and so his plays become mirrors of the Divine Order of the world. Shakspeare knew that the Power which works through all things is not a mere *Arbitrium*, which distributes, with exact discrimination, personal and material rewards to the good and punishments to the bad. He regarded the Divine Power as an irresistible Tendency, which works through suffering, crime, weakness, and death, continually evolving nobler things out of the waste and failure of a miserable past. Shakspeare knew that the

Divinity which rules the world is not a feeble Judge, who can only *separate* sheep from goats, and place a gulf between Heaven and Hell ; but an Almighty and Eternal Goodness, which, through dispensations of change and death, is working out an Everlasting Righteousness, to be through all and upon all.

The old era must end. Crime has worked out its own destruction. The feeble will, that could not strive with wrong, must also pass away. The old generation is outworn ; a new and nobler age must rise to redress the wrongs of mankind and restore peace and order to a distracted world. And so, with consummate wisdom, Shakspeare makes the expiring Hamlet nominate the vigorous Fortinbras as his successor to the vacant throne. The *Hamlet* of the stage ends with the death of the Prince. But Shakspeare's *Hamlet* does not close in such unmitigated gloom ; already there is a flash of creative light ; as the old Heaven and Earth pass away, lo ! the dawn of a new Heaven and a new Earth. While we are lamenting the past, with its heap of slain, already young Fortinbras comes in, flushed with victory, possessed of courage, will, and wisdom to become an instrument of that Divine Purpose, which, out of crime, decay, ruin, and death, is able to bring forth new worlds of life and beauty, strength and wisdom.

II.

The resurrection of a new world from moral chaos is wonderfully exhibited in *The Tempest*. *The Tempest* is supposed to be the last play Shakspeare wrote ; and if so, then he closed his writings with a beautiful gospel, and crowned his work by a wonderful prophecy. In *Hamlet* dark clouds hang over the sad story from first to last. In *Hamlet* Shakspeare is exercised by the strange conditions and circumstances of life. The tide of Fate rolls on its way through scenes of crime and passion and supernatural terror,

carrying a whole generation to one direful mood. In *Hamlet* Shakspeare fails to solve the problem. He states the riddle of the world which he cannot answer. *And to be able to state the problem is a great gain.* People do not get full answers, because they are afraid to speak their doubts and frame their questions. We can trust this poet, who is not afraid to face the facts, who does not shrink from describing all the terrible events possible in a most distracted world. If Shakspeare ever gets an answer to the great questions, we are sure his answer will be worth listening to.

In *Hamlet*, though he fails to solve the problem, yet in all his darkness and difficulty he never once complains or despairs, he never loses faith and hope. He never loses faith. He tells us of that "divinity that shapes our ends rough-hew them how we will," even though he cannot clearly see the end for which Divinity is working, or vindicate the strange methods along which it moves. He never loses hope. He is appalled, as much as any of us, to see Ophelia and Hamlet swept away along the fateful torrent which bears innocent and guilty to a common grave; yet with unconquered hope he brings into the hall of death Fortinbras, the strong deliverer, who must retrieve the nation's fortunes, and repair the desolation wrought by crime and weakness. In *Hamlet* Shakspeare stands in the midst of life; its noises assail his ears; its awful sights appal his mind; its clouds and dust darken his soul. He believes it possible to gain a higher, broader view; but as yet he cannot rise into the Mount of Vision, as yet he cannot clearly behold the Divine Pattern by which earthly things are being surely fashioned. But in *The Tempest* he ascends that Mount of Vision, and in the light of the Divine Purpose he can see the meaning of the world. The Tempest of sin and suffering is raging far down below, but now he can see how all its rage is over-ruled by an unerring Wisdom at one with a perfect Love. Guilt and

crime and passion, which seem sometimes to rule the world, are being secretly governed by an invisible Goodness, an infinite and resistless Love, which is working out a sure atonement to be revealed at the appointed hour.

No wonder the poet laid down his pen as he completed this matchless play. He has told his vision, uttered his prophecy, revealed the things which are within the veil, made a sublime discovery beyond which the grandest faith and hope can never rise. What more can he say? His message is complete; his work is done. He has explored Humanity, and mirrored the world in his wondrous art; now at last he opens Heaven, closes his revelations by an Apocalypse of coming glory, affirms the omnipotence of Love, and prophesies the redemption of the universe through the resistless energy of that Mercy which is "mightiest in the mighty." What more can he say? What higher word can he add? From that serene height the great soul speaks his final prophecy, and completes his book of life. His task is finished, and for him "the rest is silence." Like Prospero he breaks his magic wand, renounces his potent art, and leaves his completed task to work out its large results. For as we said that we might regard the meditative Hamlet as in some sort representing the poet himself, so here we cannot but see in the noble Prospero the image of that great magician who, by his wondrous arts, has compelled Nature and Man into his service, and employed them for wisest and most beneficent ends.

In this play we find Prospero, the great genius who has pierced into the subtlest secrets of Nature, dwelling on that strange island within whose compass we are made to see every mood of Nature and every passion of Humanity. By the envy of his brother and the treachery of his king, Prospero, the Duke of Milan, is banished, with his infant, from his dukedom. Placed with the crying child of three

years into a wretched rotten boat, he yet, by a most kind Providence, arrives in safety on the magic island. There for twelve years he remains, and presides over the lonely place as a superintending providence. That island, as the play proceeds, appears as the symbol of the world. This world of ours, rolling solitary through space, teeming with mysterious forms of life, the scene of contending passions—what is this but the magic island? With this key the whole course of the play opens up a treasury of wisdom. In former times this magic island was enslaved by a frightful witch named Sycorax, who worshipped an evil deity named Setebos. Until Prospero's arrival, the lovely place lay under a curse. The delicate powers of Nature (spirits of life and joy and beauty) were spellbound and imprisoned, or else compelled to become the slaves of Sycorax. At length the hideous creature died, but her hateful influence remained. Caliban, her monstrous offspring, still ruled the island, and Ariel, the spirit of joy and beauty, was still held fast by a fatal spell within a cloven pine-tree.

Thus things stood, when Prospero arrived with his young daughter. The powers of evil are now brought face to face with the powers of goodness. We take it as most significant that Shakspeare first brings to the island a wicked mother and her hateful son, and afterwards, to work redemption, a noble father and his pure and lovely daughter. In *Hamlet* Fortinbras, the deliverer, comes in as a sort of *deus ex machinâ*, to do the work in which Hamlet failed. There is no organic bond; there is a break between the old generation and the new. But here is a profounder doctrine of hereditary influence and organic continuity. Each power, whether of good or evil, *continuates* (to use a Coleridgean expression) itself. The individual is always more than an individual. The individual stands in an unbroken chain of living influence which comes down from all the past and goes forth through all

the future. The murdered King lived in the distracted realm he left behind and in the grief and horror of his afflicted son ; as we said before, the Ghost which haunts the city is the dramatic representation of the presence of the dead Past in the living Present. In *The Tempest* this doctrine of continuation is taught more vitally. Though Sycorax be dead, yet still she lives—lives in her monstrous offspring, lives in the curse which still rests upon the unhappy isle. And to work redemption there comes, not only an individual, but one whose being is already propagated into the future in the person of a most hopeful child ; there comes not only a *Man* to do his work and die, but a *FATHER*, who shall live in holiest influences through future time by the sacred womanhood of a most chaste and lovely daughter. Miranda is as much more wonderful than Ophelia as Prospero is nobler than Hamlet. She is the most radiant vision of womanhood ever conceived by a poet's mind. Shakspeare has created a long line of splendid women, but of them all there is not one with more matchless grace and beauty, more charm of maidenhood, than Prospero's daughter. Well might Ferdinand exclaim when he was told her name :—

Admired Miranda !

Indeed the top of admiration ! worth

What's dearest to the world

. You, O you,

So perfect and so peerless, are created

Of every creature's best !

Miranda is the only woman in the play. She appears in unique and radiant womanhood against the background of various and darker manhood. She stands, amidst this crowd of various men, the very type of perfect womanhood—daughter, lover, wife, and we are sure mother yet to be. Apart from her, salvation is impossible. Her infant smiles cheered her father in his exile. The babe was “infused with a fortitude from heaven.” Her helpless weakness became his

mightiest strength. For her he lived. To her training and education he devoted his lonely life. Through her alone he can see a hope of better things. In his despondency he cheers himself with the vision of Miranda restored to her home, married to some noble husband, and blessing the world with offspring as perfect as herself. For twelve years has Miranda lived upon the magic island, that island all her world, a narrow cave her home, her stately father her only companion. Reverence, trust, love—these are the only emotions which absorb her soul (except, indeed, repugnance for the monster Caliban, who has requited all her kindness with most brutal violence). In her helpless ignorance Prospero is her providence. He encompasses her with wisdom and tenderness, seeking to be to her both father and mother. He knows all about that mysterious origin of hers, which lingers in her own memory only like the shadow of a dream. He knows her by birth to be a princess. He is able to fathom those deep emotions of maidenhood which still lie latent beneath her filial consciousness. In his far-seeing vision he beholds the obedient daughter a faithful wife, the simple maiden a joyful mother of children. He encompasses her before and behind with a providence too wonderful for her to understand; he lays his hand upon her with a love too deep for her to measure; he foresees a destiny awaiting her which her wildest fancy has never conceived. From the lust of Caliban on the one hand, and from the wild beauty of Ariel on the other, he maintains her pure and perfect human nature, worthy to partake, at the appointed hour, in every holy sacrament of womanhood.

Can we help discerning in all this the symbol of that vast Divinity, whose being embraces the little island of our world, whose wisdom knows our mysterious origin, and pierces the deepest secrets of our souls, whose Providence foresees the destiny which awaits us in worlds unknown? In Miranda's happy ignorance faith in her father is enough. As a perfect

daughter, she is best prepared to become a perfect wife. Reverence and filial trust are but ripening her nature, until the day when all the deep fountains of unsuspected love rise from fathomless depths, and she yields herself without reserve in one supreme gift to him who claims her as a wife, and whom she rejoices to look up to as her lord.

By strange methods and dark ways the providence of Prospero works towards its end. A dreadful storm one day descends upon the island. The waves rise mountains high, till they seem to touch the stars. The heavens seem to open, while continuous fire bursts down on sea and land. All the forces of destruction seem combined to do their worst. A brave ship is seen struggling with the tempest, and then in a moment appears to be dashed to pieces. Miranda beholds, and her tender soul is in an agony of pity. She knows her father, by his magic, is able to control the elements, and now she entreats him, with tears, to allay the dreadful storm. She cannot understand such a catastrophe. She cannot see any wise meaning in the tempest, nor how it can be serving any beneficent end. Were *she* a god of power she would have sunk the sea beneath the earth before it should have wrought such terrible destruction. And then there is revealed to her (as under similar doubts there *cannot yet* be revealed to us) the secret of her father's providence. No wrath, revenge, or ruin is intended by this strife of elements, through that confusion one loving purpose moves, above that seeming chaos one great wisdom reigns supreme. Not one soul in that tempest-tossed ship is utterly to perish, all at last shall be brought safe to land.

The hour for which, all through those long years, Prospero has watched and waited, is now drawing near. In that ship, tossed upon the waves, are his treacherous brother and his old enemy, the King of Naples. By a strange fate these men are cast upon the very island where dwells the injured man they purposed to destroy. And with the King

of Naples comes his princely son, Ferdinand. Injured and injurer both have offspring in whose young minds no evil memories remain. Through the new generation atonement must be made, ancient quarrels reconciled, and the world restored to peace and goodwill. These two princely children, Ferdinand and Miranda, through a spontaneous love, are to become the unwitting saviours. Wandering through the island on which the waves have cast him, lamenting his father as perished in the storm, suddenly there bursts upon the young prince the radiant vision of a perfect maiden. "At the first sight they have changed eyes." At once the children of the two ancient foes are bound together, soul to soul, in one perfect atonement of unutterable love. But Prospero must be assured that this is no common gushing sentiment, no transient passion. He must know that this is a love equal to the great issues for which it is born. He separates the children, assumes a stern demeanour, lays heavy tasks upon the Prince, and treats him as a slave. But labour only feeds the young man's love, and sorrowful sympathy deepens the tenderness of gentle Miranda's breast. In one of the chastest passages which his pen ever wrote, Shakespeare describes Miranda soothing Ferdinand in his toil, and pouring out to him, while he labours like a slave, those hidden secrets which she would have locked securely in her heart had she found him seated on a throne. *Labour and suffering*, these only give true love the grander opportunity for triumph. The stern Prospero and the lamented King are both forgotten by these children in the new passion of that all-absorbing love. Forgetful of her father's command, Miranda reveals her name; unmindful of his recent grief, Ferdinand pours forth his admiring affection.

Revealed to each other, they also, for the first time, begin to know themselves. Each is the other's hidden soul, now, for the first time, discovered. Within an hour Miranda has

entered into a new world, and discovered within her soul emotions which seem more urgent and compelling than any commands which even a father's authority can give. At first she struggles to hide her passion in maidenly reserve. But at last her simple, natural, unsophisticated heart yields; she will obey the deep instincts of her own pure soul; no hollow conventionalities shall restrain the divine impulse which fills her breast:—

. . . . Hence, bashful cunning!
And prompt me, plain and holy innocence!
I am your wife, if you will marry me.

It has been well said, "What a commentary is this scene on the words, *For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave unto his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh.*" Unconsciously to those two young souls, their spontaneous instincts were serving a vaster purpose, and their passionate love was the moving of that Infinite Charity which is ever seeking to make an end of sin and bring in an everlasting righteousness. In this way the poet consecrates the pure love of youth and maid by showing its inevitable service in the progress of the race, making the union of the sexes an awful sacrament of Divine Providence. We have not space to show how, in this play, Shakspeare still further exalts the marriage bond, transfiguring its sensuous relations by the consecration of duty, and sanctifying passion by inviolate chastity and moral obligation. Neither can we say all that might be said of those two wonderful creations, Caliban, the earth-born monster, and Ariel, the ærial spirit of joy and beauty. Caliban is the undeveloped man, with nascent intellect and imagination, capable of great things through ages of toilful evolution. But at present he is devoid of conscience, and has no sense of moral relationship. His lust is savage; his hatred terrible; his appetite gross; his

noblest deity a wretched drunkard ; his highest freedom to plunge without restraint into mad intoxication. On Ariel a whole volume might be written. He is the secret soul of natural joy and loveliness, the love of beauty for its own sake. Or may we not say this?—Ariel is the spirit of Ideal Art, long paralysed by an age of gross materialism ; still kept in partial servitude while the strife continues between the powers of good and evil, and only to rise into perfect liberty when man has triumphed over every power of darkness and gained peace with himself and atonement with the universe.* Thus in Ariel's imprisonment, service, and final freedom we can see a deeper meaning in those words of the apostle : "*The creature was made subject to immaturity not of its own will, but by reason of him who put it into subjection, in hope that even Nature itself will be liberated from the bondage of decay, and brought into the freedom of the glory of the children of God.*"

We hasten to the happy close. The treacherous King and faithless brother are brought face to face with the man they have injured at the very moment when Ferdinand and Miranda are discovered conversing within the cave. The lost are found ; the old enmities are forgotten in the vision of perfect love. In *Hamlet* the old generation was swept away, to take no part in the atonement. But here the old generation, which has filled the world with hate and misery, stands face to face with a succeeding generation, which shall inaugurate a new and nobler era. "*Instead of the fathers shall come up the children.*" Through the purity of childhood and the mystery of love the Divine Purpose is moving on, leaving hate and sin and suffering behind, and bringing in a kingdom of peace and goodwill. The wrath of man is made to praise God. Eternal Providence is vindicated, the secret

* This will appear more than a fanciful suggestion to those who are familiar with Kant's doctrine of Art as the mediating realm between the sensible and spiritual worlds.

of the world revealed. That old crime was overruled ; the unnatural deed which exiled Prospero and his child has at last provided safety and shelter to the criminals themselves. That fearful storm, that sudden wreck, that separation which seemed long as death itself—these have brought the lost together, reconciled hearts that were alienated, and made provision for a better future. All suffering is disciplinary ; in it there is no element of wrath, but an irresistible purpose to make man perfect, even at the cost of ages of anguish. In the most terrible punishment there is no revenge ; even in the deepest hell there is only a purgatorial fire of love to purge the dross, and to refine the gold. The divinest power in the universe is neither material energy nor brute force ; these are impotent against the might of all-conquering love. Justice itself bows before mercy ; the tempest of wrath breaks at the feet of penitence ; vengeance sheathes her sword at the bidding of a full and free forgiveness. To sum up the Gospel of Shakspeare's last play in the words of a modern thinker—“ *Man has an instinct in the depths of his consciousness, which teaches him that the throne of Mercy is above that of Justice, that wrath is by nature transient, and that a sentence of condemnation may be revoked, but that the voice of Love is eternal, and that when it has once gone forth, the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.*”

FRANK WALTERS.

THE IMAGE OF TRUTH.

A DREAM.

I DREAMT that I stood on a wide plain. It seemed to be an autumn afternoon, for a great part of the plain was covered with fields of stubble. Some harvest, good or bad, must lately have been reaped, and the plough had not yet passed over, removing the traces.

In the midst of the plain, some way from where I stood, was a very great Image. It reached from earth into the invisibility of the deepest heavens. I saw only from its knees to its breast, for the feet rested far below the level of the ground on the granite beds at earth's heart, and the head and shoulders (while I somehow could not but believe they existed) were out of sight above me. Whether their invisibility was due to their great distance, whether they were lost in some purple autumn haze, or whether they were themselves partly transparent, and so of a like purple with the sky, I could not quite determine. But it did not occur to me to suppose that the Image possessed *no* head or shoulders. I longed for a telescope that might help me to find the lips. Grand lips in form and in utterance, I thought, must they be that should tally with the stately form I beheld before me.

From the distance at which I stood, the outline of the Image was all I could clearly observe. Full of admiration, I inwardly questioned what it was, and whose it was. An informant stood at once beside me, who answered

my two questions in two words—"My Truth," and vanished.

So she was living—a Figure, and not an Image, after all.

I approached her. But, alas! my admiration of the stupendous beauty of her form grew feebler as I came nearer, and saw the colouring and detail of her garb. Gaudy raiment of all crude and garish hues draped her. She was bedizened, too, with false jewels on a gigantic scale. Baubles, beads, swords, gilt books, compasses, sextants, crucibles, pendulums, thumb-screws, hand-cuffs, gags, money-bags, flagons and quill-pens were only a few of the objects I could discern, hung about her as if by way of ornament. Her robe was also covered with pictures and writing—pictures of goblins and angels, and writings in every character, few of which I had skill to read.

And so, on a near view, the noble form—or, rather, so much of her as I could from such a position see—stood before me, a hideous jumble of everything unbeautiful, inharmonious, and commonplace. I began to doubt whether I had heard correctly the words of my late informant. His veracity it did not yet occur to me to doubt; but my own hearing, I fancied, might have misled me.

So I went back to my former position, whence the garish details of the apparel were softened by distance. I considered the Figure anew, and the glorious outline at once reconvinced me I could be gazing upon nothing less divine than Truth herself.

But men approached. More—more—a crowd.

I joined them.

Each, as he came near the knees of the Figure, made obeisance. I watched the various countenances meanwhile, and observed the very differing expressions they bore, and still more the extreme variety of the directions in which the worshipping glance was cast.

Many—most—looked at the lowest fringe of the gaudy

skirt. This skirt, reaching to the knee, just touched the earth. Its fringe was composed of coins and jewels, mostly counterfeit.

These worshippers were in most cases men—strong men, and well apparelled.

And there were many, very many, and these chiefly women, who riveted their eyes on the charms hanging low at the side of the Figure. These charms were a silver heart set with rubies, and a brazen cross wound round about with a glittering serpent. These worshippers did not appear quite so wretched as the former group, not an individual among which looked as if smiling were possible to him. Yet even the charm worshippers appeared uneasy, and started as if frightened and unsafe whenever the crowd jostled them. And I perceived that they had, every one of them, stopping of some kind in both ears.

Then there were sad-looking men with beautiful eyes, who raised their glance a little higher, to where the robe of the Figure was covered with words, and musical notes, and paintings, in endless confusion; verses, and lyres, and dragons, and wings; painted trumpets blown by painted lips, and painted blood shed by painted combatants.

And higher yet on the Figure was her girdle of brass, upon which were graven the twelve signs of the ecliptic, and from which hung innumerable short chains of platinum. These chains supported a variety of strange objects. A specimen of every instrument science has invented to prosecute her inquiries or to simplify her labour, and a copy of every book which has done service from earliest ages by advancing the study and knowledge of facts; and the author's name was emblazoned on every book. A group of persons made their obeisance with glance exclusively fixed upon this girdle, and the weight of things dependent from it. These girdle-worshippers had a calm look of unhasting

interest on their faces; but there was no triumph and no joy in their searching eyes.

And a few there were on the outer rim of the crowd who looked higher still as they paid their homage; looked up of where the great hand of the Figure pressed on the greater heart. And these were very troubled men. They had on their faces the wistfullest look of wonder and question, and they sighed as they made their obeisance.

There was a little hillock just beyond the verge of the crowd, upon which I mounted in order to see the mass of worshippers as a whole, from a more commanding point. I then perceived a very intent group apparently digging busily about the place where the knees of the Figure disappeared beneath the ground; but I could not make out exactly what they were about. They scarcely seemed to be worshipping at all, since their glance was downward. Of these anon.

I turned away from the crowd in disgust, for I said to myself—"These men have dressed up Truth in their own way, till she is hidden under the tawdry trifles with which they have decked her; and now each party is content to worship, instead of her, just so much of her apparel as it has itself contributed to provide. Were she at this moment unclothed except by her own glorious grandeur, which of them, I wonder, would worship her any more?"

So turning, and so exclaiming, I came upon a group of haughty, erect persons who stood apart, and made no obeisance. There were but a few of them—a score or so among the millions.

"Why do you not join the rest in the worship of Truth?"—I inquired, addressing myself to these men. A smile half of hope, half of bitterness answered me; and one man spoke.

"We would worship Truth," said he, "could we but see her to worship. But in tedious course of many years the crowd have heaped this tinsel so thickly upon her that there is nothing of her to be seen. And she must be seen to be

worthily worshipped. We mean to tear off the disguise to-morrow, that these fools may cease from their idolatry; but even then *we* cannot hope to worship; for we shall not see her eyes; they are so far away. Nought but her very eyes can content us. These multitudes are deluded; we are merely puzzled. If we have a hope it is to see her face through the vision of our children, ages hence. And for their sake, and for our own sake in them, we will presently find us means to tear off the trammels and gauds that oppress yon lofty one, and make her clutch at her grand heart in patient pain."

"Nay," said a second of these proud persons; "it is not her eyes that we seek, but her very voice. A word from the lips of Truth would command our adoration; yet we know this of her and of ourselves, that her speech is not human speech, and that our ears are not so constructed that we could hear it—no, not though she shouted till the universe rang again! Yet our children *may* hear better than we, and we will disrobe Truth of her trumpery raiment that they may live nearer her lips, and catch, maybe, her whispers."

So were these men not at one among themselves—some desiring the eyes of Truth, and others her voice. Yet in this they were agreed, that each held himself destined to take part in the unveiling of the lofty Figure, and each placed his hope and his faith in this intended act.

I asked, how should the disrobing of Truth help their children to climb within sight of her eyes, or within hearing of her voice?

"Because when all the many implements men make in honour of truth shall be laid on the earth before her, instead of being left dangling about her in the vain attempt to draw her down into visibility by their mere weight, there will be made, as it were, steps, by which men may mount and worship from a loftier standpoint. It is thus that our children

shall grow by the wisdom of their fathers. Likewise, when the good and bad raiment which has been hung upon Truth shall be by us taken off and strewed upon the ground where we stand, it shall make a very great heap, from the summit of which men may see so much the higher. It is thus our children shall grow wise, even by the *folly* of their fathers. See you not that already we have reached her knees? The ground upward from her feet is formed of *débris*, amassed from time to time, as again and again Truth has been freed of the garb that had become too opaque and oppressive for her longer to endure, and we stand by so much higher than our fathers. She presses on her heart to-day; to-morrow *we* will deliver her from her trammels, and show these herds their folly."

He turned loftily for assent to his companions. "Ay, to-morrow!" responded they, and the select few looked complacent.

But suddenly a loud gust of wind filled the air with dust and tumult. Truth moved her hand from her breast, and with it tore off, bit by bit, every morsel of coloured and glittering array, and, casting all from her among the excited crowd, stood still again in a new effulgent whiteness.

The crowd, every man and woman of them, after rubbing from their eyes the dust which the stupendous action had raised, continued to worship. But to my amazement, they, one and all, ignored entirely the lofty, shining Figure, and confined their homage to that particular detail or bauble of her late garb which had engrossed their attention before.

But it had been a different matter to worship these when they hung, if not in order, at least at a common centre, so that each devotee could see and could kneel without inconveniencing his neighbour. Now, the rags into which Truth had torn her raiment lay about in disordered confusion. The fringe of coins was hopelessly entangled among the beads, crosses, and charms. The sharp point of many a

lancet and the broken glass of many a lens from the brazen girdle had torn cruel holes in the painted skirt, where angels now showed wingless and dragons headless, and where the verses and chaunts in many notations had lost their titles and key-notes.

Oh! the jostling, and fighting, and cursing that now went on! One party rushed frantically away at last, bearing in triumph the gilt books—all soiled as they were—the broken crosses, and the battered flagons.

“We have the Truth!” they madly cried. “All who follow not with us are liars and devils.”

Another party escaped from the turmoil with less ado and cackle, each silently hugging a bag of the coins which he had succeeded in extricating with bleeding hands from the heaps of *débris*. These chuckled softly.

“We have the one Truth worthy of adoration. See this most precious metal! See these most excellent jewels! Let those fight over their charms and relics who please; we alone are the wise worshippers of Truth.”

I observed that this group had grown much more numerous in the scuffle, and that it now comprised, not only the vast number of men who from the first had paid homage to the fringe of gold and silver, but many also who had formerly belonged to the several other groups. This seemed the stranger when I remembered that the coins were counterfeit, as also the jewels; and that this nearer view might have been expected to work the contrary effect.

Then the anxious-visaged persons who had gazed so sadly and so lovingly upon the paintings,—who had deciphered the verses, and listened for strains from the pictured lyres, bent their beautiful eyes closer over the torn and dusty raiment on the ground. It was decaying very fast as it lay in limp heaps, and from its folds and from the ground close about it, there issued swift, slimy things, and lizards, and veno-

mous adders. Yet these worshippers bent low, and murmured between weeping and smiling—"If Truth be left to us at all, she is here among the forms and sounds of beauty. Ay! most beautiful is she! most beautiful! even in her decay; and still we worship. What but beauty shall reveal Truth to us?"

And fondly they handled the torn raiment; and some of them even caressed, as if abstractedly, the strange, sly reptiles that were clustering among it.

The girdle-worshippers I next observed. These, with calmness and no hurry, collected their scattered instruments, and at once applied them, each after his fashion, to ascertain if possible what had happened.

One took a telescope of enormous power to investigate the precise nature of this strange, pervading dust with which the clear autumn air had so suddenly become darkened. Another turned the lens of a microscope in the direction of the majestic Figure; and a third, having picked up one of the jewelled crosses that were charms, proceeded inquisitively to ascertain its precise value by melting it in a crucible. "Surely" said all, "Truth lurks here somewhere. Vain indeed to seek her, save among the crucibles, the scalpels, and the lenses!"

Lastly, the questioners who had dumbly watched the hand at the heart, seeing it there no longer, looked for it nowhere else. Their knees shook; and they fell to the ground, and wept.

And lo! Truth herself grew transparent as the dust settled, and I could well believe that none saw, or could hope to see her at all, whose eyes had become filled with the image of her dress.

Then the select knot of explainers came forward; but to my astonishment they stood, to a man, with their backs turned to the living Figure. They went from group to group, and pointed out the madness of the gold-worshippers,

the weakness of the charm-worshippers, the error, fault, and folly of all; and the end of their discourse was that the whole multitude took to quarrelling, wrestling, sneering, despairing, and dying; while Truth stood hard by, deserted, and owning not one worshipper among them all.

Sick with horror and blank disgust, I was striving to awake from the distress of such a dream, when my informant stood once more at my elbow, and gravely spoke.

"You have not seen all," he said. "Look at those men yonder, busy with spade and shovel among the heap of *débris*. Nay, come nearer."

I obeyed. There was an opening—a deep, dark shaft, as if to a mine.

"What are they doing here?" I inquired.

"Burrowing back to the feet of Truth. These are the men who hold that Truth is, and can be, nothing but feet. Her feet are of gas, they say; though her knees and body are solid as Life, and her unseen head, for all they can deny, is of the strong impalpability of Thought itself. But their faith is in feet. As the Foot is, so is the Heart and also the Head. That is their proverb. All Truth thus is gas, and all gas is Truth. Only one thing is worthy of deference, and that is the theory which proclaims the omnipotence of gas. Burrow not with these men, thou dreaming child, but climb rather, as I will later show thee. For the Heart of Truth is nobler than her Feet; and her Head, which no man hath yet seen, is noblest of all."

"Alas!" said I, "then *all* are wrong. Truth is here, and worshippers are here, yet the worshippers have no Truth, and Truth has no worshippers! In very deed, the thing is to me so bewildering that I half misdoubt me whether there be not error in thy information. What if this Image that serves men as a peg for their ideals be, after all, not a Life, but a Name? not a Figure, but an Idol? What, if we may not see her feet, is duty? What, if we may not see her

head, is worship? What is this crowd so concerned about in her name? What is Truth?"

My informant lightly touched my eyelids. The vault of the zenith opened up above me to an immeasurable and awful height. The earth at my feet clave open into an immeasurable and appalling abyss. The Figure of Truth hung between the fathomless gulf and the fathomless heaven; and I saw from her feet to her incomprehensible eyes.

But then, as I gazed, a horrible thing happened. A dimness seemed to clothe her slowly round about. A dimness, extending from her knees to her shoulders;—no further, upward or downward. A dimness that grew to a cloud; a cloud that grew to a black darkness that formed a horrid cleft in the central being of Truth.

I shivered with deadly cold. A biting, raw, gusty wind sprang up from every quarter at once, and whirled round and round me; while the air was filled with low, hideous laughter, and wails, and chilly screams.

Then the dark gap, occupying just that portion of space which the visible part of Truth's figure had formerly filled, slowly lightened. But the form did not re-appear. I still saw the distant outline of her head, too far above me, and in too unearthly a light to interest me at all now that my first surprise was past, especially in that wild clamour of the elements. I still saw the great, firm, immovable feet lit by their own whiteness, infinitely far below me; but where her hand had been, and the heart her hand had pressed, there was—*nothing*. I saw the distant horizon, black with thunder, where the plain met the sky;—saw it right through the blank where the Figure so lately had stood. And the blank was framed, above by the shoulders and head I cared not that I could not reach, and below by the feet I cared not that I could not stoop to. And the elements roared, fiercely

and confusedly, right through the emptiness which the great Heart erewhile had seemed to fill.

I suddenly fell weeping very bitterly ; for I would rather never have been born than thus to have looked upon Truth that had no heart.

My pitying informant again touched my eyelids. "Of this—enough !" said he.

All appeared once more as it had done at first. The natural sky arched overhead a little mistily, and in the mist the Figure was again lost above the breast, the earth was closed about her knees, and the stubble of the unploughed field stood up sharply where that awful chasm had lately seemed to open. Only the babbling, fighting crowd had vanished, and all its treasures with it.

But more was to be revealed.

"Here, then, is Truth," said my informant. "Are you now content to have her heart, while forgetting her feet and waiting for a change to appreciate her head? Can you worship the heart of that which is, *for you*, headless?"

I felt that I was committing myself blindly to I knew not what ; but, in my terror lest any further hesitation on my part should bring back that awful vision of a blank, and that blowing of merciless winds, I said, faintly, "Yes."

"Then here are your companions."

Immediately the air around the Figure was seen to be filled with an active, silent throng, invisible before. My informant floated up among them and through their midst, and as he disappeared in the purple haze above them, he cried sweetly down to me his final words :—

"These are they who do the Best, and speak not. When the crowd below catches a glimpse of them, it asks them concerning the Truth they love. They have no answer to give. For what men say of Truth is but the emptiness of opinion. Yet when the cry reaches them, 'What shall be done?' they answer promptly with a deed. But you, O

dreaming child! if you will have a Word whereby to answer those who may question of your dream, can take your choice of three, only remembering that a name is but a name, and that to worship it is idolatry and corruption. The Truth, for those who circle round the centre and are silent, and for you who have chosen your lot with them, has to-day three lawful names:—I. *Unself at Work*. II. *The Handing-On*. III. *The Will of God*."

His last words were very faint with distance, and when they were spoken I awoke.

L. S. BEVINGTON.

R. W. EMERSON.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "MODERN REVIEW."

MY DEAR SIR,—Once more to fail in bearing my promised testimony in your Review to the revered Emerson, is a grief; but "willing as the spirit may be, the flesh is weak." And after having written—amidst recurring attacks of illness—a voluminous heap of MSS., the result proves to be that my notice was planned on the scale of a book, rather than of an article, and is unworthy of our honoured friend; while neither strength nor time permit me to re-write or to condense it fitly.

This disappointment causes regret, because my hope was to bring into brighter light the rare blending of the Spiritual with the Intellectual in Emerson's life and aims. For, though by common consent scholars of the Anglo-American race acknowledge him as the grandest "Representative Man" of *Genius* of the Western Republic, by his embodiment in thought of her purest Ideal—apparently, they fail to see that, by his pre-eminent Virtue in character and life, he stood as a Real Type of that *Personal Greatness*, towards which he welcomed his compeers everywhere to aspire.

How unique, in quickening influence and inspiring energy, his *Genius* and *Personal Greatness* were, appears in this. As one reads with impartial judgment the tributes of grateful love, which already have been offered up in his honour—from his "Life by G. W. Cooke," that heralded, like a bright procession of sunset clouds, his departure; on, through the touching effusions at his funeral, from the elect friends summoned to conduct the closing rites, W. H. Furness, Rockwood Hoar, J. Freeman Clarke, Howard Brown, A. Bronson Alcott, and F. Henry Hedge, whose accidentally-delayed words soon followed in resonant response; and on again, through the series of fervent Memorial Discourses, too many to particularise, in America and Great Britain, and the discriminating notices which have appeared in weekly,

monthly, quarterly periodicals, from highly skilled and variously gifted critics, to his faithful disciple, Alexander Ireland's most timely and interesting "In Memoriam"—he is cheered to find that, among these mirrored forms of Emerson, there is scarcely one which has not caught characteristic splendour from his glowing beauty, translucent truthfulness, humane magnanimity, and symmetric manhood. So generous and equitable, indeed, have been these manifestations of regard, that the writer of this note consented to complete what he had tried to say of Emerson—as The Young Preacher; The Orator, Lecturer, and Scholar; The Reformer, Citizen and Patriot; and The Friend*—only because he hoped to crown those photographs from memory by two finished pictures of The Poet-Seer, and Mystic-Saint. But in these aspects, even, he now has been anticipated by Edwin P. Whipple's eloquent article on "Emerson the Poet," in the July number of the *North American Review*, and by R. Heber Newton's magnificent discourse on "Emerson's Gospel of the Religion of Nature."

Difficult would it be to add words of worth to these manifold testimonials of our friend's transcending excellence, as exemplar, guide, inciter, and illuminator. Indeed, it seems presumptuous to describe Emerson at all! For has he not, throughout his works, imaged himself unconsciously, in each alternate tendency, mood, attainment, aspiration, with such luminous fidelity, that it seems irreverent to copy, with a blunt pencil, portraits exquisitely perfected in characters of light? One feels prompted, rather, to say to new students of the Sage of Concord's writings: Would you know aright this Prophet of the Soul, as he lived, read his Orations, Addresses, Essays, Poems, and especially the earlier ones, such as "Nature," "The American Scholar," "Literary Ethics," "The Method of Nature," &c., reading what is inscribed with sympathetic ink between the lines, and yielding to the impressions made on heart and conscience, yet more than on critical intellect, by these *Confessions*—and you shall behold this beautiful Person as he was in character, as in conduct he irradiated the scenes he moved among, and as he was known inmost to God and guardian angels. There he stands revealed! For if man ever did, he wrote in hearts' blood, according to Sidney's maxim, "Look in your heart and write." The very passage of Autobiography, wherein this maxim is

* See the *Inquirer* for May 6, 1882.

quoted—the Essay on “Spiritual Laws”—is a transcript from his Diary: “The way to speak and write what shall not go out of fashion is to speak and write sincerely. The argument which has not power to reach my own practice, I may well doubt, will fail to reach yours. He that writes to himself writes to an eternal public.”

A second difficulty, in attempting to sketch Emerson, is that no two observers saw the same man. Unchangingly faithful to his own spirit, as he was, he yet presented ever new phases to the persons he met, according to their quality. And each on-looker saw that side only which his own vision was fitted to discern. So must it be with his works. One is inclined, therefore, to whisper in the ear of his critics: Beware how you judge this whole-souled brother, for you go to judgment yourself in the estimate you are enlightened and just, humble and loving enough to form of one who so earnestly listened to the “Over Soul.” This man was, in the best sense, a high-bred Christian Gentleman; but no Stoic was ever more nobly proud, no Puritan more sternly upright. He scorned pretension, had shrewd insight into character, and, as he says of Nature, “knew how, without swell, brag, strain, or shock, to keep firm common sense, ‘*Semper sibi similis.*’”

Then a final hindrance to declaring what one's heart prompts him to say of this singularly impersonal person is, that the friends who revered him most highly, most scrupulously withheld the least allusion which might be vitiated by praise, for the reason that they knew how devoutly he referred all goodness and wisdom to the ever-present Inspirer, with whom he sought to dwell in calm communion, unruffled by a breath of self-love. Well does his confidential comrade, Alcott, write of the “one subtraction from the pleasure of his books, his pains to be impersonal or discrete, as if he feared any the least intrusion of himself were an offence offered to self-respect, the courtesy due to intercourse and authorship.” And who can forget the passage in his essay on “Friendship,” where he writes: “Let me be alone to the end of the world rather than that my friend should overstep, by a word or a look, his real sympathy. I am equally balked by antagonism and by compliance. Let him not cease to be himself an instant. I hate, where I looked for a manly furtherance, or a manly resistance, to find a mush of concession. . . . Friendship demands religious treatment. Reverence is a great part of it. . . . Should

not the society of my friend be to me poetic, pure, universal, as Nature itself?" Though our forerunner has ascended into the transparent world of light, therefore, a dweller amidst shadows still relucts to testify, however modestly, to Emerson's rare merits.

Delicate as might be the duty, however, gratitude and honour alike commanded me to bear witness to this illustrious compatriot, as he had revealed himself in confidential intercourse through many years. For my conviction is firm, that hereafter Emerson will be recognised universally as a far *grander style of Person* than has been apprehended, as yet, except by the few drawn within the sphere of his close fellowship. To them he was peerless. Merely by living he opened new possibilities of personal being, of human society, of heavenly communion, of immortality begun on earth. For his daily existence was so pure, ample, free, blissful, Eden-like, that the long-transmitted "Curse" seemed transformed into the "Beatific Vision." This Man of the Future incarnate, this Golden Age revived, it was the aim of my unfinished article to enshrine for others' love, by proving how, to use his emphatic words, he actually had "annulled the adulterous divorce between Intellect and Holiness," and in his own person "*reconciled*" the Poet-Seer and Mystic-Saint in living oneness, with the wedding-ring of Beauty. But why present a blurred copy of his Ideal-Real when we have the original pictured with sunbeams, in this sublime outburst: "I stand here to say:—Let us worship the mighty and transcendent Soul. The lovers of Goodness have been one class, the students of Wisdom another, as if either could exist in purity without the other. Truth is always holy, holiness always wise. I will that we keep terms with sin and a sinful literature and society no longer, but live a life of discovery and performance. Accept the intellect and it will accept us. Be the lowly ministers of that pure omniscience and deny it not before men. It will burn up all profane literature, all base, current opinions, all false powers of the world, as in a moment of time. I draw from Nature the lesson of Intimate Divinity. The sanity of man needs the poise of this immanent force. His nobility needs the assurance of this inexhaustible reserved power. . . . The doctrine of this Supreme Presence is a cry of exultation and joy. . . . I praise with wonder this great Reality, which drowns all things in its deluge of Light. . . . The natural history of the

Soul we cannot describe, but we know that *it* is Divine. . . . From this faith I draw courage and hope. Let those fear and fawn who will. The Soul is in her native realm, and it is wider than space, older than time, wide as hope, rich as love. Pusillanimity and fear she refuses with beautiful scorn; they are not for her, who putteth on her coronation robes, and goes out through universal love to universal power."

There lives the Real-Ideal Emerson, as it would have been my joyful privilege to image him, if health had permitted. But presently "The Correspondence of Carlyle and Emerson," edited by the accomplished æsthetic Professor of Harvard University, Charles E. Norton, will appear; and then, so soon as a careful revision of his Journals, Note Books, Poems, and Correspondence can be completed, "Emerson's Life," by his friend and literary trustee, J. Elliot Cabot, of Boston, will follow. These will give the needed opportunity for some worthy critic to portray, in your pages, the radiant Optimist of the West.

WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME "JEHOVAH."

IN the last number of the *Modern Review* I notice that Mr. T. Tyler has proposed a new derivation for the name of the national God of Israel, which it has lately become the fashion to call Yahveh. He supposes it to be borrowed from the Vedic Dyaus, and endeavours to support his hypothesis by assuming the existence of an early maritime trade between Babylonia, the original home of Abraham, and the mouths of the Indus. None of his arguments, however, seem to me convincing. Philologically it is difficult to grant that the initial dental of the name could have been lost when it was borrowed by the ancestors of the Israelites. The loss of the initial in Latin is nothing to the point, as Latin is a sister language of Sanskrit, not a foreign idiom, and it is a regular law of Latin phonology for a primitive *dy* to become simply *j*. So far as I know, there is no such law either in Hebrew or in any other Semitic language.

Dyaus, moreover, does not correspond with Yahveh in character. Dyaus was the sky-god, whereas Yahveh, like other Baalim, was originally a solar deity. Semitic theology was intensely solar, and in so far as Yahveh was a god of the polytheistic multitude, and not of the prophets, he was a Baal, in whom was reflected the great luminary of day.

The connection which Mr. Tyler seeks to establish between Babylonia and India in early times is also, to say the least, very questionable. The Bactrian elephant represented on the Black Obelisk was brought from Muzri or Lesser Armenia; and even if it could be shown that there were commercial relations between India and Assyria in the ninth century B.C., we should have no proof that similar relations existed between India and Babylonia more than a thousand years earlier. The Chaldean origin of the Indian form of the deluge tradition has been called in question, and the age of the teak found at Mugheir and Abu Habba is as late as the epoch of Nebuchadnezzar. The only

evidence of early intercourse between Chaldea and India that I have come across is a mention of *Sindhu*, or Indian muslin, in an old Babylonian list of clothes. It would appear that even at the time when the fleets of Solomon and Hiram traded to Ophir (if, indeed, this is to be identified with the Indian Abhira), the mouths of the Indus were still occupied, not by an Aryan, but by a Dravidian population, since the Hebrew *tukiyyim*, "peacocks," is the Tamil *togei*.

Mr. Tyler has forgotten, however, that if the name of an Indian deity were borrowed by the inhabitants of Babylonia, they would be the trading classes of the country rather than a small tribe of aliens who had settled among them. Mugheir, which, by the way, is shown by the inscriptions to be Ur, Warka being Erech, was the seat of a powerful monarchy, and it is inconceivable that an obscure body of emigrants to the West should have carried with them the name of a deity adopted from abroad which has left no traces of itself in the native literature of Chaldaea. Our knowledge of Babylonian mythology is fairly complete, thanks to the long lists of gods and demi-gods which have been preserved to us, but there is no such deity as Yahveh to be found in it. The mythological tablets sometimes give us the names of the gods worshipped by the neighbours of the Babylonians, but here, too, we look vainly for the name of the national God of Israel. If it was borrowed by the ancestors of the Israelites, it must have been after they had left Babylonia.

Prof. Friedrich Delitzsch's attempt to find an Accadian etymology for the name is unsuccessful, as has been shown by Dr. Tiele and others. At the same time the arguments by which he tries to prove that its original form was Yahu, Yahveh being due to a later *Volksetymologie*, remain as strong as ever, and I do not well see how they can be upset. *Yahu*, however, hardly admits of a Semitic derivation, so that, after all, we seem driven to conclude that though Mr. Tyler's special thesis is unacceptable, his general view of the foreign origin of the word is correct. This is confirmed by the fact that the Canaanites or Phœnicians, the near kindred of the Hebrews both geographically and linguistically, had no more knowledge of a god *Yahu* than the other Semitic populations of Western Asia. At present this is all that can be said upon the subject with any strong show of probability; *Yahu* does not seem to have primitively been of native Israelitish origin, and yet all attempts to discover a foreign source of the name have failed.

Under these circumstances, perhaps the wisest course would

be to wait for further light, and not to suggest a new solution of the problem. But Mr. Tyler may, with some justice, claim that if I reject his solution of it, I ought to propose one of my own. If I do so, however, it must be understood to be only a tentative one. I am, myself, inclined to look to the Hittites for the origin both of the God himself and of his name. The Book of Genesis brings them into special connection with Abraham in the South of Palestine, and David, who reigned at Hebron before he reigned at Jerusalem, while making war on the Semitic Arameans of Damascus and Zobah, was in alliance with the Hittite king of Hamath. The alliance lasted long, and when in later days a panic fell upon the Syrians, they at once concluded that "the king of Israel hath hired against us the kings of the Hittites" (2 Kings vii. 6). Tou, or Toi—itself a non-Semitic name—was the king of Hamath, who sent his son Joram to form a league with David, and that Yahu is the first element in the name of Joram seems evident from the form Hadoram, which takes its place in 1 Chron. xviii. 10. I have tried to show elsewhere that Hadad was the Semitised form of Dadis or Attis, the Hittite god of the air, and that when Macrobius makes Adad the supreme god of the Syrians, and says that the word means "one," he is referring not to the Semitic Syrians, but to the people of Hierapolis and its neighbourhood, the White Syrians of Strabo. However this may be, a later king of Hamath, in the time of Sargon, when the city appears to have passed into the hands of the Semites, is called by the Assyrians Yahu-bihdi in one place, and Ilu-bihdi in another, and since Ilu is the Hebrew El, "God," it would seem that Yahu must have been as much the supreme deity of Hamath as he was of Judah. It is, therefore, significant that the Hittite captain in David's army was named Uriah. Outside Hamath and Israel the inscriptions, neither of Assyria nor of Egypt, reveal any names of which Yahu forms part.

If this suggestion of mine is rejected, I see no alternative except to adopt Dr. Robertson Smith's reference of the word to *חורר*. "to fall back upon" (as in Job xxxvii. 6), the original meaning of the name being "he who causes (rain or lightning) to fall upon (the earth)." But this etymology assumes both the Semitic origin of the word and the form Yahveh, notwithstanding the contrary evidence of compound proper names as well as of the Assyrian inscriptions.

A. H. SAYCE.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

THE PEAK IN DARIEN.*

MISS COBBE'S new book is a timely and effective contribution to the controversies of the day on some of the chief subjects to which she has devoted herself, and it is full of that freshness of feeling and earnestness of conviction which give zest and life to any discussion into which she enters. It is intended, as she says in the Preface, for those of her contemporaries who are daily brought face to face with some of the darker problems of our time, or are led by their advancing years to ponder ever more earnestly on the mystery of the great Transition. In the various papers—some new, some already published in various periodicals—she has "striven to meet fairly the questions: Whether the denial of God and Immortality be indeed (as Agnostics or Comtists are wont to boast) a 'magnanimous' creed? Whether life be truly (as Leopardi and Schopenhauer, and hundreds of their English disciples din daily into our ears) a burden and a curse? and Whether (as much recent legislation and newspaper literature would seem to teach) bodily health be, after all, the *summum bonum* for which personal freedom, courage, humanity, and purity ought all to be sacrificed?"

The first of these questions is discussed in the paper on 'Magnanimous Atheism,' which appeared, five years ago, in the *Theological Review*. Dismissing, as essentially false and irreligious, the idea of the relation between religion and morals which would make virtue a bargain with the Most High, or an act of supreme prudence, consisting in obedience to the will of God *for the sake of everlasting happiness*, or for fear of loss and punishment, it is shown that the real question is, whether a man is necessarily self-interested "in doing the will of a Being whom he loves, and whom he hopes by serving to approach and resemble." The love of goodness, which is the inspiration of such obedience to a supremely righteous and holy will, is "not a less disinterested, though naturally a more fervent, sentiment than love of goodness in the abstract." After vindicating Theism from the charge of degrading the character of human virtue, it is not difficult to go further, and to establish its claim to exalt the quality of the righteous life, and to

* *The Peak in Darien, with some other Inquiries touching Concerns of the Soul and the Body.* By FRANCES POWER COBBE. London: Williams and Norgate. 1882.

inspire and strengthen the conscience and the will under the conditions of the moral struggle. It is admitted, of course, that this, by itself *proves* nothing as to the truth or falsehood of either theory of life. Miss Cobbe's contention is, that the religious beliefs, which rest on other foundations, are not open to the charge of moral unworthiness; and she shows what a much poorer and weaker thing life would be if the faith in a supreme will, and an all-embracing love, and an imperishable spiritual life, were to disappear, or to be finally discredited as a superstition or a delusion.

In the essay on 'Pessimism and One of its Professors,' a distinction is rightly made between what we may call respectively the higher and the lower Pessimism. The former may in some measure be due to "the growth of a finer sense of pity for human woes, and the inclusion of the lower animals in the scope of our sympathies;" and it may give rise to pure philanthropies and noble self-sacrifices in the attempt to alleviate the miseries to which it is so sensitive. But there is a Pessimism, only too common, which is essentially arrogant, selfish, and heartless, unable to believe in good because afflicted with a profound incapacity to discern it. As an instance of the kind of character which naturally allies itself with a thorough-going pessimism of this uglier sort, we are invited to look at a portrait of one of its noted professors—Arthur Schopenhauer—drawn from the life with a remorseless pen. The picture is unlovely in almost every feature; and we are made to feel the truth of the remark, that "there are minds—and Schopenhauer's was one of them—whose brilliancy is that of a lighthouse. Its best use is to disclose the cold and troubled sea, and the dreary rocks whereon the unwary might make shipwreck."

The argument of the short paper, entitled 'Hygeiolatry,' is directed against the doctrine which may be embodied in the formula: "That any practice which, in the opinion of experts, conduces to bodily health, or tends to the cure of disease, becomes *ipso facto* morally lawful and right." As against this portentous fruit of some modern theories of life the thesis is defended: "That bodily health may not be lawfully sacrificed to our desire of pleasure or fear of pain. It may and ought to be sacrificed to the health of our souls, to the service of our fellow-men, or to fidelity to God." Miss Cobbe believes that under the baleful influence of the former doctrine the old courage of Englishmen is dwindling away—a view which seems to us to have something of "pessimistic" exaggeration in it. She speaks with righteous indignation of practices which are justified in the name of "physiological research," on the plea that they may conduce to the cure of disease. And she refers, with the necessary reserve, but with the intense and impressive earnestness with which she always approaches the question of purity of life, to the moral poisoning of youth, which she believes to be going on "to a frightful extent," caused by the evil counsels given by some medical men, in connection with the conditions of physical health. It is impossible to question the fact of this moral poisoning, while it is equally impossible

to know its extent. No doubt it is "frightful," whether it be small or great. But we cannot help hoping and believing that, both in her estimate of the extent to which the general principle is accepted, that *everything* may be sacrificed to bodily health, and of this last and most revolting application of it, Miss Cobbe is, in some respects, predisposed to believe the worst; and that she may be underestimating the effect of those restraining influences which so often prevent an immoral theory from producing its logical consequences. But it is impossible to speak too seriously or too emphatically on such a subject; and once more we have to thank Miss Cobbe, as we have had to thank others of her sex, for speaking with such noble, womanly courage and "godly sincerity" the word of warning and counsel.

Under the heading 'Zoophily,' the duties of man towards the lower animals are discussed, the object of the paper being to define the feeling with which they ought to be regarded, and which most naturally determine our treatment of them. We need hardly say that the argument is yet another plea to save our humbler fellow-creatures from the hands of the tormentors.

In the amusing paper on 'Sacrificial Medicine,' we are presented with a selection (accompanied with characteristic reflections) from the senseless and disgusting prescriptions of the doctors of former days, "distinguished by one or other of the grand characteristics, roughly definable as Costliness or Nastiness." The point, or, shall we say, the sting of the article is to be found, not in the recognition of the great advances made in the direction of science and common sense in the practice of medicine, but in the suggestion that "to our grandsons, half our modern nostrums . . . may possibly appear scarcely a degree less ridiculous than the Arcanum of Toads or the Mummiall Quintessence."

Passing to the next essay, we should be glad to believe that the question of the 'Fitness of Women for the Ministry of Religion' is one which "is likely soon to acquire importance." We fear that it is affected by deeply-rooted prejudices, which, while they are peculiarly unreasonable, may, perhaps, on that very account, be all the more difficult to get rid of. The good sense and sobriety of judgment with which the whole subject is discussed by Miss Cobbe ought to make its impression, and do something towards removing the hindrances which have prevented women from entering on a work for which, in many respects, they are especially qualified.

'The House on the Shore of Eternity' is a brief allegory, the interpretation of which is, perhaps, a little too immediately obvious. At the same time the analogy seems an imperfect one between the soul of man in this earthly life and a ship in the stocks, which the spectator takes to be a house most skilfully and ingeniously constructed, and yet perversely unsuited for a residence on *terra firma*. Its true nature and destination are, of course, discovered when the tide flows in and floats it away. The life of man, however, in its earthly stage, hardly corresponds to the ship which has as yet no function to fulfil. The idea of the *voyage* of life is as

beautiful and touching as it is old ; but it is the voyage begun in this life which carries us into the haven, or into unknown seas—an idea which has more of the truth of poetry and spiritual fact in it than has the newer allegory.

The paper from which the volume is named comes last, the title referring, of course, to the well-known lines which conclude one of Keats' finest sonnets. We do not feel inclined to discuss or analyse these closing pages, suggestive as they are of many reflections. They are full of tender and comforting thoughts about the great Transition, connected chiefly with the touching incidents which have been recorded as accompanying the last moments of earthly life, when the dying person has seemed to *see something* with "a sudden lighting up of the countenance, and a word or gesture of recognition," "a rapture of surprise or delight." Repudiating the idea of founding any *argument* for a future life on such occurrences—our faith in that life resting on independent grounds—Miss Cobbe regards them as suggesting, at least, the possibility that consciousness is not always lost, but is continuous through the passage from one life to another. Perhaps she draws the line a little arbitrarily, when she separates from all other classes of spiritual manifestations the cases in which those *just dying* have seen visions of the departed ; and there are many equally well authenticated accounts of the appearance, in visible form, of far absent friends, with no suggestion of any permanent separation of the soul from the body of either seer or seen. Whether such visions may be the creation of the brain under certain exceptional conditions, or whether they are due to a real spiritual presence which is not hindered by the material conditions of space, is a question the solution of which is at present in a very rudimentary state. Certainly there are no stories of these visions which we are more *willing* to believe than in those, the special and pathetic interest of which is here so touchingly and sympathetically shown, and which are on the side of the deepest longings and the brightest hopes which we approach the moment of crossing the borders of the Silent Land.

PROFESSOR KNIGHT'S EDITION OF WORDSWORTH'S POEMS.*

WE are at last to have, in fitting beauty of form, the complete and standard edition of Wordsworth's poems. In undertaking the duty of preparing it, Professor Knight has earned the gratitude of all true Wordsworthians. His task, though it could not but be a congenial one, was one which involved no little labour of a kind which might easily degenerate into drudgery, for one of its chief features is the collation of all the various editions published during the poet's life-time, from

* *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth*. Edited by WILLIAM KNIGHT LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Andrews. Vols. I. and II. Edinburgh: William Paterson. 1882.

the *Evening Walk*, of 1793, to the sixth collective edition of 1845, involving the labour of going through the earlier poems a dozen times, and the *Excursion* half a dozen times, with a single eye to the changes in the text, from the important and significant alterations, which have a real literary interest, down to the constantly recurring slight verbal amendments. The results of this collation are given at the foot of the page, on a simple and perspicuous plan, which enables the reader to see at a glance how the text originally stood, what was the date at which it was finally settled, and what intermediate changes, if any, may have been made in it. Thus to the opening line of the Sonnet Composed on the Beach near Calais—"It is a beautiful evening, calm and free,"—the note gives the date of 1807, with the following readings:—

Air sleeps,—from strife or stir the clouds are free,	1836.
A fairer face of evening cannot be,	1842.
It is a beautiful evening, calm and free,	1846.

(Returning to 1807.)

Those of us who are lucky enough to possess the original editions, say, of the *Lyrical Ballads* of 1793 and 1800, or the two volumes published in 1807, will not give up the pleasure of reading the poems in the form, both inward and outward, in which they originally appeared, and noting mentally, as they read, the passages which the author afterwards altered or rejected. But these precious little volumes are now among the prizes to be picked up on rare occasions, and at extravagant prices; and even those who have them will not the less, but rather the more, appreciate the value of the complete collation, the varied interest of which they have ascertained for themselves at first-hand, within a narrower range.

It is probable that the majority of readers will be surprised to find how frequently Wordsworth revised his poems, and how many alterations he made in them. Some of the pages of the new edition are pretty equally divided between the text and the various readings; and though this naturally happens oftenest in the *Evening Walk* and the *Descriptive Sketches*—those early and more conventional productions which the author might just as well have left as they were written, instead of laboriously endeavouring to assimilate them to his later style—it will also be found in the case of some of the *Lyrical Ballads*, and other early poems; and, at a later date, amongst other instances, *Peter Bell* was subjected to a careful, and, on the whole, an advantageous revision. We feel tempted to give some specimens in evidence of the interest and value of this part of Professor Knight's work, but we have not room for them here; and we shall probably return to the subject, when the future volumes have enabled us to take a more comprehensive view. One thing will certainly be made clear, that, contrary perhaps to the general impression, in the large majority of cases Wordsworth improved when he altered. There are instances, it is true, sometimes quoted as if

they were representative ones, in which the poet in his critical mood has done harm in retouching his first fresh work. But no reader of any critical discernment who would go through the twelve or thirteen hundred variations which are recorded in these two volumes alone, could hesitate to approve, on the whole, of the results of the poet's self-criticism, as embodied in his final readings.

There is no doubt that Professor Knight has done wisely in taking his text from the latest editions, and giving the previous readings in the foot-notes, rather than adopting the earliest form of the text, which would have been the only other admissible alternative. We should have thought that the third course, which he speaks of, as having required consideration, viz.: the production of an eclectic text, in which each poem should be given in the form which approved itself as the best to the editor's judgment, was out of court altogether. The special purpose of the collation, is to give the reader the means of judging for himself whether the poet's original work, or his afterthought, is the happier; and it would have greatly complicated matters to have had the editor's opinion always intervening. With regard to the choice between the text of the earliest and the latest editions, it seems to us only just to an author to give his works, in a standard edition, in the form which he himself finally settled, even if it were not, as in this case, so evidently the one to be on the whole preferred on its own merits.

The arrangement of the poems in chronological order (as they were written, of course, not as published) adds a new feature of interest, and was required in an edition designed especially for the study of the poet's art and the development of his genius. A complete list of the poems, with the dates of composition and of publication, is given; and it is interesting to learn from it, among other things, how much of Wordsworth's best known and finest work belongs to nearly the earliest period, written between his 28th and 37th years, and published in the *Lyrical Ballads*, which include the 'Lines written in 1793, a few miles above Tintern Abbey,' and in the *Poems* of 1807, amongst which are the 'Ode to Duty' (1805), and the 'Intimations of Immortality' (begun in 1803, and completed in 1806).

The edition will contain, of course, all the author's own printed notes and prefaces, and also the indispensable personal memoranda which he dictated, late in life, to his old friend Miss Isabella Fenwick. A selection only of these was given in the edition published by the poet's executors; and although they were printed *in extenso* in Dr. Grosart's edition of the *Prose Works*, they now appear for the first time in their proper place, in connection with the poems to which they severally refer. A new and very interesting source of information as to the circumstances under which many of the poems were written, extending often to minute detail, has happily been available in the form of the journals kept by Miss Wordsworth, at Grasmere, from 1800 to 1803. Professor Knight, in speaking of these journals at the Wordsworth Society's last meeting, said that they were "a singularly interesting record of 'plain living and

high thinking,'—of very plain living, and of very lofty thought, imagination, and feeling. They were the best possible commentary on the poems belonging to that period; because they showed the manner of life of the brother and the sister, the character of their daily work, the influences of Nature to which they were subjected, the homeliness of their ways, and the materials on which the poems were based, as well as the sources of their inspiration. . . . Miss Wordsworth's delineations of Nature in these daily jottings were quite as subtle and minute, quite as delicate and ethereal, as anything in her brother's poems. Above all, there was in these records a most interesting disclosure of Dorothy Wordsworth's friendship with Coleridge; and a very remarkable friendship it was." The editor has been allowed to use such portions only of these journals as serve the same general purposes of illustration as do the Fenwick notes; from a line or two indicating a date or locality, to a page of exquisite description of some scene, the essence of which was fixed on the spot or afterwards by the poet's art. It is to be hoped that these extracts, like those which were given in the Memoirs from Miss Wordsworth's *Recollections of the Tour in Scotland*, are only the precursors of the appearance of the complete record. We are glad to have many descriptive passages from these Scotch journals, also reprinted here, in connection with the poems which they illustrate; and Professor Knight, who is himself a chief authority on topographical matters connected with Wordsworth, has embodied in additional notes much of the information contained in his delightful book, '*The Lake District as Interpreted in the Poems of Wordsworth*.'

Certainly nothing more could well be asked for in the way of illustration than has been provided in these volumes. They give us the opportunity of studying the poet's mind and work in a way which he himself approved and encouraged; and if it should seem to us at first that poetry which deals, as Wordsworth's does, so simply and directly with the heart of nature and the inner life of human thought and affections, needs no such elaborate apparatus for its interpretation and enjoyment, we shall still find that there is scarcely a poem which has not been enriched by having some fresh and interesting association connected with it, and some more personal significance imparted to it.

We are promised, in the preface, "several poems or fragments of poems, hitherto unpublished." It is not mentioned what these are to be, and we can only hope that now at last we are to have that book of *The Recluse*, from which a quotation was made thirty-one years ago in the Memoirs, but which has been hitherto so unaccountably withheld from publication. It is not to be supposed that anything else of importance is still in manuscript; and among the pieces which had been dropped out of the later editions, or had been printed elsewhere and never included in them, perhaps the only ones of any real interest are the quaintly characteristic picture of 'Andrew Jones,' the pest of the village, which we may smile at, but be rather glad to recover; and the stanzas on the Glowworm, which, though less perfect than the others of the group of

poems referring to 'Lucy,' to which they belong, are not unworthy to be restored to the place from which they were unceremoniously dismissed, after appearing in one issue only.

The editor promises us a new Life of Wordsworth, and he is also preparing a bibliography of criticism, or critical estimates of the poet, which will, we hope, not be a mere index or reference list, but will briefly indicate, if possible, the character of such criticisms as are of any special interest. We hope also that all discoverable traces of the study of Wordsworth on the Continent will be registered; and specimens of any translations of his poems into other languages would be very welcome.

The two volumes already published (to be followed by six others) will require a careful list of additions to the various readings in the foot-notes, with a few other corrections, the possible sources of error in the collation not having been sufficiently guarded against. Fortunately the editor is now forewarned as regards the greater part of his task, and we may confidently reckon on the accuracy of what has yet to be done. In every point requiring judgment, discrimination, and an intimate knowledge of his subject, Professor Knight seems to us to have done his work as well as it could be done; and when it is completed it will be a worthy monument of the pure and lofty genius in whose honour it has been undertaken.

THE FACSIMILE REPRINT OF 'THE TEMPLE.' *

AN Introductory Essay by the author of 'John Inglesant' was enough to ensure the popularity of Mr. Unwin's facsimile of the original edition of George Herbert's Poems, even if the quaint and pretty little volume had not deserved success on its own account. It is reproduced as nearly as possible in the exact form in which it was given to the world, two centuries and a half ago, by the author's friend and brother, Mr. Nicholas Ferrar, of whom readers of 'John Inglesant' are not ignorant; a form which nearly resembles what is perhaps, as far as externals are concerned, the most desirable of the modern editions, the one printed at the Chiswick Press, and published by Mr. Pickering in 1850. The only fault to be found with it is that the binding, in imitation of the original "sprinkled sheep," is an ingenious counterfeit made of paper, which soon gives premature signs of wear at the edges and in the hinges. It is, however, an uncommonly good imitation of the old-fashioned style of cover; and the little book is altogether a very dainty quaint image of the original.

The few preparatory pages of Mr. Shorthouse's most delicate and

* *The Temple: Sacred Poems and Private Ejaculations.* By MR. GEORGE HERBERT. A New Edition, with Introductory Essay by J. HENRY SHORTHOUSE, Author of 'John Inglesant.' London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1892.

harmonious prose are very pleasant to read, and are suggestive of many thoughts which might carry us some distance from George Herbert. He has less to say in the way of literary criticism of the poet's work than he has of certain matters concerning religion and culture which suggest themselves to him in this connection. He writes of George Herbert, "the ascetic priest, who was also a fine gentleman, with his fine cloth, his cambric fall, and his delicate hands," as the type of that "exquisite refinement" which he considers to be "the peculiar gift and office of the Church" [of England]. "Just as *George Herbert*, when on his way to the music meeting in the Close of *Sarum*, hesitated not to soil his hands and clothes, 'usually so neat and clean,' in helping the man with the cart that had broken down, so this exquisite Church, delicate with the scent of violet and Lent-lily, and with the country places which God made and not man—eschewing alike the gaudiness of one ritual and the excitement and noise of other appeals to the uncultivated—still holds forth in town precincts and back alleys and courts this Gospel of refinement and sacred culture, apparently so alien to the people among whom its lot is cast."

This is very charmingly put, and there is much truth as well as beauty in it. But we should say that the Church does really preach first to the uncultivated a robustness if a less "exquisite" Gospel than this, where it wins its way to any good purpose,—a Gospel of purity and decency of living, of common honesty, of "righteousness, temperance and judgement to come." The refinement and culture which characterise the English Church are certainly not her exclusive possession. Those who are open to the influences of refinement and culture in all their workings in literature, art, and life, will be attracted to the Church which has assimilated so much that is gracious and beautiful and of fine literary and artistic quality. But it is claiming rather too much to say of the Church of England that she "has produced a culture unequalled in the world beside."

In the essayist's critical remarks on *The Temple*, there is much that is true and discriminating, as when he finely observes that Herbert's poetry is "the spiritual instinct of a human life consecrated to God amid the pleasures, the temptations, the pains, of the world's courts and cities." He seems to us, however, to be inclined to underrate its literary quality, only allowing that "here and there you meet with three or four lines of great felicity and melody of rhythm," and even this "seems the result of chance." Those "three or four" happy lines certainly occur a good deal oftener than is implied in the phrase "here and there." At the same time we may share Mr. Shorthouse's doubt whether *The Temple* will ever be popular again; while recognising in it "a strength of expression and a reality of feeling which will always ensure for it an audience fit, if few." His genial and thoughtful Introduction will be sure to send his readers to the Poems in the right mood to enjoy them and to find in them a new interest and charm.

GREIN AND WÜLCKER'S CORPUS OF ANGLO-SAXON POETRY.*

COMPARATIVELY few Englishmen have at all an adequate conception of the strength and grandeur of early English civilisation ; and probably nothing but a more widespread study of the Anglo-Saxon literature will finally dispel that strange illusion under the influence of which many otherwise intelligent persons still practically remain—that English history begins with the Norman Conquest ! What presented itself to us when children as a kind of chaotic preface which we wanted to skip (Alfred hanging in an unattached way in the middle of it, without antecedents or consequents) was in truth “the making of England,” and the more we become acquainted with the noble literature, so long and so unaccountably neglected by us, the more shall we become convinced that all the best and all the most permanent characteristics of the English character are already reflected there. We have no small satisfaction, then, in welcoming the first instalment of the long-expected new edition of Grein's *Bibliothek* of Anglo-Saxon poetry, and sincerely hope that it will be largely circulated and diligently studied in England as well as in Germany. It is in reality a new work, and, although the original *Bibliothek* bore in every part that unmistakable stamp of genius which never wears out, yet the progress made in Anglo-Saxon studies during the last quarter of a century is so great, and the opportunities of consulting the original MSS. which Wülcker has enjoyed are so extended, that the new work ought to mark a great advance upon the old one. At present, however, we can hardly judge of its execution, and it will doubtless be many years before the completion of the “glossary” will enable competent judges to form a definitive estimate of its merits. The present half-volume contains a few short poems, to which it may be inferred the editor assigns a high antiquity, and an accurate transcription of the MS. of *Béowulf*. The edited text of *Béowulf*, together with a number of minor but important poems and (presumably short) literary notices, will make up the second half-volume. Only those who have reached an advanced stage of proficiency—indeed, hardly any but experts—can read *Béowulf* in the text here provided, which makes it all the more to be regretted that the progress of the work is so extremely slow. When the restored text is published, we may, perhaps, be allowed to call attention to some of the claims of the great Anglo-Saxon epic upon the attention of modern English readers ; meanwhile we cannot resist the temptation of citing the passage in which the poet relieves by his gentle simile the horror of the scene when the giant sword, with which *Béowulf* has slain the monster, Grendel's mother, is eaten away by the hot and poisonous blood, and melts down to the hilt, “most like an icicle, when

* *Bibliothek der Angelsächsischen Poesie*. Von CHRISTIAN W. M. GREIN. Neu bearbeitet von RICHARD PAUL WÜLCKER. 1 Band. 1 Hälfte. Kassel. 1881.

that the Father loosens the frost-band, unwinds the wave-ropes—He who has power o'er times and o'er seasons, the true Creator."

P. H. W.

EWALD'S 'BOOK OF JOB.'

EWALD'S Commentary on Job, with translation,* well deserved to be included in the series of translations of the most important books on the Bible, which are given us by the Theological Translation Fund. The ingenuity of interpretation, so conspicuous and never-failing, and the clear head and systematising faculty required to trace the general scope of the argument of this difficult book, all possessed in so high a degree by Ewald, make this one of the most successful of his labours. That it is so may be seen by a glance at most of the writings on Job that have appeared since his, such as Hirzel, Renan (who says, "Il serait injuste d'oublier qu'après Schultens, c'est M. Ewald qui a le plus contribué aux progrès de l'exégèse du livre de Job"), Kuenen, and Samuel Cox. As an early work it is marvellous in boldness and novelty, and, perhaps, most of its new ideas have stood the test of time.

Mr. J. Frederick Smith has been engaged so long on the translation of Ewald's translations that he could safely be entrusted with this; and his work is generally well, sometimes surprisingly well done. At the same time, I cannot but say that some of his accepted rules of translation are, in my judgment, to be regretted, and differ considerably from Ewald's own. At the outset, the title is unfortunate. The book is not, in the intention of its author, a "a commentary with translation," but a "translation with a commentary" (*das Buch Ijob übersetzt und erklärt*). The fastidious care bestowed on the language, rhythm, and strophes of the translation, shows this to be the essential text of the work; it is intended to be self-sufficient, and the *explanation* (rather than "commentary") consists mainly of *pièces justificatives*. Mr. Smith says in his preface, "The translator has considered it his duty . . . to faithfully observe the fundamental principles on which the great interpreter of the Hebrew Scriptures performed his task of reproducing as closely as possible the minutest peculiarities of his Hebrew authors, even at the cost of German grammar and idiom. Real students of Ewald would not thank an English translator for the attempt to improve upon him." I cannot understand this, or if I do I think it the reverse of the truth. Nothing is more conspicuous in Ewald's Hebrew grammar and Biblical translations than his constant endeavour to rise above mere literal renderings, and to show what in idiomatic German is the sense of each Hebrew phrase. Thus here, in I. 1, "Ein Mann war in Lande Uss,

* *Commentary on the Book of Job, with Translation*. By the late Dr. G. H. A. VON EWALD. Translated from the German by J. Frederick Smith. (Theological Translation Fund Library. Vol. xxviii.) Williams and Norgate. 1882.

Ijob genannt," where the Hebrew is literally, "his name (being) Ijob;" and I. 5, "Also that Ijob *all die Zeit*," where the Hebrew has "all the days;" but a plurality of days being a *time* or *period*, the more familiar German idiom is preferred. And again, at the beginning of v. 5, we have *vajjehi* "and it was," "and it came to pass," a word essential in narrative when an adverb or dependent clause of time or place is prefixed to the principal verb (here the clause "when the days of the feast were gone by"), but to which nothing in any modern language corresponds; Ewald, therefore, omits it, and writes simply, "Doch wann die Tage, &c." When will our translators generally understand this, and cancel "And it came to pass" throughout the whole Bible? for the N. T. *καὶ ἐγένετο* is only the same Hebraism, reproduced in Greek through a slavishly literal system of translation. Now, as I cannot think that Ewald has sacrificed German grammar and idiom, so I do not believe that an English translator ought to renounce the attempt to produce really idiomatic English for Ewald's German. To quote Renan again: "Il me semble que les traducteurs entendent, en général, leurs devoirs d'une manière fort incomplète. On croit conserver la couleur de l'original en conservant des tours opposés au génie de la langue dans laquelle on traduit; on ne songe pas qu'une langue ne doit jamais être parlée ni écrite à demi." It is only in a slight degree that I think Mr. Smith's practice is open to these objections, which his principles, announced in the preface, have suggested; but he says (I. 3), "the man was greater than *all sons of the East*," where Ewald has "*alle Söhne des Ostens*," because the definite article is not usual in German after *alle*, which, however, gives the definite sense, so that the proper English would be "*all the sons*." That the translator has preserved, not only the rhythmic division of the verses into two or three lines, but the longer strophes of several verses, each as arranged by Ewald, is a matter of course; the reader unaccustomed to see the poetical books of the Old Testament printed thus will be struck by the new beauties thereby disclosed. But if Mr. Smith intentionally abandoned Ewald's rhythmical (iambic or trochaic) treatment of the lines, he should have given his reason for departing from his original in so important a point. It is the fact that Ewald's language is felt to be poetry that makes the frequently fanciful phraseology pass current without being called affected; the want of poetic rhythm may earn for the English some such reproach. Whether Job *should* be translated into verse is a different question—I should be inclined to say not—but this is a translation of Ewald, not of the original.

Of the merits of Ewald's exegesis of the book of Job, in regard to its general character, the development of its plot, the questions raised and discussed, and their final solution, some account ought to be given; but space fails me to indicate any of these except in the briefest manner. A certain excitement of spirit or enthusiasm pervades his treatment of the book, which has, perhaps, led him to overlook difficulties in the way of his preconceived conception, and has prevented others from always fol-

lowing him. Thus the idea that the discussion on the Divine government—in which Job's three friends maintain the traditional thesis that pain and misery are given in retribution for sin, so that, conversely, sin may be inferred where affliction is found, and Job denies the doctrine and asserts his own integrity—culminates in ch. xix., in Job's obtaining a vision of an immortality of the soul, which will solve the difficulty concerning the morality of the Divine government, is not accepted by Renan, Davidson, Kuenen, &c., and certainly seems seriously to derange the argument. This would be the solution, and no further discussion would be necessary; the poem would close here, and would be unique in the Old Testament in establishing at a far earlier date than can be *de facto* claimed for it, a belief among the Jews in the future life of the soul. Kuenen, with greater sobriety of judgment, says, "Ewald ascribes to Job and his friends a refinement in argument and a profundity of thought, of which, with the best will, one can discover very little in their speeches; moreover, the poet stands surely high as an artist, and need not be so very strongly idealised by Ewald." But the interpolation of all the speeches of Elihu (ch. xxxii.—xxxvii.) has been so ably proved by Ewald that scarcely any one now believes them to be genuine; their excision restores argument and beauty to the poem.

It may be that Ewald, with his love and profound knowledge of Arabic poetry, is tempted, like his predecessor Schultens, to ascribe too much of Arabic character to this poem, which is Arabic in the locality assigned to its persons, but otherwise essentially Hebrew in character. Still, even on this side he has done good service, *e.g.*, in discovering in the word חֲרֻבּוֹת III. 14 the original designation of the *pyramids*, and the native word, from which the Greek *πυραμίδας* was borrowed: "Kings . . . who built pyramids for themselves," in place of the meaningless "desolate places" or "ruins,"—a sense obtained from a Hebrew word.

R. M.

PROFESSOR PÜNJER'S 'THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT.'

IN his Preface to this first volume of an annual report on the Theological Literature of the Year,* Professor Pünjer, of Jena, the Editor, states that the object of the undertaking is to facilitate the formation of a general idea of the position of theological inquiry in every department. Students of theology, in whatever department, know how desirable it is to get such an idea, and will be grateful for any assistance which facilitates its acquirement. The names of the Editor of the above *Jahresbericht* and his collaborators sufficiently guarantee that abundant

* *Theologischer Jahresbericht*. Unter Mitwirkung von BASSELMANN, BENRATH, BÖHEINGER, DREYER, GASS, HOLTZMANN, LIPPJUS, LUDEMANN, SEYERLEN, SIEGFRIED, WERNER, herausgegeben von B. PÜNJER. Erster Band, enthaltend die Literatur des Jahres 1881. J. A. Barth, Leipzig, 1882.

learning, simple devotion to the truth, and an honest, outspoken judgment will be brought to bear upon its production. Our duty in this brief notice is simply to call attention to some of the features of the undertaking, which we believe will procure for it hearty support amongst the independent theological students of England. First, the various branches of theological literature have been assigned to the collaborators above enumerated, according to each man's special study. Professors Siegfried, Pünjer, Lipsius, and Seyerlen (all of Jena), review, for instance, the Literature of the Old Testament, Philosophy of Religion, Dogmatic Theology, and Ecclesiastical Politics, according as they respectively make one of these special branches of theology the study of their lives. In the next place, it is the aim of the review to be as complete as possible. It is true that in this first volume the theological literature of Germany only has been surveyed with anything approaching completeness; but the literature of other countries has been less fully dealt with, simply because in the case of quite a fresh undertaking of this kind, and with the limited funds at the disposal of German professors and German libraries, foreign books are not always to be obtained. As publishers generally hear of the work, defects of this kind will most likely be supplied in subsequent volumes. Again, it is evidently the aim of the Editor and his collaborators to preserve their review from the vice of representing one school of theology only as possessing any claim to a share in the important work of furthering the study of theology. Though these scholars all belong to the ranks of free and independent inquirers, they strive to be perfectly fair to scholars who occupy another theological position. Thus, for instance, Professor Lipsius warmly acknowledges the merits of Dörner's *Christliche Glaubenslehre*; and Dr. Werner knows how to appreciate the value of Kurtz's Church History in its newest edition. Other excellent features of the first volume of this review we must pass unnoticed. We sincerely trust the theological public of the world will support an undertaking which promises to supply a real want. The first volume is an excellent commencement of a very desirable work, and if it meets with the encouragement it deserves, the subsequent volumes are sure to be still more excellent.

J. F. S.

MR. SHARPE'S HISTORY OF THE HEBREW NATION.*

MR. SHARPE'S History needs no introduction to the readers of the *Modern Review*. The revered and lamented author was busy almost to the very end of his life with the studies of which the successive editions of this work have presented the results, and it is pleasant to think

* *The History of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature*. By SAMUEL SHARPE. Fourth Edition. London: Williams and Norgate. 1882.

of even his latest labours finding their permanent record here. The book is so intensely characteristic of the writer that as we look through its pages we seem to be once more in his presence, and the History seems to talk to us rather than offer itself to be read. The unwelcome task of the critic may surely be put aside. The book, like its author, seems to challenge assent to every proposition, but is in reality most tolerant of diverging opinions—one thing only is not to be endured and that is indifference. And it is here that we find the great merit of Mr. Sharpe's work. Its earnestness and sincerity demand attention, and it has been the means of rousing many a mind to independent thought and investigation. Mr. Sharpe's stubborn independence was pushed to an extreme which prevented his deriving from the works of other scholars as much help as he might otherwise have gained from them, and, as an inevitable consequence, prevented his having as much influence on them as he might otherwise have had; but the influence of his steady devotion, his genial warmth, and his fearless originality, will long be felt amongst those who knew him, and will itself be no mean monument to his fame.

P. H. W.

DR. STEBBINS' 'STUDY OF THE PENTATEUCH.'*

AS "the result of [his] own personal investigations, extending over a period approaching half a century," and at the request "of scholars, professors in theological schools, and ministers of different denominations," Dr. Stebbins has published a *Study of the Pentateuch*. This "study" is introduced by an attack on the Dutch school of Biblical critics (more especially as represented by Dr. Kuenen) in the shape of a running account and "refutation" of *The Religion of Israel*. Dr. Stebbins declares "the infallibility of the late Pio Nono was modestly compared with the dogmatic certainty with which [the Dutch critics] make affirmations upon subjects about which such scholars as Gesenius, Ewald, De Wette, to say nothing of others hardly their inferiors, hesitated to give an opinion, much less (*sic*) to dogmatise. The emphatic manner in which they announce as finalities some of the flimsiest of their speculations and hypotheses provokes a smile. There will be ample and frequent opportunity to illustrate this signal characteristic of the work under review [Kuenen's *Religion of Israel*] in the course of this essay" (pp. 7, 8). Such a beginning prepares us beforehand for a "plentiful lack" of sound argument and judicial impartiality; but it leaves us at a loss to understand how an ex-lecturer on Hebrew literature can have studied so lucid a writer as Kuenen, and can yet remain in ignorance of

* *A Study of the Pentateuch, for Popular Reading, &c., &c.* By RUFUS P. STEBBINS, D.D., formerly President, Lecturer on Hebrew Literature, and Professor of Theology in the Meadville Theological School. Boston: G. H. Ellis. 1881.

the very A B C of modern Biblical criticism, as expounded by that scholar and others. Dr. Stebbins, indeed, falls into errors which, when we consider the position he has held, suggest curious questions as to the demands made by the "Meadville Theological School" on her staff of professors.

Even so simple a matter as the technical use of the term historical "*tradition*," to signify the material that has come down to a writer from previous generations, takes Dr. Stebbins out of his depth, and he thinks he has caught Dr. Kuenen *flagrante delicto*, because he shows that a writer whom the latter describes as working up "*materials supplied by tradition*," had *written sources* on which to rely! (p. 11). Immediately after this (pp. 12, 13) Dr. Stebbins is equally pleased with himself because he finds it said in the Book of Chronicles that "the Levites were more upright in heart to sanctify themselves than the priests," a statement which he regards as fatal to a supposition he has seen good to attribute to Dr. Kuenen—viz., that the Chronicler's "purpose was to elevate the priesthood above the Levites." Here there is the grossest confusion. I am not aware that either Kuenen or any one else has ever attributed any such purpose to the Chronicler. Ezekiel, and the author of the Book of Origins did, indeed, labour hard and successfully to establish this distinction between priests and Levites, which had not previously been recognised; and the Chronicler, doubtless, wrote his history in conformity with the ideas and practices that had become prevalent in consequence of their efforts, and in the interests of the priestly and Levitical views of history; but he himself, living about two centuries after the introduction of the Law, and at a time when the elevation of the priests over the other Levites was no more challenged than the exclusive rights of the tribe of Levi itself, could have had no such purpose as Dr. Stebbins imagines Dr. Kuenen to attribute to him. In point of fact, the Chronicler's leaning towards the non-priestly Levites has been perfectly well noted and set forth by Kuenen and his school. Dr. Stebbins is simply beating the air.

But we are far from having sounded the depths of our author's misconceptions. By systematically ignoring the composite character of the Pentateuch, he produces the impression (it is not clear whether he means expressly to assert it [p. 21]), that Kuenen assigns *all* the narratives in the Pentateuch to a date at least as late as that of the Captivity. This is entirely untrue, and we have only to remember that Kuenen assigns the "Prophetic narratives" to the eighth century B. C. in order to see how completely Dr. Stebbins' argument collapses when he tries to show that the evidence of the earlier prophets reduces Kuenen's hypothesis to an absurdity. This assumption of the practical integrity of the Pentateuch, however, runs through the whole of our author's work, and he attempts to justify it on two grounds. What are they?

We are almost ashamed to remind our readers that recent criticism recognises, as one of the most important documents of the Pentateuch, a work generally called "The Book of Origins," which is partly narrative

and partly legislative, and is distinguished, amongst other characteristic marks, by a scrupulous avoidance of the use of the Divine name of *Yahweh* previous to the moment of its revelation to Moses (recorded in Ex. vi. 2, 3). After this point the name *Yahweh* is freely used, and the critic is dependent upon other characteristics of the document in separating it out from the composite whole through which it runs. Owing to the exclusive use of the word *Elohim* (God), and the avoidance of the name *Yahweh*, in the early portion of this work, it has frequently been called the "Elohistic Document." Now Dr. Stebbins takes hold of this name, says that Dr. Kuenen regards the use of *Elohim* as a "chief characteristic" of the author's style, and then triumphantly points to a series of passages—all of them *subsequent* to Ex. vi.—in which the use of the name *Yahweh* prevails, and which Kuenen nevertheless assigns to the "Elohistic" author! "This," he adds, "is sufficient to show the fallacy of the whole criticism; for, if the 'chief characteristic' of one of the theoretical documents is found to be almost universally used in the others in practice, either the theory or the practice is sadly at fault" (p. 71). This is almost incredible. The merest tyro who had heard a single popular lecture on the criticism of the Pentateuch could not have made such a blunder. Yet Dr. Stebbins gives it as the result of "a careful and most minute study"!

Our author's second reason for rejecting as entirely baseless the results of the critical dissection of the Pentateuch is almost equally astonishing. It rests on the want of agreement amongst critics as to the division of the books. Now the fact is that in this matter the almost absolute agreement of recent critics of very different schools, is one of the most encouraging phenomena on the field of Biblical investigation. This agreement is so remarkable that Dr. Robertson Smith, who regards the "Book of Origins" as the latest great stratum of the Pentateuch, is able to accept, as the basis of his argument, the list of passages assigned to that book by Nöldeke, who regards it as the earliest! But Dr. Stebbins does not know, or does not choose to know, anything of this, and thinks he has established his point by comparing Nöldeke's list with that of — Stähelin, as given in Parker's *De Wette*! On the strength of such arguments as these, the Pentateuch is treated as a single whole, and when Dr. Stebbins passes from criticising Kuenen to attempting an independent investigation into the age of the Pentateuch, every reference to a passage in Deuteronomy, the Book of the Covenant (Ex. xxi.—xxiii. 19), or, the Prophetic narratives is fearlessly accepted as evidence that the whole Law, as known and enforced by Ezra and Nehemiah, existed at the time when the reference was made. By this style of argument, backed by a good deal of equally valuable "internal evidence," Dr. Stebbins reaches the conclusion that nearly the whole of the Pentateuch was written in the age of Moses.

The publication of such a book is in itself a matter of very small interest or significance. In the long run matters of historical criticism are decided by a select committee of students, and "the public" simply

accepts their conclusions. A book, on a question *adhuc sub judice*, intended "for popular reading" may delay or accelerate the process of public enlightenment, but it will not affect the final result unless it can affect the judgment of students; and we find it difficult to suppose that Dr. Stebbins' work will give students of the Bible cause to reconsider any position assailed, or to feel more secure in any position defended by him. In itself, then, the book in no way merits the long notice we have given it. It is a bad specimen of a bad style of book. Those who agree with its conclusions will, if they are wise, regret its publication more than those who dissent from them. The fact, however, that it has been published by an "ex-Lecturer on Hebrew Literature and Professor of Theology," and at the request of "scholars" and "professors in theological schools," is one which invites more serious consideration than the book deserves on its own account. This must be the excuse for so long a notice.

P. H. W.

THE SYNOD OF ELVIRA.*

"THE City of Elvira for long has been a mere name; its very site is uncertain, matter only of inference and conjecture; and to the world of our own day the Synod to which the city gave its name is hardly more familiar." If this statement is incontestable it will not be amiss to say that Elvira, or Iliberris, was a city of the South of Spain, standing, there is good reason to believe, on the site of the modern Granada, though some place it on the hills four miles away; and that the council of Spanish bishops and clergy called after it met early in the fourth century, "primarily to restore order in the Church of Spain after its disturbance in the recent persecution." Strange that the canons of this council have come down to us without any hint, beyond their own internal evidence, as to the time when it was held; stranger still that historians have differed about the date by no less than five hundred years! Reasonable doubts, however, would seem to contract themselves within the more modest limits of a quarter of a century, and even these limits are still farther reduced by the fact that most writers bring the Synod into more or less intimate connection with the Diocletian persecution. Discarding the authority of almost all the great historians of the Spanish councils, Mr. Dale contends, with convincing force, that the Synod of Elvira must have been held, not during, but after the persecution, and places it accordingly in the early part of 806 A.D. In truth, the canons all through imply times of peace rather than of trouble. Some of them are directed against offences to which there could be no temptation when persecution was

* *The Synod of Elvira and Christian Life in the Fourth Century.* An Historical Essay. By ALFRED WILLIAM WINTERSLOW DALE, M.A. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

raging, and if one canon decrees a penalty for non-attendance at church, and another, to the scandal of the devout Catholic, prohibits paintings on the walls of churches, it follows that the Christians must have been, at the time, in quiet possession of their places of worship. Moreover, a principal figure at this council was Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, the statesman of the Church. Now, at no other time than that here assigned, could Hosius have been present. Not earlier, for we have his own testimony that he was a confessor when the persecution took place under Maximian. And not very easily later, for from the accession of Constantine, in July, 306—so we correct Mr. Dale, who (p. 41) inadvertently says 307—he would seem to have been closely absorbed in State affairs as private adviser to the Emperor. Thus the name of Hosius alone might seem to fix the date of the council with tolerable certainty, while in another respect his presence was of marked significance. Mr. Dale at least would have it believed that the convening of the Synod was the result of a policy which even then the far-sighted Churchman was pursuing—that of drawing together the antagonistic powers of Church and State and uniting them in permanent reconciliation. There can be no doubt, at any rate, that it aimed at the unity of the Church, and a uniform system of discipline.

But the chief interest of the decrees of this council lies in their bearings on the life of the time, and it is in this aspect that they are here for the most part discussed. "The fourscore canons of the Synod stereotype in outline a faithful picture of the Spanish Church as it existed in the early years of the fourth century; and although it is the dark and ignoble elements of thought and action that must inevitably preponderate in a representation of this nature, through the shadow and the shame of penal legislation we catch glimpses of a noble ideal, present then in aspiration and hope." It is this outline which Mr. Dale undertakes to fill in, and the picture which he presents to us may be profitably compared with that so powerfully drawn by Mr. Lecky in his *History of European Morals*. If any fault is to be found with Mr. Dale, it is that he is, perhaps, a little reluctant to acknowledge any influences, other than Christian, tending to mitigate the horrors of a time when even professing Christians could think themselves obliged, as State officials, to assist at human sacrifices, when ladies (Christians, too!) sometimes beat their slaves to death, and when there was a continual demand for bloodshed and slaughter. That such things were utterly at variance with the spirit of Christianity will be denied by no one, and the only point of difference can be as to the extent and nature of the influence exercised by the Church in attempting to suppress them. Mr. Dale complains that "Lecky, in his *History of Rationalism*, does scant credit to the exertions of the Church to put an end to these scandalous cruelties;" yet, in his later work, Mr. Lecky distinctly and exclusively ascribes to Christianity "the destruction of the Gladiatorial games" (*European Morals* i. 282). Indeed, on this point, Mr. Dale himself does not utter an altogether certain sound. As a Christian, he would no doubt wish to give all the credit to Christianity. As a Pro-

testant, is he not a little afraid of seeming to ascribe too much to methods which afterwards became identified with Rome? At any rate, he tells us, in regard to the evils of that age and the attempts made by the Synod of Elvira and other Synods to suppress them, that "it was all in vain; the penal law could not reach a disease which lay at the very heart of life, and would yield only to spiritual remedies." Is this, it may be asked, altogether true? The moral evils inherent in the Roman civilisation were not, of course, to be healed in a day, and they gave way at last only before the slow and gradual diffusion of those humaner principles which it will not be denied that Christianity was a chief agent in promoting; but the Church probably did the best that could be done at the time with the means at her disposal, and, after all, the penalties which she enforced—her only weapon was excommunication—were of the kind which are usually called "spiritual." However, we have no inclination to quarrel with Mr. Dale's views, which have evidently been thought out with great care, and are very moderately expressed; and on whatever points we might be inclined to differ from him, we have no hesitation in saying that he has produced an essay of more than ordinary value, and one which well deserves the attention of the historical student.

R. B. D.

DR. VANCE SMITH'S 'TEXTS AND MARGINS OF THE REVISED NEW TESTAMENT.'

THE publication of a second edition, in pamphlet form, of Dr. Vance Smith's useful notes on certain Texts and Margins of the Revised New Testament,* gives us an opportunity of mentioning them here for the benefit of those of our readers who are interested in the doctrinal questions which have been raised in connection with the revisers' work. It would be absurd to suppose that a theological system which has been formed in the course of so many centuries, and considered from every imaginable point of view by scholars and divines, could be upset or materially weakened by the correction of a few passages in the English translation of the original documents. At the same time, so long as those documents are appealed to in support of the popular doctrines of Christianity, it is interesting to see how far and in what way the "proof texts" have been affected by the changes which have been made by a body of picked scholars, and (for the most part) divines of the orthodox school, in either the Greek text or the English translation. The texts in question have been by this time pretty thoroughly discussed, the acceptance or rejection of the new version of them being almost

* *Texts and Margins of the Revised New Testament affecting Theological Doctrine briefly reviewed.* By G. VANCE SMITH, B.A., Theol. and Philos. Doct. Second edition. London: British and Foreign Unitarian Association, 37, Norfolk Street, Strand. 1882.

inevitably affected, to some appreciable extent, by the doctrinal prepossessions of the critic or reader. Dr. Vance Smith does not claim to be absolutely free from *bias* himself; but the fact that he does not expect to find only the language of his own theology in the words of Evangelist and Apostle, or even of Jesus himself, leaves him comparatively free from the temptation to decide, as a partisan rather than as an impartial judge, on questions of scholarship and criticism. At any rate, we think he has succeeded in making such a fair statement of the points which he discusses as to enable his readers (so far as a popular exposition will do so) to judge the case for themselves. While admitting his own liability to some bias, in spite of his desire to be impartial, he suggests, reasonably enough, that his fellow-members of the company of revisers may not have been absolutely secure from being influenced in certain cases by their theological opinions—a consideration which gives additional significance to such emendations as may be supposed to have gone against the grain and to have been made only under the compulsion of fidelity to their duty as scholars and interpreters. Oddly enough, Canon Cook, in his recently published work, *The Revised Version of the Three Gospels, considered in its Bearings on the Records of our Lord's Words, and the Incidents of His Life*, refers more than once to Dr. Vance Smith's remark as a reflection on the *orthodoxy* of the revisers, as though he had said that they may have been biased *in favour* of the readings which have pleased their unorthodox critics, and are condemned by Canon Cook! He speaks of it as "an imputation to be met by indignant repudiation, and refuted by substantial arguments." We are not concerned now to discuss Canon Cook's position, or to see further what he has to say about such of the disputed texts as come within the scope of his special treatise. In our next number we hope that Dr. Vance Smith will himself review Canon Cook's book, which appears to be written in the main to the same effect as the famous articles in the *Quarterly Review*, and Sir Edmund Becket's book which we noticed when it appeared.

Dr. Vance Smith's discussion of the selected texts is intended, not for scholars and experts so much as for ordinary readers, who can appreciate a simple and candid statement of the case. As good instances of his method, we may refer to his remarks, amongst other critical matters, on the marginal reading, "God only begotten," in connection with the doctrine of the Logos, on Phil. ii. 5—7 and the idea of the Divine humiliation, on the two texts translated by the revisers, "our God and Saviour Jesus Christ," on the different suggested renderings of Rom. ix. 5, and on "deliver us from the evil *one*." Dr. Vance Smith's method and results will not altogether satisfy the partisans of any system, orthodox or heterodox, of what is called, in a thorough-going and exclusive sense, "Scriptural Doctrine." His failure to do so may be reckoned among his credentials, and accepted as a testimony to the candour and common sense which he has brought to a discussion in which those faculties are too often conspicuous by their absence.

MR. BOULGER'S HISTORY OF CHINA. *

MR. BOULGER continues the long story he has to tell with the same plodding patience which characterised his first volume. The present instalment carries us down to the end of the eighteenth century, and covers the sixty years' reign of Kanghi, and the equally protracted sovereignty of his yet greater grandson, Keen Lung.

The figure of Keen Lung is unquestionably one of the most remarkable in the history of the world. Ascending the throne at twenty-five, in 1735, he assumed the government of 60,000,000 people: there seems no reason to doubt that the octogenarian Emperor held sway over a population of no less than 300,000,000. The six decades of his rule saw the establishment of a "scientific frontier" along the whole vast line of his western marches. His generals and his soldiers made his name a name of fear, not only to the milder populations further north, but even to the fierce and reckless Ghoorkas of Nepaul. It is worth noting, that one of the roots of the hatred of the Chinese mandarin for England lies in the belief that these savage marauders had British support in their wanton assault on the outlying populations of China. Keen Lung in his old age saw the successful achievement of the great scheme for the restraint of the mighty Hoangho within its banks. Like others of the nation's greatest rulers, he found time also for literary pursuits; and it was he who extorted from Voltaire the tribute—

Occupé sans relâche à tous les soins divers,
D'un gouvernement qu'on admire,
Le plus grand potentat, qui soit dans l'univers
Est le meilleur lettré qui soit dans son empire.

We look forward with exceeding interest to Mr. Boulger's third and last volume. No more competent narrator could tell the tale of the relations of the Western nations with China during the present century. We hope and believe that the narrative will be impartially related. In that case assuredly it will carry its moral on its front!

R. A. A.

PROFESSOR BIRKS AND MR. HERBERT SPENCER.

PROFESSOR BIRKS in his lectures on Modern Physical Fatalism,† undertook to refute the doctrines of Evolution as contained in Mr. Herbert Spencer's *First Principles*. It appears that Mr. Spencer, in an

* *History of China*. By DEMETRIUS CHARLES BOULGER. Vol. II. London: W. H. Allen and Co. 1882.

† *Modern Physical Fatalism and the Doctrine of Evolution*. By THOMAS RANSEN BIRKS, M.A., Prof. of Mor. Phil. Cambridge. Second edition. With a Preface in reply to the *Strictures of Mr. H. Spencer*. By C. PRITCHARD, D.D., F.R.S., Prof. of Astronomy in the University of Cambridge. London: Macmillan. 1882.

Appendix to his book, has dealt rather severely with these Lectures of Professor Birks', charging him with unfairness and misrepresentation, as well as with want of intellectual acumen. The Professor having been prevented by illness from replying, or indeed from knowing anything about Mr. Spencer's strictures, his friend Dr. C. Pritchard has undertaken his defence in some twenty pages prefixed to the new edition. It is generously done, and will serve to bring some of the controverted matters more distinctly before the reader. We confess, however, that Dr. Pritchard seems to us to have been more successful in clearing his friend from the charge of any conscious unfairness, than in vindicating his scientific accuracy of statement or his full appreciation of the matters in dispute.

WE have been obliged, from press of other matter, to postpone several notices of books which should have had place in this number. *Natural Religion*, by the author of *Ecce Homo*, we hope to treat at greater length than would in any case have been possible here, and we shall also have some account to give of Mr. Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*. We have received from America some books, published by Messrs. Houghton, Mifflin and Co., Mr. G. H. Ellis, and Messrs. Roberts Brothers, of Boston. These, with several other volumes which are on our table, must be reserved for future notice.

END OF VOL III.

